The classical formulation of the object of ethics refers to a knowledge of the rules of the adaptation of the human species to their natural environments, to normative expectations supposed in the others and to the biographical evolution of the self. Accordingly, a doctrine of the duties was edified on three pillars, embracing a reference to the duties towards nature, towards the others and towards oneself. Notwithstanding the fact that human action obeys to a variety of factors including bio-physiological conditions and the dimensions of the social environment, ancient and modern metaphysical models of ethics favored the commendatory discourse about the predicates “right” and “wrong,” concurring to ultimate goals. The ethical discussions consisted chiefly in the investigation of the adequacy of the subordinate goals to the final ends of the human action or in the treatment of the metaphysical questions related to free will or determinism, the opposition of the intentionality of the voluntary conduct of man to the mechanical or quasi-mechanical responses of the inferior organisms or machines. From a “second order” approach to the ethical action and imperatives, I propose with this book a critical analysis of the metaphysical and the Kantian ethics. Relevance: In “Ethics and Second-Order Cybernetics” (1992) Heinz von Foerster referred the importance of the application of his notion of “second-order cybernetics” to ethics and moral reasoning. Initially, second-order cybernetics intended an epistemological discussion of recursive operations in non-trivial machines, which were able to include in their evolving states their own self-awareness in observations. The application of his views to ethics entails new challenges. After H. von Foerster essay, what I mean with “second-order ethics is an attempt to identify the advantages of the adoption of his proposal, some consequences in the therapeutically field and lines for new developments.

Key words: Ethics, moral discourse, commendations, second-order cybernetics, observer, objectivity

Most of Shaun Gallagher’s Enactivist Interventions into philosophical issues about the mind are quite effective, but there are a few that could be improved. In what follows, we attempt to make two of Gallagher’s arguments more convincing. Our focus will be on Gallagher’s use of Francisco Varela’s “threefold distinction in temporal and dynamical registers” (Gallagher 2017, 8; Varela 1999). Gallagher uses this threefold distinction to address issues concerning what he calls the “causal-constitution fallacy” and issues concerning neuroscientific findings and free will. Gallagher is less convincing than he could be when he addresses these issues, because although he invokes Varela’s threefold distinction, he does not also provide a detailed story about how these “temporal and dynamical registers” relate to one another. We will provide a counter-intuitive, but empirically well-supported story about how the registers relate to one another, and, in so doing, improve upon Gallagher’s.…

From the introduction: We will argue that OCD patients testify to the general condition that exercising an increased conscious control over actions can in fact diminish the sense of agency rather than increase the experience of freedom. Referring to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty we argue that conscious control and deliberation may be useful when the natural flow of action is disturbed: for instance when a necessary tool is broken or missing or when one learns a new skill. However, deliberation itself may also disturb the flow of unreflective action. Too much deliberation on and analysis of one’s unreflective, habitual actions may cause insecurity and even a breakdown of what was once ‘second nature’. We introduce three different ways in which too much deliberation can have negative effects on patients with OCD, rendering them even more unfree.

Key words: Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, free will, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, conscious control, phenomenology

This article shows that the concept of choice is central to Isaiah Berlin’s liberalism. It argues that his valuing of choice is anchored in a particular conception of human nature, one that assumes and presupposes free will. Berlin’s works sketch a metaphysics of choice, and his reluctance to situate himself openly in the debate on free will is unconvincing. By introducing the theory of autopoiesis, this article further suggests that there is a way to take Berlin’s value pluralism seriously, by considering sets of values as autopoietic conscious systems. Drawing on the works of Maturana and Varela in biology and Luhmann in sociology, autopoiesis strengthens value pluralism and acts as a critique of liberalism. By putting objectivity in parenthesis, autopoiesis finally allows for value systems to coexist side by side in a stronger sense than Berlin’s liberalism ever could.

Key words: autopoiesis, isaiah berlin, choice, free will, niklas luhmann.

Von Bertalanffy stated that, at a certain threshold of complexity – namely when numerous forces are simultaneously interacting – systems” dynamics belong to a class other than causal mechanism, whether linear or circular. My objective here is to develop Von Bertalanffy’s point and to sort out a class of systems, the multilevel web, in which various forces or subsystems interact simultaneously within and across levels. Webs thus exhibit dynamical evolution through the cooperation and co-evolution of processes. I focus on two instances of multilevel web – the human mind, and small groups of people and show that cognitive webs demonstrate creative self-organization, as well as plural self-reference and free-will. I argue that, in multilevel webs, the variety and the complexity of forces interacting simultaneously instantiate inter-influences between connected elements/processes, so complex that they render causality irrelevant as a formalism. Webs’ inter-influences are fundamentally non deterministic, and they reach beyond causal mechanisms. However, simpler mechanisms such as linear cause-effects and circular causality may exist as component processes, enmeshed in the ensemble of interactions of the more complex system. In the first and second sections I present cognitive and social webs and sort out their properties.

