Open peer commentary on the article “An Analysis Procedure for the Micro-Phenomenological Interview” by Camila Valenzuela-Moguillansky & Alejandra Vásquez-Rosati. Abstract: The target article presents a methodology of micro-phenomenological analysis that gives salience to the idea of researching as an intersubjective meaning-making process. While the methodology belongs to the so-called “first-person research methods,” in my commentary I address the questions of whether it is also part of the traditional qualitative methods and whether it is epistemologically consistent.

The article briefly describes the relatively young field of cognitive science dedicated to the research of lived human experience – the so-called phenomenological inquiry (or first-person research). It enumerates the reasons for the renewed interest in the study of experience and outlines the field’s relation to the rest of cognitive science. With the help of an example (phenomenology of thinking), the article attempts to illustrate the importance of systematic study of experience and addresses some open questions emerging from such an enterprise.

Key words: phenomenological inquiry, first-person perspective, experience, thoughts

The aim of the article is twofold. First, it aims to overview current empirical methods in the area of first-person research. Such a review cannot overlook epistemological and ontological issues, but must at the same time keep in mind methodological and almost technical nature of the problem. Empirical experience research is positioned within the frame of cognitive science and the overview of approaches and techniques of empirical phenomenology is presented, together with epistemological considerations. The second aim of the paper is concerned with the future of research in the discussed area. It suggests that in-depth, existentially liable introspection and self-inquiry should be considered as serious scientific research tools.

Key words: empirical phenomenology, first-person methods, cognitive science, mindfulness

Context: Philosophical and - more recently - empirical approaches to the study of mind have recognized the research of lived experience as crucial for the understanding of their subject matter. Such research is faced with self-referentiality: every attempt at examining the experience seems to change the experience in question. This so-called “excavation fallacy” has been taken by many to undermine the possibility of first-person inquiry as a form of scientific practice. Problem: What is the epistemic character and value of reflectively acquired phenomenological data? Can the study of experience, despite the excavation fallacy, rely on the act of reflection on lived experience and make sense and use of its results? Method: Through a philosophical discourse, informed by empirical first-person inquiry, we explore the experiential structure of the act of reflection and the formation of the corresponding belief about past experience. Results: We present a provisional first-person model of the experiential dynamics of retrospective reflection, in which the reflective act is characterized as enaction of belief about past experience that co-determines - rather than distorts - its results. From a constructivist perspective on the inevitable interdependence between the act of observing and the observed, the excavation “fallacy” is recognized as an intrinsic characteristic of reflection. Reflection is described as an iterative, self-referential process, guided by a context- and subject-specific horizon of expectations. Implications: Knowing the characteristics of the formation of beliefs about experience is essential for understanding first-person data and for the possibility of their acquisition and use in scientific practice, particularly in the context of second-person approaches to the study of experience. Constructivist content: We relate the proposed understanding of reflection to constructivist epistemology and argue that constructivism provides an epistemological foundation for the empirical study of experience more suitable than the traditional epistemological objectivism of cognitive science. We suggest that the constructive nature of the process of reflection calls for a collaboration between the fields of constructivism, phenomenology, and first-person research, and points towards the potential for their mutual enrichment.

Key words: Reflection, enaction, constructivism, past experience, excavation fallacy, second-person methodology

Recent decades have seen a development of a variety of approaches for examining lived experience in the context of cognitive science. However, the field of first-person research has yet to develop a pragmatic epistemological framework that would enable researchers to compare and integrate – as well as understand the epistemic status of – different methods and their findings. In this article, we present the foundation of such a framework, grounded in an epistemological investigation of gestures involved in acquiring data on experience. We examine the acts of turning towards one’s experiential field and attending to experience within the process of reflection. We describe what we call the horizon of attending to experience by analogy to the “experimental arrangement” in quantum observation: this horizon, we argue, co-defines experiential phenomena that end up being observed and reported; at the same time, it itself forms an element of experience and is therefore amenable to phenomenological investigation. Drawing on the constructivist notion of enaction, we show that acknowledging the inherently constructive nature of attending to experience and accepting one’s lack of epistemic access to the “original”, observation-independent pre-reflective experience is not a dead end for first-person research when situated in a constructivist (but not relativist) understanding of the reflective act and its results. Expanding the notion of the horizon to encompass all epistemic acts involved in producing phenomenological data and final results of a first-person study (i.e., horizon of the method), we suggest some lines of inquiry that would allow researchers to identify and articulate horizons of particular methods, opening a way towards integrating past and future findings of different complementary first-person approaches into a comprehensive map of lived experience.

Key words: first-person research, empirical phenomenology, epistemology, methodology, reflection, enaction, constructivism.

The present article discusses shared epistemological characteristics of two distinct areas of research: the field of first-person inquiry and the field of quantum mechanics. We outline certain philosophical challenges that arise in each of the two lines of inquiry, and point towards the central similarity of their observational situation: the impossibility of disregarding the interrelatedness of the observed phenomena with the act of observation. We argue that this observational feature delineates a specific category of research that we call the non-trivial domain. Unlike the trivial domain, non-trivial research cannot assume the view from nowhere on which the observed phenomena could be regarded as existing independently of the process of observation. Presenting first-person inquiry and quantum mechanics as two of its examples, we show that non-trivial research violates several fundamental observational presuppositions of the trivial domain, exemplified in the principles of classical physics. Drawing on Niels Bohr’s philosophy of quantum mechanics and the constructivist notion of enaction, we stress the constructive, participatory, and irreversible nature of observation in the non-trivial domain. We discuss the possibility of developing a non-representationalist epistemology of the non-trivial, and consider the implications of our discussion for research in the non-trivial domain, as well as for the general understanding of the scientific inquiry.

