Diverse forms of constructivism can be found in the literature today. They exhibit a commonality regarding certain classical positions that they oppose – a unity in their negative identities – but a sometimes wild multiplicity and incompatibility regarding the positive proposals that they put forward. In particular, some constructivisms propose an epistemological idealism, with a concomitant relativism, while others are explicitly opposed to such positions, and move in multifarious different directions. This is a potentially confusing situation, and has resulted in some critics branding all constructivisms with the charge of relativism, and throwing out the baby with the bath water. In addition, since the epistemological foundations of even non-relativist constructivisms are not as familiar as the classical positions, there is a risk of mis-interpretation of constructivisms and their consequences, even by some who endorse them, not to mention those who criticize. Because I urge that some version of constructivism is an epistemological necessity, this situation strikes me as seriously unfortunate for philosophy, and potentially dangerous for the practice of education.
Bitbol M. (1998) Some steps towards a transcendental deduction of quantum mechanics. Philosophia Naturalis 35: 253–280. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/3658
Excerpt: My purpose in this paper is to show that the two major options on which the current debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics relies, namely realism and empiricism (or instrumentalism), are far from being exhaustive. There is at least one more position available; a position which has been widely known in the history of philosophy during the past two centuries but which, in spite of some momentous exceptions, has only attracted little interest until recently in relation to the foundational problems of quantum mechanics. According to this third position, one may provide a theory with much stronger justifications than mere a posteriori empirical adequacy, without invoking the slightest degree of isomorphism between this theory and the elusive things out there. Such an intermediate attitude, which is metaphysically as agnostic as empiricism, but which shares with realism a commitment to considering the structure of theories as highly significant, has been named transcendentalism after Kant. Of course, I have no intention in this paper to rehearse the procedures and concepts developed by Kant himself; for these particular procedures and concepts were mostly adapted to the state of physics in his time, namely to Newtonian mechanics. I rather wish to formulate a generalized version of his method and show how this can yield a reasoning that one is entitled to call a transcendental deduction of quantum mechanics. This will be done in three steps. To begin with, I shall define carefully the word “transcendental,” and the procedure of “transcendental deduction,” in terms which will make clear how they can have a much broader field of application than Kant ever dared to imagine. Then, I shall show briefly that the main structural features of quantum mechanics can indeed be transcendentally deduced in this modern sense. Finally, I shall discuss the significance, and also the limits, of these results.
Glasersfeld E. von (2005) Thirty Years Constructivism. Constructivist Foundations 1(1): 9–12. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2
Excerpt: In 1974… I wrote a chapter assembling some philosophical precedents and presenting my interpretation of Piaget’s theory. It was the first time the epithet “radical” was used. It was intended in the sense that William James had used in his radical empiricism, i.e., meaning “going to the roots” or “uncompromising.” I chose it because at the time many developmental psychologists were mentioning Piaget’s constructivism but without going into its epistemological implications. What they called construction seemed to refer to the fact that children acquire adult knowledge not all at once, but in small pieces. I did not think that this was a revelation and therefore called their approach “trivial constructivism.” It was clearly no way to gain the friendship of traditional psychologists but in the long run it did not do much harm.
Glasersfeld E. von & Ackermann E. K. (2011) Reflections on the Concept of Experience and the Role of Consciousness. Unfinished Fragments. Constructivist Foundations 6(2): 193–203. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/200
Context: The idea to write this paper sprang up in a casual conversation that led to the question of how the word “experience” would be translated into German. Distinctions between the German “Erleben” and “Erfahren,” and their intricacies with “Erkennen” and “Anerkennen,” soon led to the conviction that this was a thread worth pursuing. Problem: Much has been written about the nature of experience, but there is little consensus, to this day, regarding the role of consciousness in the process of experiencing. Although RC acknowledges the significance of tacit or sensorimotor knowledge in the individual’s practical operating, it cannot admit it as a basis to the formation of conceptual structures that, by definition, are conscious. Method: Drawing from our backgrounds in epistemology and psychology, and a shared interest in Piaget’s psychogenetic approach, we investigate the origins and development of human experience, in this case the mastery of space, time, causation, and object-permanency. We focus on how “noticeable encounters” are gauged, reflected upon, and ultimately worked through, consciously or unconsciously, by the “experiencer.” Results: A child’s abilities to enact a certain action pattern in a given situation no more demonstrates a re-presentation of the pattern than does recognition in the case of objects. In his studies with children, Piaget has shown that the Kantian categories of space, time object, and “causality” are co-constitutive of the child’s own motion – and its felt impact – as a means to make the world cohere. Of importance here are the concepts of “effective causality,” felicitous encounters, and agency. Implications: Understanding the circumstances under which some “lived” events, whether self-initiated or striking as if out of nowhere, become noticeable and able affect a person’s life is a daunting task. This joint essay is no more than a conversation-starter and an invitation to further explore the intricacies between agency and causation, sensation and cognition, and, yes, motions and emotions in the making of consciousness itself.
