Context: The journal Constructivist Foundations celebrates ten years of publishing articles on constructivist approaches, in particular radical constructivism. Problem: In order to preserve the sustainability of radical constructivism and regain its appeal to new generations of researchers, we set up a new course of action for and with the radical constructivist community to study its innovative potential. This new avenue is “second-order science.” Method: We specify two motivations of second-order science, i.e., the inclusion of the observer, and self-reflexivity that allows second-order science to operate on the products of normal or first-order science. Also, we present a short overview of the contributions that we have collected for this inaugural issue on second-order science. Results: These six initial contributions demonstrate the potential of the new set of approaches to second-order science across several disciplines. Implications: Second-order science is believed to be a cogent concept in the evolution of science, leading to a new wave of innovations, novel experiments and a much closer relationship with current research in the cognitive neurosciences in particular, and with evolutionary and complexity theories in general.

Key words: Radical constructivism, second-order science, observer, self-reflexivity

Context: In this article we match machine learning (ML) and interactive machine learning (iML) with radical constructivism (RC) to build a tentative radical constructivist framework for iML; we then present a pilot study in which RC-framed iML is applied to assistive robotics, namely upper-limb prosthetics (myocontrol. Problem: Despite more than 40 years of academic research, myocontrol is still unsolved, with rejection rates of up to 75. This is mainly due to its unreliability - the inability to correctly predict the patient’s intent in daily life. Method: We propose a description of the typical problems posed by ML-based myocontrol through the lingo of RC, highlighting the advantages of such a modelisation. We abstract some aspects of RC and project them onto the concepts of ML, to make it evolve into the concept of RC-framed iML. Results: Such a projection leads to the design and development of a myocontrol system based upon RC-framed iML, used to foster the co-adaptation of human and prosthesis. The iML-based myocontrol system is then compared to a traditional ML-based one in a pilot study involving human participants in a goal-reaching task mimicking the control of a prosthetic hand and wrist. Implications: We argue that the usage of RC-framed iML in myocontrol could be of great help to the community of assistive robotics, and that the constructivist perspective can lead to principled design of the system itself, as well as of the training/calibration/co-adaptation procedure. Constructivist content: Ernst von Glasersfeld’s RC is the leading principle pushing for the usage of RC-framed iML; it also provides guidelines for the design of the system, the human/machine interface, the experiments and the experimental setups.

Key words: Machine learning, interactive machine learning, radical constructivism, assistive robotics, human-machine interaction, co-adaptation.

Upshot: Our commentators’ very constructive criticisms point out a number of weaknesses in the design of our experiment, and offer insight into how such weaknesses might have led to the poor results of the experiments. We summarize the suggestions, which point in a few precise directions, and outline how we will try to implement them in the near future.

Context: Perceptual presence is the experience wherein veridical objects are experienced as belonging to an observer-independent world. Problem: Experimental investigations of perceptual presence are rare. It may be that the standard conceptualizations of perceptual presence are not suitable for experimental operationalization. Method: Using the framework of constructivist grounded theory, three observational perspectives (engaged, near-ecological, and receptive) are employed to discern method-invariant phenomenological properties of perceptual presence. Inductive coding is used as a main analytical instrument. Results: Four phenomenological properties of perceptual presence are constructed: perceptually present objects (a) appear inexhaustible in the amount of modal detail they contain; (b) are experienced as a particular arrangement of lived space; (c) allow for some and preclude other bodily interactions; and (d) are marked by a specific feeling of coupling. Implications: Descriptions of lived experience of perceptual presence, in particular the structure of lived space, may further allow for the design of experiments that more precisely target individual properties of this phenomenon. Constructivist content: Perceptual presence is conceived of as one of the main properties of consciousness: it is the experience of objects as belonging to an observer-independent world. Phenomenological properties contributing to how this sense of veridicality is constructed are presented.

Key words: Perceptual presence, empirical phenomenology, grounded theory, artistic research, signal-contingent experience sampling, contemplative research.

Abstract: Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual “filling in,” visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception. Relevance: action; change blindness; consciousness; experience; perception; qualia; sensation; sensorimotor.

Previous results are reviewed and two series of experiments on learning are described, one carried out in the laboratory, and the other in educational institutions. Both series use ‘conversational’ systems which allow mental activities to be described in terms of dialogue and behaviour. Several types of result are reported: (a) the significance of understanding; (b) the existence of, and variations in, learning strategies; (c) the effect of matching and mismatching a teaching strategy to an individual’s learning strategy; (d) the nature and classification of cognitive style; and (e) transfer effects and ‘learning to learn.’ A theoretical basis is developed for a classification of learning styles.

