Diverse forms of constructivism can be found in the literature today. They exhibit a commonality regarding certain classical positions that they oppose – a unity in their negative identities – but a sometimes wild multiplicity and incompatibility regarding the positive proposals that they put forward. In particular, some constructivisms propose an epistemological idealism, with a concomitant relativism, while others are explicitly opposed to such positions, and move in multifarious different directions. This is a potentially confusing situation, and has resulted in some critics branding all constructivisms with the charge of relativism, and throwing out the baby with the bath water. In addition, since the epistemological foundations of even non-relativist constructivisms are not as familiar as the classical positions, there is a risk of mis-interpretation of constructivisms and their consequences, even by some who endorse them, not to mention those who criticize. Because I urge that some version of constructivism is an epistemological necessity, this situation strikes me as seriously unfortunate for philosophy, and potentially dangerous for the practice of education.

Key words: realism, idealism, empiricism, innatism, constructivism, relativism, representation, epistemology, scaffolding.

Excerpt: My purpose in this paper is to show that the two major options on which the current debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics relies, namely realism and empiricism (or instrumentalism), are far from being exhaustive. There is at least one more position available; a position which has been widely known in the history of philosophy during the past two centuries but which, in spite of some momentous exceptions, has only attracted little interest until recently in relation to the foundational problems of quantum mechanics. According to this third position, one may provide a theory with much stronger justifications than mere a posteriori empirical adequacy, without invoking the slightest degree of isomorphism between this theory and the elusive things out there. Such an intermediate attitude, which is metaphysically as agnostic as empiricism, but which shares with realism a commitment to considering the structure of theories as highly significant, has been named transcendentalism after Kant. Of course, I have no intention in this paper to rehearse the procedures and concepts developed by Kant himself; for these particular procedures and concepts were mostly adapted to the state of physics in his time, namely to Newtonian mechanics. I rather wish to formulate a generalized version of his method and show how this can yield a reasoning that one is entitled to call a transcendental deduction of quantum mechanics. This will be done in three steps. To begin with, I shall define carefully the word “transcendental,” and the procedure of “transcendental deduction,” in terms which will make clear how they can have a much broader field of application than Kant ever dared to imagine. Then, I shall show briefly that the main structural features of quantum mechanics can indeed be transcendentally deduced in this modern sense. Finally, I shall discuss the significance, and also the limits, of these results.

Excerpt: In 1974… I wrote a chapter assembling some philosophical precedents and presenting my interpretation of Piaget’s theory. It was the first time the epithet “radical” was used. It was intended in the sense that William James had used in his radical empiricism, i.e., meaning “going to the roots” or “uncompromising.” I chose it because at the time many developmental psychologists were mentioning Piaget’s constructivism but without going into its epistemological implications. What they called construction seemed to refer to the fact that children acquire adult knowledge not all at once, but in small pieces. I did not think that this was a revelation and therefore called their approach “trivial constructivism.” It was clearly no way to gain the friendship of traditional psychologists but in the long run it did not do much harm.

Key words: experience, knowledge, Jean Piaget, Silvio Ceccato

Context: The idea to write this paper sprang up in a casual conversation that led to the question of how the word “experience” would be translated into German. Distinctions between the German “Erleben” and “Erfahren,” and their intricacies with “Erkennen” and “Anerkennen,” soon led to the conviction that this was a thread worth pursuing.  Problem: Much has been written about the nature of experience, but there is little consensus, to this day, regarding the role of consciousness in the process of experiencing. Although RC acknowledges the significance of tacit or sensorimotor knowledge in the individual’s practical operating, it cannot admit it as a basis to the formation of conceptual structures that, by definition, are conscious. Method: Drawing from our backgrounds in epistemology and psychology, and a shared interest in Piaget’s psychogenetic approach, we investigate the origins and development of human experience, in this case the mastery of space, time, causation, and object-permanency. We focus on how “noticeable encounters” are gauged, reflected upon, and ultimately worked through, consciously or unconsciously, by the “experiencer.” Results: A child’s abilities to enact a certain action pattern in a given situation no more demonstrates a re-presentation of the pattern than does recognition in the case of objects. In his studies with children, Piaget has shown that the Kantian categories of space, time object, and “causality” are co-constitutive of the child’s own motion – and its felt impact – as a means to make the world cohere. Of importance here are the concepts of “effective causality,” felicitous encounters, and agency. Implications: Understanding the circumstances under which some “lived” events, whether self-initiated or striking as if out of nowhere, become noticeable and able affect a person’s life is a daunting task. This joint essay is no more than a conversation-starter and an invitation to further explore the intricacies between agency and causation, sensation and cognition, and, yes, motions and emotions in the making of consciousness itself.