Alan Watts (1915–1973) was a religious philosopher and interpreter of Zen Buddhism and Indian and Chinese philosophy to the West. Francisco Varela (1946–2001) was a biologist, a neuroscientist, and practitioner-scholar of IndoTibetan Buddhism. Watts and Varela share common interest in Buddhist and phenomenological approaches to human experience. In this article, I explore intersections of Watts and Varela regarding their phenomenologically grounded radical empiricisms, particularly: (1) embodied cognition; and (2) the specious present. This exploration is prefaced by establishing Watts’ phenomenological place in Humanistic Psychology, and delineating Varela’s neurophenomenological research agenda.
Haarkötter H. (2017) Konstruktivismus oder „Neuer Realismus“? Zwei konkurrierende Ansätze der Welterklärung und ihre Bedeutung für Journalismus und Journalismusforschung. M&K Medien & Kommunikationswissenschaft 65(2): 294–312.
The ‘New Realism’ is more than just a catchphrase. It offers the opportunity to reconcile theoretical and methodological standpoints such as realism and constructivism, which have so far been irreconcilable. Ontologically, this occurs through the inclusion of objective reality and observer perspective (‘Sinnfeldontologie’), epistemologically it occurs through the broadening of the concept of empiricism and the reference to the mediality of perception and experience (‘documentality’). This is relevant to journalism and journalism research, because the relevance of reality in journalism is evident. However, this cannot be substantiated adequately through constructivism, although this theory is very popular within Media and Communication Studies. Moreover, the concept of reality is closely related to the concept of truth in journalism; the latter even being standardised by law. A ’moderate realism’ or ‘soft constructivism’ can, therefore, theoretically substantiate this claim, and thus unify objective factuality and subjectively meant meaning.
Mahoney J. (2004) What is constructivism and why is it growing? Review of the book Studies in Meaning: Exploring Constructivist Psychology. edited by J. D. Raskin & S. K. Bridges. Contemporary Psychology 49(3): 360–363.
This book attempts to clarify the meanings of constructivism and its variations. The reviewer notes that being a collection of papers presented at a North American gathering of specialists in personal construct psychology, the volume is uneven in its emphasis on the contributions of George Kelly and its relative neglect of such constructivists as Adler, Frankl, Hayek, and Piaget. Raskin touches on the insiders’ distinction made between constructivism and social constructionism. Social constructionists like Gergen have criticized radical forms of constructivism as being too “interiorized” and enamored with the self. McNamee offers a cogent critique of psychology’s penchant for classification and diagnosis, and Szasz reiterates the polemics he has now been offering for decades. Arvay makes a strong statement on the need to “put the heart back in constructivist research” (p. 201), and Hoskins elaborates that theme in a well-argued proposal for the use of synthetic and relational inquiry methods in such research. Shotter extends that invitation with a scholarly discussion of hermeneutics and Goethe’s delicate empiricism.
Matthews M. R. (1993) Constructivism and science education: Some epistemological problems. Journal of Science Education and Technology 2(1): 359–370. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/3003
The paper outlines the significant influence of constructivism in contemporary science and mathematics education and emphasizes the central role that epistemology plays in constructivist theory and practice. It is claimed that constructivism is basically a variant of old-style empiricist epistemology, which had its origins in Aristotle’s individualist and sense-based theory of knowledge. There are well-known problems with empiricism from which constructivism appears unable to dissociate itself.
Maturana and Varela have developed important theories about living systems (autopoiesis) and also about the brain/nervous system and cognition. These theories have strongly subjectivist implications leading to the view that our explanations and descriptions reflect the structure of the subject, rather than that of an objective world, and that we therefore construct the world which we experi¬ence. This paper analyzes Maturana’s ideas in terms of the main philosophical traditions – empiricism, idealism, and realism – showing that they are a blend of both realist and antirealist positions. It then provides a critique of Maturana’s radical subjectivism and argues that his theory is best seen as compatible with critical realism.
The aim of research in cognitive development is to understand the origins of human knowledge and to provide an account of cognitive change. Theorizing regarding these issues is rooted in the nativist–empiricist debate. This article traces changing views in that debate, from the beginnings of psychology, through the cognitive revolution, Piaget, and alternatives to Piaget, including nativism, Vygotskyan theory, and information-processing work. The last section presents current theorizing and outlines various modern versions of nativism, constructivism, and empiricism