Diverse forms of constructivism can be found in the literature today. They exhibit a commonality regarding certain classical positions that they oppose – a unity in their negative identities – but a sometimes wild multiplicity and incompatibility regarding the positive proposals that they put forward. In particular, some constructivisms propose an epistemological idealism, with a concomitant relativism, while others are explicitly opposed to such positions, and move in multifarious different directions. This is a potentially confusing situation, and has resulted in some critics branding all constructivisms with the charge of relativism, and throwing out the baby with the bath water. In addition, since the epistemological foundations of even non-relativist constructivisms are not as familiar as the classical positions, there is a risk of mis-interpretation of constructivisms and their consequences, even by some who endorse them, not to mention those who criticize. Because I urge that some version of constructivism is an epistemological necessity, this situation strikes me as seriously unfortunate for philosophy, and potentially dangerous for the practice of education.

Key words: realism, idealism, empiricism, innatism, constructivism, relativism, representation, epistemology, scaffolding.

Excerpt: My purpose in this paper is to show that the two major options on which the current debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics relies, namely realism and empiricism (or instrumentalism), are far from being exhaustive. There is at least one more position available; a position which has been widely known in the history of philosophy during the past two centuries but which, in spite of some momentous exceptions, has only attracted little interest until recently in relation to the foundational problems of quantum mechanics. According to this third position, one may provide a theory with much stronger justifications than mere a posteriori empirical adequacy, without invoking the slightest degree of isomorphism between this theory and the elusive things out there. Such an intermediate attitude, which is metaphysically as agnostic as empiricism, but which shares with realism a commitment to considering the structure of theories as highly significant, has been named transcendentalism after Kant. Of course, I have no intention in this paper to rehearse the procedures and concepts developed by Kant himself; for these particular procedures and concepts were mostly adapted to the state of physics in his time, namely to Newtonian mechanics. I rather wish to formulate a generalized version of his method and show how this can yield a reasoning that one is entitled to call a transcendental deduction of quantum mechanics. This will be done in three steps. To begin with, I shall define carefully the word “transcendental,” and the procedure of “transcendental deduction,” in terms which will make clear how they can have a much broader field of application than Kant ever dared to imagine. Then, I shall show briefly that the main structural features of quantum mechanics can indeed be transcendentally deduced in this modern sense. Finally, I shall discuss the significance, and also the limits, of these results.

This paper reports on the Kuhnian revolution now occurring in neuropsychology that is finally supportive of and friendly to phenomenology – the “enactive” approach to the mind-body relation, grounded in the notion of self-organization, which is consistent with Husserl and Merleau-Ponty on virtually every point. According to the enactive approach, human minds understand the world by virtue of the ways our bodies can act relative to it, or the ways we can imagine acting. This requires that action be distinguished from passivity, that the mental be approached from a first person perspective, and that the cognitive capacities of the brain be grounded in the emotional and motivational processes that guide action and anticipate action affordances. It avoids the old intractable problems inherent in the computationalist approaches of twentieth century atomism and radical empiricism, and again allows phenomenology to bridge to neuropsychology in the way Merleau-Ponty was already doing over half a century ago.

Key words: occipital lobe, causal power, john benjamin, phenomenal consciousness, efferent activity.

An understanding of Piaget’s theoretical position on the knowing process is necessary in order to appreciate fully the impact of his research. His theory of knowledge has many significant points in common with that of the German philosopher Kant. This article sketches the epistemologies of the 17th and 18th century movements of rationalism, empiricism, and romanticism which preceded Kant, Kant’s revolutionary conclusions concerning reality and the knowing process, and some parallels and areas of divergence between the Kantian and Piagetian theories of knowledge

Instructional technology has typically been viewed as incorporating a systematic application of scientific principles of instruction to the learning environment. Within this framework, the focus has been on analysis, decision making, and evaluation regarding curriculum (what should be taught) and instruction (how one should teach). For most of its history, instructional technology has attempted to justify and verify its own basic assumption that both the processes of technology and the products of technology can help improve instructional effectiveness (Brody, 1984). Thus, an instructional design model (i.e., the systems approach to instruction) has predominated the field (Koetting, 1984). This article argues that, in spite of interest and aptitude, instructional designers have not yet come to grips with the tenets of constructivism. Rather, the field has been grounded in empiricism. An historical review of the research on instructional uses of media highlights such philosophical roots

Excerpt: In 1974… I wrote a chapter assembling some philosophical precedents and presenting my interpretation of Piaget’s theory. It was the first time the epithet “radical” was used. It was intended in the sense that William James had used in his radical empiricism, i.e., meaning “going to the roots” or “uncompromising.” I chose it because at the time many developmental psychologists were mentioning Piaget’s constructivism but without going into its epistemological implications. What they called construction seemed to refer to the fact that children acquire adult knowledge not all at once, but in small pieces. I did not think that this was a revelation and therefore called their approach “trivial constructivism.” It was clearly no way to gain the friendship of traditional psychologists but in the long run it did not do much harm.