Key words: Self-organization, self-reference, autopoiesis, multilevel webs, inter-influences

The problems associated with a really conscious decision do not disappear by mixing determination with a touch of coincidence. Both must enter into a higher unity. In so doing it will emerge that a certain degree of freedom of choice (or free will) is just as omnipresent as consciousness – an inherent part of reality itself. Relevance: This paper unites aspects of radical constructivism, non-dualism and first-person approaches to explain freedom of choice by a broader definition of consciousness.

Key words: free will, consciousness, perception, choice, decision, freedom

Can we trace back consciousness, reality, awareness, and free will to a single basic structure without giving up any of them? Can the universe exist in both real and individual ways without being composed of both? This metaphysical dialogue founds consciousness and freedom of choice on the basis of a new reality concept that also includes the infinite as far as we understand it. Just the simplest distinction contains consciousness. It is not static, but a constant alternation of perspectives. From its entirety and movement, however, there arises a freedom of choice being more than reinterpreted necessity and unpredictability. Although decisions ultimately involve the whole universe, they are free in varying degrees also here and now. The unity and openness of the infinite enables the individual to be creative while this creativity directly and indirectly enters into all other individuals without impeding them. A contrary impression originates only in a narrowed awareness. But even the most conscious and free awareness can neither anticipate all decisions nor extinguish individuality. Their creativity is secured. Relevance: This article includes major constructivist concepts like operational closure and openness, individual and alternating perception, creativity, and a non-dualistic theory of everything.

Key words: consciousness, distinction, free will, reality, individuality, intersubjectivity, identity, awareness

When phenomenal experience is examined through the lens of physics, several conundrums come to light including: Specificity of mind–body interactions, feelings of free will in a deterministic universe, and the relativity of subjective perception. The new biology of “emotion” can shed direct light upon these issues, via a broadened categorical definition that includes both affective feelings and their coupled (yet often subconscious) hedonic motivations. In this new view, evaluative (good/bad) feelings that trigger approach/avoid behaviors emerged with life itself, a crude stimulus-response information loop between organism and its environment, a semiotic signaling system embodying the first crude form of “mind.” Emotion serves the ancient function of sensory-motor self-regulation and affords organisms – at every level of complexity – an active, adaptive, role in evolution. A careful examination of the biophysics involved in emotional “self-regulatory” signaling, however, acknowledges constituents that are incompatible with classical physics. This requires a further investigation, proposed herein, of the fundamental nature of “the self” as the subjective observer central to the measurement process in quantum mechanics, and ultimately as an active, unified, self-awareness with a centrally creative role in “self-organizing” processes and physical forces of the classical world. In this deeper investigation, a new phenomenological dualism is proposed: The flow of complex human experience is instantiated by both a classically embodied mind and a deeper form of quantum consciousness that is inherent in the universe itself, implying much deeper – more Whiteheadian – interpretations of the “self-regulatory” and “self-relevant” nature of emotional stimulus. A broad stroke, speculative, intuitive sketch of this new territory is then set forth, loosely mapped to several theoretical models of consciousness, potentially relevant mathematical devices and pertinent philosophical themes, in an attempt to acknowledge the myriad questions – and limitations – implicit in the quest to understand “sentience” in any ontologically pansentient universe.

When we meet a professional fortune-teller who promises to use his art to reveal our future, we generally have mixed feelings. On the one hand, the idea appeals to us that someone can look into our future by looking at our hands and relying on a determinism that is inscrutable for us but decipherable by him. On the other hand, we resist the idea that we are determined, explainable, and predictable beings. We cherish our free will and want to be beyond determinism. But at the same time, we want the doctor to cure our diseases by treating us as structurally determined systems. What does this tell us? What relation is there between our organic being and our behavior? Our purpose in this chapter and the next ones is to answer these questions. To this end we shall begin by examining more closely how we can understand a behavioral domain in all its possible dimensions.

The notions of prediction and retrodiction, and the role they play in the natural sciences, are discussed. These notions derive from our perception of the fundamental category of time, as an ordering scheme for our experiential world. The issue of philosophical determinism vs. human free will is examined from a perspective of radical constructivism, and contrasted with the issue of solipsism vs. shared experience; and it is argued that both philosophical determinism and solipsism may be rejected, on the same (existential, not logical) grounds. Both prediction and retrodiction are discussed, in the context of some sciences (notably, classical and quantum physics), and are shown to be realisable only to a very limited extent. Some consequences of this, for the ability of science to forecast what will happen in the future, or to infer what has happened in the past, are reviewed. It is concluded that scientific knowledge, of both the past and the future, is (and must be) constructed in the present, based on presently observed data and theoretical arguments. Hence there can be no conception of true knowledge, either of the future or of the past.