Wheeler M. (2017) The revolution will not be optimised: Radical enactivism, extended functionalism and the extensive mind. Topoi 36(3): 457–472. https://cepa.info/4689
Optimising the 4E (embodied–embedded–extended–enactive) revolution in cognitive science arguably requires the rejection of two guiding commitments made by orthodox thinking in the field, namely that the material realisers of cognitive states and processes are located entirely inside the head (internalism), and that intelligent thought and action are to be explained in terms of the building and manipulation of content-bearing representations (representationalism). In other words, the full- strength 4E revolution would be secured only by a position that delivered externalism plus antirepresentationalism. I argue that one view in 4E space – extended functionalism – is appropriately poised to deliver externalism but not antirepresentationalism. By contrast, in the case of a competing 4E view – radical enactivism – even if that view can deliver antirepresentationalism, its pivotal notion of extensiveness falls short of establishing externalism. These conclusions are justified via an examination of, and by responding critically to, certain key arguments offered in support of their view (and against extended functionalism) by the radical enactivists.
Zahidi K. & Myin E. (2016) Radically enactive numerical cognition. In: Etzelmüller G. & Twews C. (eds.) Embodiment in evolution and culture. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen: 57–71. https://cepa.info/7391
We deal with the general question of how culture affects cognition by looking at numerical cognition. After presenting radical enactivism, according to which contentful cognition arises only with the emergence of truth telling practices, we confront recent research about the origins of numerical cognition. We contest readings of some of the empirical data, according to which numerical cognition predates culture. We argue that REC-friendly interpretations of the data are not only possible but preferable, as they avoid the staunch theoretical problems which plague cognitivist readings.
Zaslawski N. (2017) “Dialectical Dance” and “Dialectical Star”: What Exactly Are We Talking About? Constructivist Foundations 13(1): 44–46. https://cepa.info/4390
Open peer commentary on the article “Enacting Enaction: A Dialectic Between Knowing and Being” by Sebastjan Vörös & Michel Bitbol. Upshot: In this commentary, though I agree with most of Vörös and Bitbol’s statements about Varela’s work, I ask the authors both for a clarification regarding their concept of dialectic and whether their understanding of this concept should lead us to accept their view according to which no further attempt to “find a theoretical fix […] to solve the mind-body problem” is needed (§26.
Zebrowski R. L. & McGraw E. B. (2021) Autonomy and openness in human and machine systems: Participatory sense-making and artificial minds. Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness 8(2): 303–323.
Within artificial intelligence (AI) and machine consciousness research, social cognition as a whole is often ignored. When it is addressed, it is often thought of as one application of more traditional forms of cognition. However, while theoretical approaches to AI have been fairly stagnant in recent years, social cognition research has progressed in productive new ways, specifically through enactive approaches. Using participatory sense-making (PSM) as an approach, we rethink conceptions of autonomy and openness in AI and enactivism, shifting the focus away from living systems to allow incorporation of artificial systems into social forms of sense-making. PSM provides an entire level of analysis through an overlooked autonomous system produced via social interaction that can be both measured and modeled in order to instantiate and examine more robust artificial cognitive systems.
Ziat M., Gapenne O., Lenay C. & Stewart J. (2006) Zoomable user interfaces: Ecological and enactive [Representations: External memory and technical artefacts]. In: Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on enactive interfaces. Association ACROE, Grenoble: 239–240. https://cepa.info/7196
In information visualisation, zoomable user interfaces (ZUI) were developed in order to navigate in a big information space. They have an infinite space and allow the manipulation of infinite pans and zooms but the main drawback is the risk of getting lost in the information space. Understanding how a human being perceived the scale changes and how he is living this “zoomable” experience will help to avoid the user disorientation when he manipulate this kind of interfaces. While basing on ecological and enactive theories, we will try to bring some elements of responses in order to understand the navigation in ZUI.
Ziemke T. (2011) Realism Redux: Gibson’s Affordances Get a Well-Deserved Update. Review of “Radical Embodied Cognitive Science” by Anthony Chemero. Constructivist Foundations 7(1): 87–89. https://constructivist.info/7/1/087
Upshot: Chemero provides a modern re-interpretation of Gibson’s ecological psychology and his affordance concept that is more coherent than the original and in line with antirepresentationalist, dynamical theories in embodied cognitive science. He argues for a radical embodied cognitive science, in which ecological and enactive approaches join forces against the more watered-down, mainstream embodied cognitive science that still maintains traditional commitments to representationalism and computationalism. He also defends a special version of realism, entity realism, which many constructivists might not find entirely convincing, but which is nevertheless more or less compatible with enactive theories of embodied cognition.
Zilio F. (2020) The body surpassed towards the world and perception surpassed towards action: A comparison between enactivism and Sartre’s phenomenology. Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy 28(1): 73–99. https://cepa.info/7796
Enactivism maintains that the mind is not produced and localized inside the head but is distributed along and through brain-body-environment interactions. This idea of an intrinsic relationship between the agent and the world derives from the classical phenomenological investigations of the body (Merleau-Ponty in particular). This paper discusses similarities and differences between enactivism and Jean-Paul Sartre’s phenomenology, which is not usually considered as a paradigmatic example of the relationship between phenomenological investigations and enactivism (or 4E theories in general). After a preliminary analysis of the three principal varieties of enactivism (sensorimotor, autopoietic and radical), I will present Sartre’s account of the body, addressing some key points that can be related to the current enactivist positions: perception-action unity, anti-representationalism, anti-internalism, organism-environment interaction, and sense-making cognition. Despite some basic similarities, enactivism and Sartre’s phenomenology move in different directions as to how these concepts are developed. Nevertheless, I will suggest that Sartre’s phenomenology is useful to the enactivist approaches to provide a broader and more complete analysis of consciousness and cognition, by developing a pluralist account of corporeality, enriching the investigation of the organism-environment coupling through an existentialist perspective, and reincluding the concept of subjectivity without the hypostatisation of an I-subject detached from body and world.
Øberg G. K., Normann B. & Gallagher S. (2015) Embodied-enactive clinical reasoning in physical therapy. Physiotherapy Theory and Practice 31(4): 244–252. https://cepa.info/6922
Clinical reasoning is essential in physical therapy practice. Instrumental approaches and more recent narrative approaches to clinical reasoning guide physical therapists in their understanding of the patient’s movement disturbances and help them to plan strategies to improve function. To the extent that instrumental and/or narrative models of clinical reasoning represent impairments as mere physical disturbances, we argue that such models remain incomplete. We draw on a phenomenologically inspired approach to embodied cognition (termed “enactivism”) to suggest that the dynamics of lived bodily engagement between physical therapist and patient contribute to and help to constitute the clinical reasoning process. This article outlines the phenomenologically informed enactive perspective on clinical reasoning, with special reference to clinical work that addresses impairments as sequelae of neurological diseases.