Buhrmann T. & Di Paolo E. (2015) The sense of agency: A phenomenological consequence of enacting sensorimotor schemes. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16(2): 207–236. https://cepa.info/7313
The sensorimotor approach to perception addresses various aspects of perceptual experience, but not the subjectivity of intentional action. Conversely, the problem that current accounts of the sense of agency deal with is primarily one of subjectivity. But the proposed models, based on internal signal comparisons, arguably fail to make the transition from subpersonal computations to personal experience. In this paper we suggest an alternative direction towards explaining the sense of agency by braiding three theoretical strands: a world-involving, dynamical interpretation of the sensorimotor approach, an enactive description of sensorimotor agency as contrasted with organic agency in general, and a dynamical theory of equilibration within and between sensorimotor schemes. On this new account, the sense of oneself as the author of one’s own actions corresponds to what we experience during the ongoing adventure of establishing, losing, and re-establishing meaningful interactions with the world. The meaningful relation between agent and world is given by the precarious constitution of sensorimotor agency as a self-asserting network of schemes and dispositions. Acts are owned as they adaptively assert the constitution of the agent. Thus, awareness for different aspects of agency experience, such as the initiation of action, the effort exerted in controlling it, or the achievement of the desired effect, can be accounted for by processes involved in maintaining the sensorimotor organization that enables these interactions with the world. We discuss these processes in detail from a non-representational, dynamical perspective and show how they cohere with the personal experience of agency.
Open peer commentary on the article “Music as Semiotic Eigenbehavior” by Douglas Walter Scott. Upshot: An alternative semiotics of music grounded in a neuropsychological framework is outlined. The purposes and effects of music listening are to modulate internal psychological states rather than to support externalized actions. Von Foerster’s eigenbehaviors are discussed in the context of self-constructing purposive percept-coordination-action systems and Piaget’s theory of equilibration.
Castorina J. A. (2010) La dialéctica en la psicologia del desarrollo: Relevancia y significación en la investigación [Dialectic in developmental psychology: Its importance and significance in research]. Psicologia: Reflexao e Critica 23(3): 516–524. https://cepa.info/4632
The present article analyses the signficance and relevance of dialectic in Piaget’s and Vigotsky’s psychological studies. On one hand, it highlights the common dialectical methodology present in units of analysis in research. On the other hand, it focuses on the peculiar features dialectic acquires within both authors’ explanation of psychological development. Lastly, a characterization of dialectic features based on previous analysis is introduced. The present article argues against the unique dialectic and its a priori features in Developmental Psychology and Human Sciences areas. It also justifies its diversity in relation to the subject matters under investigation as well as the existence of certain limits in the use of that category in empirical research. The use of dialectics requires the adoption of diverse forms regarding different issues and theoretical focuses.
Di Paolo E. A., Barandiaran X. E., Beaton M. & Buhrmann T. (2014) Learning to perceive in the sensorimotor approach: Piaget’s theory of equilibration interpreted dynamically. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8: 551. https://cepa.info/4799
Learning to perceive is faced with a classical paradox: if understanding is required for perception, how can we learn to perceive something new, something we do not yet understand? According to the sensorimotor approach, perception involves mastery of regular sensorimotor co-variations that depend on the agent and the environment, also known as the “laws” of sensorimotor contingencies (SMCs) In this sense, perception involves enacting relevant sensorimotor skills in each situation. It is important for this proposal that such skills can be learned and refined with experience and yet up to this date, the sensorimotor approach has had no explicit theory of perceptual learning. The situation is made more complex if we acknowledge the open-ended nature of human learning. In this paper we propose Piaget’s theory of equilibration as a potential candidate to fulfill this role. This theory highlights the importance of intrinsic sensorimotor norms, in terms of the closure of sensorimotor schemes. It also explains how the equilibration of a sensorimotor organization faced with novelty or breakdowns proceeds by re-shaping pre-existing structures in coupling with dynamical regularities of the world. This way learning to perceive is guided by the equilibration of emerging forms of skillful coping with the world. We demonstrate the compatibility between Piaget’s theory and the sensorimotor approach by providing a dynamical formalization of equilibration to give an explicit micro-genetic account of sensorimotor learning and, by extension, of how we learn to perceive. This allows us to draw important lessons in the form of general principles for open-ended sensorimotor learning, including the need for an intrinsic normative evaluation by the agent itself. We also explore implications of our micro-genetic account at the personal level.
