Despite its short historical moment in the sun, behaviorism has become something akin to a theoria non grata, a position that dare not be explicitly endorsed. The reasons for this are complex, of course, and they include sociological factors which we cannot consider here, but to put it briefly: many have doubted the ambition to establish law-like relationships between mental states and behavior that dispense with any sort of mentalistic or intentional idiom, judging that explanations of intelligent behavior require reference to qualia and/or mental events. Today, when behaviorism is discussed at all, it is usually in a negative manner, either as an attempt to discredit an opponent’s view via a reductio, or by enabling a position to distinguish its identity and positive claims by reference to what it is (allegedly) not. In this paper, however, we argue that the ghost of behaviorism is present in influential, contemporary work in the field of embodied and enactive cognition, and even in aspects of the phenomenological tradition that these theorists draw on. Rather than take this to be a problem for these views as some have (e.g. Block, J Philos 102:259–272, 2005; Jacob, Rev Philos Psychol 2(3):519–540, 2011; O’Brien and Opie, Philos 43:723–729, 2015), we argue that once the behaviorist dimensions are clarified and distinguished from the straw-man version of the view, it is in fact an asset, one which will help with task of setting forth a scientifically reputable version of enactivism and/or philosophical behaviorism that is nonetheless not brain-centric but behavior-centric. While this is a bit like “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” strategy, as Shaun Gallagher notes (in Philos Stud 176(3):839–8512019), with the shared enemy of behaviorism and enactivism being classical Cartesian views and/or orthodox cognitivism in its various guises, the task of this paper is to render this alliance philosophically plausible.
Barbaras R. (2002) Francisco Varela: A new idea of perception and life. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1(2): 127–132. https://cepa.info/4769
Connections among Varela’s theory of enactive cognition, his evolutionary theory of natural drift, and his concept of autopoiesis are made clear. Two questions are posed in relation to Varela’s conception of perception, and the tension that exists in his thought between the formal level of organization and the Jonasian notion of the organism.
Barrett N. F. (2015) Enactive theory and the problem of non-sense. Adaptive Behavior 23(4): 234–240. https://cepa.info/2472
Review of: Massimiliano Cappuccio and Tom Froese (eds.) Enactive cognition at the edge of sense-making: Making sense of non-sense. PalgraveMacmillan: Basingstoke, UK, 2014
de Carvalho L. L. & Kogler J. E. (2021) The enactive computational basis of cognition and the explanatory cognitive basis for computing. Cognitive Systems Research 67: 96–103.
The computational theory of cognition, or computationalism, holds that cognition is a form of computation. Two issues related to this view are comprised by the goal of this paper: A) Computing systems are traditionally seen as representational systems, but functional and enactive approaches support non-representational theories; B) Recently, a sociocultural theory against computationalism was proposed with the aim of ontologically reducing computing to cognition. We defend, however, that cognition and computation are in action, thus cognition is just a form of computing and that cognition is the explanatory basis for computation. We state that: 1. Representational theories of computing recurring to intentional content run into metaphysical problems. 2. Functional non-representational theories do not incur this metaphysical problem when describing computing in terms of the abstract machine. 3. Functional theories are consistent with enactive in describing computing machines not in a strictly functional way, but especially in terms of their organization. 4. Enactive cognition is consistent with the computationalism in describing Turing machines as functionally and organizationally closed systems. 5. The cognitive explanatory basis for computing improves the computational theory of cognition. When developed in the human linguistic domain, computer science is seen as a product of human socionatural normative practices, however, cognition is just an explanatory, not ontological, basis for computing. The paper concludes by supporting that computation is in action, that cognition is just one form of computing in the world and the explanatory basis for computation.
Excerpt: The papers collected in this special issue are written to further develop diverse aspects of human morality. On the one hand, they develop further the already existing foundation of enactive ethics, elaborating key concepts such as participatory sense-making and ethical know-how. They also navigate further into the relations between enactivism and neighboring ethical theories, such as care ethics, phenomenological and hermeneutical ethics, as well as relations with moral psychology and the social sciences. Yet, at the same time, this special issue intends to bring enactivism closer to applied ethics, that is, several papers in this issue investigate how enactivism can respond to contemporary ethical issues, such as environmental ethics and health care. The papers collected here tackle ethical aspects of enactive cognition on three main levels: 1. Some of the articles develop further already existing aspects and concepts of relations between ethics and enactivism, for example, by developing further the notion of ethical know-how. 2. A second way in which the contributed papers develop ethical aspects of enactive cognition is by engaging into a dialogue with other, neighboring domains of enactivism, including moral psychology and hermeneutics. 3. Finally, this special issue features contributions that apply enactive theory to specific moral problems, such as health care, the environment and social media.
Gallagher S. (2014) Pragmatic interventions into enactive and extended conceptions of cognition. Philosophical Issues 24(1): 110–126.
Clear statements of both extended and enactive conceptions of cognition can be found in John Dewey and other pragmatists. In this paper I’ll argue that we can find resources in the pragmatists to address two ongoing debates: (1) in contrast to recent disagreements between proponents of extended vs enactive cognition, pragmatism supports a more integrative view – an enactive conception of extended cognition, and (2) pragmatist views suggest ways to answer the main objections raised against extended and enactive conceptions – specifically objections focused on constitution versus causal factors, and the mark of the mental.