Key words: non-trivial research, first-person research, quantum mechanics, niels bohr, enaction, constructivism.

The article highlights some of the parallels encountered in the areas of mindfulness and first-person scientific approaches to research into consciousness. It thus considers the possibilities of using mindfulness as a scientific method in the area of cognitive science. We are well aware that both first-person research approaches in cognitive science and mindfulness as a type of Buddhist practice are intertwined with certain conceptual frameworks. This calls for a careful consideration of their individual characteristics, which may gain completely different meanings outside of their primary contexts. Since the concept of mindfulness has been a part of Western thinking for some time now, especially in the area of therapy, we believe it is necessary for a critical reflection on the possibilities of both of these areas to inspire each other. We touch upon some of the important epistemological and methodological questions, and point out some of the problems common to both empirical first-person research and Buddhist methods of contemplation of experience. More specifically, this work examines the problem of limited scope of insight, the subject-object split and excavation fallacy, the problem of researching everyday experience, and the issue of horizon. We also consider the question of research intention in both science and Buddhism. The conclusion gives some suggestions as to how these two areas might mutually benefit one another. We also point out the ethical aspects that Buddhism might contribute to scientific research, and the open-endedness that science could contribute to Buddhism and other spiritual practices.

Key words: mindfulness, phenomenology, first-person research, ethics, cognitive science

Abstract: Addressing the methodological issues raised by the commentators, I argue that the disagreement among them regarding the optimal method to gather phenomenal data (micro-phenomenology or descriptive experience sampling) points to the constructive nature of consciousness. Then, I discuss the idea of naturalistic cognitive science (i.e., cognitive science that is relatively free of laboratory constraints. I conclude that if we are to engage in naturalistic first-person research, we must embrace methodological pluralism in order to (a) contend with the constructive nature of consciousness; and (b) account for demand characteristics.

Context: Among the many theories of pain, the biopsychosocial explanation of pain remains the most established in medicine. However, the three components are unevenly represented, with emphasis on the biological component. From this perspective the experience of pain may considered as an epiphenomenon. Problem: I empirically investigated the characteristics of pain (especially chronic pain) and investigated how these characteristics relate to existing conceptualizations of pain. Method: A case-study approach was used to demonstrate different ways of understanding and describing pain. Case-study data were collected by two co-researchers through a series of clinical and research-focused phenomenological interviews with eleven people experiencing chronic pain. The aim of the analysis was to explore and evaluate empirical support for the 5E theory of pain. Results: The findings point to the insufficiency of the biopsychosocial approach to understanding pain and support a qualitatively different approach to its investigation. The enactivist and phenomenological approach, and the “horizons of attending to experience,” may open new perspectives on pain perception. Implications: Enactivism and phenomenology offer important theoretical advancements. A shift away from biological or biologically oriented approaches (e.g., biomedical and biopsychosocial models) is necessary to better understand the complexity of first-person experience of chronic pain. The shift is needed because of the complex and overwhelming nature of (chronic) pain, which cannot be described by (any) three components. However, understanding the process of constant interaction between somebody in pain and herself, and with her environment, meaning understanding the dynamic of how pain is embodied, embedded, enacted, extended and emotive, can bring a new level of understanding of pain and patients who suffer. “Horizons of attending to experience” are an additional offering for the holistic approach to understanding patients in pain, and to facilitate better coping. Constructivist content: When studying phenomena of consciousness such as pain, an enactivist and phenomenological approach should be considered, consistent with the constructivist approach.

Key words: 5E, chronic pain, enaction, first-person research, horizon of attending to experience, subject-object integration

Context: Phenomenology and the enactive approach pose a unique challenge to dream research: during sleep one seems to be relatively disconnected from both world and body. Movement and perception, prerequisites for sensorimotor subjectivity, are restricted; the dreamer’s experience is turned inwards. In cognitive neurosciences, on the other hand, the generally accepted approach holds that dream formation is a direct result of neural activations in the absence of perception, and dreaming is often equated with “delusions.” Problem: Can enactivism and phenomenology account for the variety of dream experiences? What kinds of experiential and empirical approaches are required in order to probe into dreaming subjectivity? Investigating qualities of perception, sensation, and embodiment in dreams, as well as the relationship between the dream-world and waking-world requires a step away from a delusional or altered-state framework of dream formation and a step toward an enactive integrative approach. Method: In this article, we will focus on the “depth” of dream experiences, i.e., what is possible in the dream state. Our article is divided into two parts: a theoretical framework for approaching dreaming from an enactive cognition standpoint; and discussion of the role and strategies for experimentation on dreaming. Based on phenomenology and theories of enactivism, we will argue for the primacy of subjectivity and imagination in the formation of lived experience. Results: We propose that neurophenomenology of dreaming is a nascent discipline that requires rethinking the relative role of third-, first- and second-person methodologies, and that a paradigm shift is required in order to investigate dreaming as a phenomenon on a continuum of conscious phenomena as opposed to a break from or an alteration of consciousness. Implications: Dream science, as part of the larger enterprise of consciousness and subjectivity studies, can be included in the enactive framework. This implies that dream experiences are neither passively lived nor functionally disconnected from dreamers’ world and body. We propose the basis and some concrete strategies for an empirical enactive neurophenomenology of dreaming. We conclude that investigating dream experiences can illuminate qualities of subjective perception and relation to the world, and thus challenge the traditional subject-object juxtaposition. Constructivist content: This article argues for an interdisciplinary enactive cognitive science approach to dream studies.

Key words: Dreaming, enaction, first-person research, consciousness, neurophenomenology.