Dykstra Jr. D. (2010) Radical Constructivism Has an Answer – But This Answer Is not an Easy One. Constructivist Foundations 6(1): 22–30. https://constructivist.info/6/1/022
Context: In spite of its advantages and its ability to make valid responses to objections, radical constructivism is not mainstream. Problem: Extolling the virtues of radical constructivism and responding logically to the objections does not work. We know this from the evidence of many attempts. Our theoretical stance, radical constructivism, also suggests this approach is not likely to have much influence on realists. We cannot transmit understanding in the signals with which we attempt to communicate. How can we in radical constructivism enable those outside of RC to understand our explanation of human knowing? Method: Examine our understanding of radical constructivism itself, because it is an explanation of how, why and under what circumstances people change their understandings of their experiential worlds. Results: We must find ways to direct the attention of others to situations that they cannot explain with their existing understanding of the world. Then we must create conditions conducive to their revising and testing new understandings for fit with the evidence of their experience. Implications: Since radical constructivism is a theory of human knowing, it tells us how humans develop knowledge, hence it is an answer to the questions central to this special issue. This answer is not one to be used to win in debates with realists. Radical constructivism gives us an answer to the problem of engaging realists in understanding our position, but strategies consistent with radical constructivism are not easily carried out. Developing and executing such strategies is the work at hand.
Fosnot C. T. (1993) Rethinking science education: A defense of Piagetian constructivism. Journal of Research in Science Teaching 30(9): 1189–1201. https://cepa.info/2947
O’Loughlin critiqued Piagetian constructivism and urged that science educators adopt a sociocultural constructivism in its place. The central thesis of this response is that Piaget’s revisions of his theory in the 10 years prior to his death offer a new model of equilibration that is contemporary and helpful as we rethink science education. Further, it is argued that decentering is an important human attribute – a necessary aspect of the scientific process. The sociocultural model is critiqued as nihilistic, culturally relative, and dangerous when placed in the context of real science classrooms.
Fuller R., Campbell T., Dykstra Jr. D. & Stevens S. (2009) College teaching and the development of reasoning. Information Age Publishing, Charlotte NC.
This book is an update of the workshop that introduced the work of Jean Piaget to the science teaching community in the U.S. The result of Robert Karplus’ introduction of Piaget’s theory and observations to the Physics community have resulted in the formation of a whole new sub-discipline named physics education research (PER). The theoretical underpinnings of Piaget’s theory of cognitive equilibration are described and contrasted with the work of Vygotsky. Piaget’s ideas spawned a number of Piagetian-based course programs in institutions of higher education in the U.S. which are described in the book. Examples of work in disciplines beyond the sciences from such programs are given.
Glasersfeld E. von (1980) The concept of equilibration in a constructivist theory of knowledge. In: Benseler F., Hejl P. M. & Koeck W. K. (eds.) Autopoiesis, communication, and society. Campus, Frankfurt/New York: 75–85. https://cepa.info/1352
At the end of my talk at the symposium in Paderborn, Humberto MATURANA raised the question of “goals.” The discussion that followed was not conclusive and the question, I felt, was left hanging in the air. Since it is an important question and particularly relevant to any theory of equilibration, I shall try to begin this written version of my talk by explaining the connections I see between the concepts of perturbation, equilibration, and goal-directedness.
Luger G. F. (2021) A constructivist rapprochement and an epistemic stance. Chapter 7 in: Knowing our world: An artificial intelligence perspective. Springer, Cham: 175–188. https://cepa.info/7278
EX: This chapter proposed a constructivist rapprochement to address the shortcomings found in the rationalist, empiricist, and pragmatist traditions. It was argued that a survival-based tension exists between the expectations of the perceiving agent and perceived information. The agent’s expectations can be characterized by Kant’s, Bartlett’s, or Piaget’s schemas that are either reinforced or recalibrated as new information is perceived. Friston (2009) refers to this phenomenon as free energy minimization; Piaget (1970) describes it as continuing to move towards a state of equilibration. A set of five assumptions and 8 follow-on conjectures were proposed to capture this active subject perception dialectic. The set of conjectures included characterizing the meta-concepts of knowledge, meaning, and truth.
Niaz M. (1992) From Piaget’s epistemic subject to Pascual-Leone’s metasubject: Epistemic transition in the constructivist-rationalist theory of cognitive development. International Journal of Psychology 27: 443–457.
The explanation of the transition from one epistemic theory to another is an important part of Piaget’s genetic epistemology. It is argued that this epistemic transition leads to a retrodictable orthogenetic tendency toward optimizing equilibration. The objective of this paper is to establish a relationship between Piaget’s epistemic subject and Pascual-Leone’s metasubject and to demonstrate that the postulation of the latter can be considered as an epistemic transition between two constructivist – rationalist theories, which leads to the development of a theory with greater explanatory power. Epistemic transition in this paper refers to a progressive problemshift (cf. Lakatos, 1970), between the theories of Piaget and Pascual-Leone. Piaget builds a “general model” by neglecting individual differences, that is, studies the epistemic subject, whereas Pascual-Leone by incorporating a framework for individual difference variables, studies the metasubject – the psychological organization of the epistemic subject. Empirical evidence is presented to demonstrate that Pascual-Leone’s theory of constructive operators is a model of the psychological organism (the metasubject), which is at work inside Piaget’s epistemic subject. Finally, it is concluded that the greater explanatory power of Pascual-Leone’s theory can be interpreted as an epistemic transition between Piaget’s epistemic subject and Pascual-Leone’s metasubject.