García D. M. (2013) Intelligent horses: A cybersemiotic perspective. ProQuest LLC (Dissertation), Ann Arbor MI USA. https://cepa.info/1065
Horses represent a billion dollar industry with an alarming incidence of accidents, mostly resulting from the incorrect use of horse-human communication protocols. This study found significant gaps in research with respect to how horses and humans communicate and learn together. To respond to this gap, this dissertation addresses the topics of communication, learning and cognition in horse-human interactions utilizing the cybersemiotic model developed by Danish philosopher of science Søren Brier. The cybersemiotic model is a transdisciplinary research platform that addresses knowledge creation from an objective and subjective vision of reality. At the center of the model is semiosis, the sign system and spheres of signification through which living beings create meaning and make sense of the world. The methodological tools used in the study include Gregory Bateson’s theories of non-verbal communication and learning, based on the second-order cybernetic science view, as well as Humberto Maturana’s theory of autopoiesis and Evan Thompson’s concept of enactive cognition. The role of the inner life and consciousness in horse–human interaction is analyzed through the phenomenological, pragmaticist philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce and his triadic conception of semiosis. The results of the study show the importance of constructing ethologically relevant communication protocols in equestrian activities, which also has implications in the larger question of ethics in the relationships of humans to non-human others and the ecology of the Earth at large. Relevance: Methodological tools used in the study include the biology of cognition, autopoiesis, second order cybernetics, and non-duality as expressed in the triadic semiosis of C.S. Peirce.
Georgeon O. L. & Ritter F. E. (2012) An intrinsically-motivated schema mechanism to model and simulate emergent cognition. Cognitive Systems Research 15–16: 73–92.
We introduce an approach to simulate the early mechanisms of emergent cognition based on theories of enactive cognition and on constructivist epistemology. The agent has intrinsic motivations implemented as inborn proclivities that drive the agent in a proactive way. Following these drives, the agent autonomously learns regularities afforded by the environment, and hierarchical sequences of behaviors adapted to these regularities. The agent represents its current situation in terms of perceived affordances that develop through the agent’s experience. This situational representation works as an emerging situation awareness that is grounded in the agent’s interaction with its environment and that in turn generates expectations and activates adapted behaviors. Through its activity and these aspects of behavior (behavioral proclivity, situation awareness, and hierarchical sequential learning), the agent starts to exhibit emergent sensibility, intrinsic motivation, and autonomous learning. Following theories of cognitive development, we argue that this initial autonomous mechanism provides a basis for implementing autonomously developing cognitive systems.
Gordon S. (2013) Psychoneurointracrinology: The embodied self. In: Gordon S. (ed.) Neurophenomenology and its applications to psychology. Springer, New York: 115–148.
This chapter introduces a psychoneurointracrine model of the embodied self and examines the interrelationship between psychological, neurological, and intracrinological processes forming a mind-brain continuum within the person. Psycho (psychological) refers to constructs variously referred to as psyche, self, soul, mind, and consciousness. Neuro (neurological) refers to the composition and reactions within the nervous system. Intracrine (intracrinological) refers to the intracellular biosynthesis of steroids, the binding of receptors, and the formation of enzymes that catalyze the creation of hormones within the cell. It is argued that self has neural correlates in the hypothalamic-pituitary-gonadal (HPG) and hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axes of the body, which are responsible for enactive engagement and the development of meaning through their connections to the higher-order functions of the brain. Two theories of enactive cognition explore this hypothesis: (1) the theory of psychoneurointracrine autopoiesis examines how the regulation of a steroid’s receptor is modulated by the person’s perception of experience, and (2) the theory of emergent global states explains how corticolimbic projections from the HPG-HPA axes integrate prereflective, autonomic, and subliminal experience in the development of meaning and emergence of self. This model depicts the growth-oriented dimension of the person or neurophenomenological self.
This paper argues that deciding on whether the cognitive sciences need a Representational Theory of Mind matters. Far from being merely semantic or inconsequential, the answer we give to the RTM-question makes a difference to how we conceive of minds. How we answer determines which theoretical framework the sciences of mind ought to embrace. The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 1 outlines Rowlands’s (2017) argument that the RTM-question is a bad question and that attempts to answer it, one way or another, have neither practical nor theoretical import. Rowlands concludes this because, on his analysis, there is no non-arbitrary fact of the matter about which properties something must possess in order to qualify as a mental representation. By way of reply, we admit that Rowlands’s analysis succeeds in revealing why attempts to answer the RTM-question simpliciter are pointless. Nevertheless, we show that if specific formulations of the RTM-question are stipulated, then it is possible, conduct substantive RTM debates that do not collapse into merely verbal disagreements. Combined, Sections 2 and 3 demonstrate how, by employing specifying stipulations, we can get around Rowlands’s arbitrariness challenge. Section 2 reveals why RTM, as canonically construed in terms of mental states exhibiting intensional (with-an-s) properties, has been deemed a valuable explanatory hypothesis in the cognitive sciences. Targeting the canonical notion of mental representations, Section 3 articulates a rival nonrepresentational hypothesis that, we propose, can do all the relevant explanatory work at much lower theoretical cost. Taken together, Sections 2 and 3 show what can be at stake in the RTM debate when it is framed by appeal to the canonical notion of mental representation and why engaging in it matters. Section 4 extends the argument for thinking that RTM debates matter. It provides reasons for thinking that, far from making no practical or theoretical difference to the sciences of the mind, deciding to abandon RTM would constitute a revolutionary conceptual shift in those sciences.