Contemporary research on neuroscience and neuro-phenomenology opens in new and more complex models of interpretation regard- ing the phenomena that govern the development of knowledge and consciousness. In an interview with “Le Monde” in February 1999, Varela said, “from the age of 9 or 10, just one question nagged at me: how to understand the relationship between the body, so physical, so heavy, and the mind perceived as ephemeral, almost atmospheric”. This question is still recurrent and is expressed as a new paradigmatic model, able to explain, in terms of knowledge, the connection and the relation between the neuronal structure and the procedural knowledge; in other words, between neurophysiology and neuro-phenomenology. Which are, in this prospective, the interpretative approaches and the speculative developments? Besides, moving from these approaches, what kind of problem we will have to consider from a didactic point of view? Which rela- tionship exists between the encephalic reality and the phenomenological living body? These considerations, that investigate about the understanding of the relational nature of neural processes which regulate the evolu- tion of human consciousness/knowledge, find their roots and justification in the studies of J. Z. Tsien (in the neuro-physiological field) and of Varela & Thompson (in the neuro-phenomenological field). Tsien and his team, in a biomedical field and through combined and complex experiments, have developed an interesting theory on the basic mechanism by which the brain would be able to transform experience into memory. Clans of neurons involved in coding, they say, make a selection of experiences stored, giving a sense at the experience and transforming it into knowledge. From a different perspective, called Radical Embodiment, the problem of the relational nature of consciousness/knowledge is inves- tigated by Thompson and Varela. Their position is considered as a new approach to the study of neuroscience.

Key words: Neuro-phenomenology, Neuro-physiology of learning, Radical Embodiment, Neural code, Memory code.

Purpose: In the educational field a lack of focus on the process of arriving at a level of profound understanding of a phenomenon can be observed. While classical approaches in education focus on “downloading,” repeating, or sometimes optimizing relatively stable chunks of knowledge (both facts and procedural knowledge), this paper proposes to shift the center of attention towards a more dynamic and constructivist perspective: learning as a process of individual and collective knowledge creation and knowledge construction. The goal of this process is to profoundly understand a phenomenon in its multi-dimensionality and complexity and to reflect on the processes that have lead to this understanding. The issue we want to tackle in this paper is how this profound understanding can be brought about in a technology-enhanced learning environment. Method: Part 1 of this paper explores strategies of technology-enhanced knowledge sharing/creation in the field of higher education. Part 2 presents a successful blended learning scenario that illustrates the implementation of these learning strategies in a concrete course design. In this case study students are involved in active theory construction processes by conducting virtual experiments with a virtual organism. Part 3 elaborates on the epistemological implications of this case study. Findings: A constructivist framework for modes of knowing and modes of coming to know is developed. It is shown that – in order to reach a profound understanding of a phenomenon – it is essential to take into account the multi-facetted character of knowledge and to use the strategy of double-loop learning. Conclusion: This leads to an understanding of learning/teaching as a process of socio-epistemological engineering. Furthermore, the role of the teacher changes in such a constructivist setting of learning/teaching: Their primary task is to provide a “pedagogically (and technologically) augmented environment.” They are responsible for creating an atmosphere of collective knowledge construction and reflection. Beyond the role of a coach and moderator the teacher has to act as a facilitator or “enabler” for the (individual and collective) processes of double-loop learning.

Key words: blended learning, collaborative co-construction, collective learning, double-loop learning, e-learning, individual learning, knowledge construction, knowledge creation, organizational learning, socio-epistemological engineering, university teaching

The article by Froese, Gould and Seth is a survey rather than a commentary, dealing with the intertwined issues of the validity of first- person reports and of their interest for a science of consciousness. While acknowledging that experiential research has already produced promising results, the authors find that it has not yet produced ‘killer experiments’ providing a definitively positive answer to these two questions, and wonder what kind of experiment would allow it. Our response will address these two questions successively.

The well-known experiments of Nisbett and Wilson lead to the conclusion that we have no introspective access to our decision-making processes. Johansson et al. have recently developed an original protocol consisting of manipulating covertly the relationship between the subjects’ intended choice and the outcome they were presented with: in 79.6% of cases, they do not detect the manipulation and provide an explanation of the choice they did not make, confirming the findings of Nisbett and Wilson. We have reproduced this protocol, while introducing for some choices expert guidance to the description of this choice. The subjects who were assisted detected the manipulation in 80% of cases. Our experiment confirms Nisbett and Wilson’s findings that we are usually unaware of our decision processes, but goes further by showing that we can access them through specific mental acts. Relevance: This article shows the possibility and reliability of disciplined first-person descriptions.