Key words: psychogenesis, space-time, effective causality, empiricism, Immanuel Kant, William James, Jean Piaget

Alan Watts (1915–1973) was a religious philosopher and interpreter of Zen Buddhism and Indian and Chinese philosophy to the West. Francisco Varela (1946–2001) was a biologist, a neuroscientist, and practitioner-scholar of IndoTibetan Buddhism. Watts and Varela share common interest in Buddhist and phenomenological approaches to human experience. In this article, I explore intersections of Watts and Varela regarding their phenomenologically grounded radical empiricisms, particularly: (1) embodied cognition; and (2) the specious present. This exploration is prefaced by establishing Watts’ phenomenological place in Humanistic Psychology, and delineating Varela’s neurophenomenological research agenda.

Key words: neurophenomenology, radical empiricism, embodiment, specious present, William James, Alan Watts, Francisco Varela

The paper outlines the significant influence of constructivism in contemporary science and mathematics education and emphasizes the central role that epistemology plays in constructivist theory and practice. It is claimed that constructivism is basically a variant of old-style empiricist epistemology, which had its origins in Aristotle’s individualist and sense-based theory of knowledge. There are well-known problems with empiricism from which constructivism appears unable to dissociate itself.

Key words: Constructivism, empiricism, epistemology, Aristotle, Galileo

Maturana and Varela have developed important theories about living systems (autopoiesis) and also about the brain/nervous system and cognition. These theories have strongly subjectivist implications leading to the view that our explanations and descriptions reflect the structure of the subject, rather than that of an objective world, and that we therefore construct the world which we experi¬ence. This paper analyzes Maturana’s ideas in terms of the main philosophical traditions – empiricism, idealism, and realism – showing that they are a blend of both realist and antirealist positions. It then provides a critique of Maturana’s radical subjectivism and argues that his theory is best seen as compatible with critical realism.

Key words: autopoiesis, cognition, epistemology, ontology, critical realism.

The aim of research in cognitive development is to understand the origins of human knowledge and to provide an account of cognitive change. Theorizing regarding these issues is rooted in the nativist–empiricist debate. This article traces changing views in that debate, from the beginnings of psychology, through the cognitive revolution, Piaget, and alternatives to Piaget, including nativism, Vygotskyan theory, and information-processing work. The last section presents current theorizing and outlines various modern versions of nativism, constructivism, and empiricism

Radical Constructivism has been criticized for its conception of epistemology, empiricism and for its operationalism. The article tries to clarify the constructionists arguments. The objections against Radical Constructivism are rejected by pointing out that the critics neglect the difference between cognitive-socially constructed worlds and reality as a domain independent from cognition. The misconception of the relation between worlds and reality leads them to a fundamental misunderstanding of experience, and of the functional relations within and between living systems, between science and reality.

Futurologists have proclaimed the birth of a new species, Machina sapiens, that will share (perhaps usurp) our place as the intelligent sovereigns of our earthly domain. These “thinking machines” will take over our burdensome mental chores, just as their mechanical predecessors were intended to eliminate physical drudgery. Eventually, they will apply their “ultra-intelligence” to solving all of our problems. Any thoughts of resisting this inevitable evolution is just a form of ‘‘speciesism,” born from a romantic and irrational attachment to the peculiarities of the human organism. Critics have argued with equal fervor that “thinking machine” is an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms. Computers, with their foundations of cold logic, can never be creative or insightful or possess real judgments. No matter how competent they appear, they do not have the genuine intentionality that is at the heart of human understanding. The vain pretensions of those who seek to understand mind as computation can be dismissed as yet another demonstration of the arrogance of modern science. Although my own understanding developed through active participation in artificial intelligence research, I have now come to recognize a larger grain of truth in the criticisms than in the enthusiastic predictions. But the story is more complex. The issues need not (perhaps cannot) be debated as fundamental questions concerning the place of humanity in the universe. Indeed, artificial intelligence has not achieved creativity, insight, and judgment. But its shortcomings are far more mundane: we have not yet been able to construct a machine with even a modicum of common sense or one that can converse on everyday topics in ordinary language. Page 199 The source of the difficulties will not be found in the details of silicon microcircuits or of Boolean logic. The basic philosophy that has guided the research is shallow and inadequate and has not received sufficient scrutiny. It is drawn from the traditions of rationalism and logical empiricism but has taken a novel turn away from its predecessors. This new “patchwork rationalism” will be our subject of examination. First, we will review the guiding principles of artificial intelligence and see how they are embodied in current research. Then we will look at the fruits of that research. I will argue that “artificial intelligence” as now conceived is limited to a very particular kind of intelligence: one that can usefully be likened to bureaucracy in its rigidity, obtuseness, and inability to adapt to changing circumstances. The weakness comes not from insufficient development of the technology but from the inadequacy of the basic tenets. But, as with bureaucracy, weaknesses go hand in hand with unique strengths. Through a reinterpretation and reformulation of the techniques that have been developed, we can anticipate and design appropriate and valuable uses. In conclusion, I will briefly introduce an orientation I call “hermeneutic constructivism” and illustrate how it can lead down this alternative path of design.