Key words: experience, knowledge, Jean Piaget, Silvio Ceccato

Context: The idea to write this paper sprang up in a casual conversation that led to the question of how the word “experience” would be translated into German. Distinctions between the German “Erleben” and “Erfahren,” and their intricacies with “Erkennen” and “Anerkennen,” soon led to the conviction that this was a thread worth pursuing.  Problem: Much has been written about the nature of experience, but there is little consensus, to this day, regarding the role of consciousness in the process of experiencing. Although RC acknowledges the significance of tacit or sensorimotor knowledge in the individual’s practical operating, it cannot admit it as a basis to the formation of conceptual structures that, by definition, are conscious. Method: Drawing from our backgrounds in epistemology and psychology, and a shared interest in Piaget’s psychogenetic approach, we investigate the origins and development of human experience, in this case the mastery of space, time, causation, and object-permanency. We focus on how “noticeable encounters” are gauged, reflected upon, and ultimately worked through, consciously or unconsciously, by the “experiencer.” Results: A child’s abilities to enact a certain action pattern in a given situation no more demonstrates a re-presentation of the pattern than does recognition in the case of objects. In his studies with children, Piaget has shown that the Kantian categories of space, time object, and “causality” are co-constitutive of the child’s own motion – and its felt impact – as a means to make the world cohere. Of importance here are the concepts of “effective causality,” felicitous encounters, and agency. Implications: Understanding the circumstances under which some “lived” events, whether self-initiated or striking as if out of nowhere, become noticeable and able affect a person’s life is a daunting task. This joint essay is no more than a conversation-starter and an invitation to further explore the intricacies between agency and causation, sensation and cognition, and, yes, motions and emotions in the making of consciousness itself.

Key words: psychogenesis, space-time, effective causality, empiricism, Immanuel Kant, William James, Jean Piaget

Alan Watts (1915–1973) was a religious philosopher and interpreter of Zen Buddhism and Indian and Chinese philosophy to the West. Francisco Varela (1946–2001) was a biologist, a neuroscientist, and practitioner-scholar of IndoTibetan Buddhism. Watts and Varela share common interest in Buddhist and phenomenological approaches to human experience. In this article, I explore intersections of Watts and Varela regarding their phenomenologically grounded radical empiricisms, particularly: (1) embodied cognition; and (2) the specious present. This exploration is prefaced by establishing Watts’ phenomenological place in Humanistic Psychology, and delineating Varela’s neurophenomenological research agenda.

Key words: neurophenomenology, radical empiricism, embodiment, specious present, William James, Alan Watts, Francisco Varela

“New Realism” is more than just a catchphrase. It offers the opportunity to reconcile theoretical and methodological standpoints such as realism and constructivism, which have so far been irreconcilable. Ontologically, this occurs through the inclusion of objective reality and observer perspective (‘Sinnfeldontologie’), epistemologically it occurs through the broadening of the concept of empiricism and the reference to the mediality of perception and experience (‘documentality’). This is relevant to journalism and journalism research, because the relevance of reality in journalism is evident. However, this cannot be substantiated adequately through constructivism, although this theory is very popular within Media and Communication Studies. Moreover, the concept of reality is closely related to the concept of truth in journalism; the latter even being standardised by law. A ‘moderate realism’ or ‘soft constructivism’ can, therefore, theoretically substantiate this claim, and thus unify objective factuality and subjectively meant meaning.

Key words: Epistemology, methodology, constructivism, realism, truth

Psychologism is defined as “the doctrine that the laws of mathematics and logic can be reduced to or depend on the laws governing thinking” (Moran & Cohen, 2012 266). And for Husserl, the laws of logic include the laws of meaning: “logic evidently is the science of meanings as such [Wissenschaft von Bedeutungen als solchen]” (Husserl (1975) 98/2001 225). I argue that, since it is sufficient for a theory to be psychologistic if the empiricistic theory of abstraction is employed, it follows that neural networks are psychologistic insofar as they use this theory of abstraction, which I demonstrate is the case (Husserl (1975) 191/2001 120). It’s sufficient for psychologism because, according to Husserl, the theory in question reduces one’s phenomenological ability to intend types (or universals) to one’s past history of intending tokens (or particulars), usually amalgamated in some fashion (classically via associations; recently via autoencoders) (ibid; Kelleher, 2019). Similarly dynamical systems theory entails psychologism. For dynamical systems theory ties content to the temporal evolution of a system, which, according to Husserl, violates the fact that intentionality toward validities and objectivities does not pertain to “particular temporal experience[s]” (Husserl (1975) 194/2001 121). It follows that neither the species (neural networks), nor the genus (dynamical systems), can avoid psychologism and intend objects “in specie” (ibid). After critiquing these two approaches, I proceed to give an account based on the essentialist school of cognitive psychology of how we may intend objects “in specie” while avoiding the empiricistic theory of abstraction (Keil, 1989, Carey, 2009, Marcus & Davis, 2019). Such an account preserves the type-token distinction without psychologistic reduction to the temporal evolution of a dynamical system (Hinzen, 2006). This opens the way toward a truly unifying account of Husserlian phenomenology in league with cognitive science that avoids Yoshimi’s (2016) and neurophenomenology’s psychologistic foundation (herein demonstrated) and builds upon Sokolowski’s (2003) syntactic account of Husserlian phenomenology.

Key words: abstraction, neural networks, dynamical systems theory, husserl, psychologism, phenomenal features, empiricism