This paper summarizes recent attempts by this author to create a transdisciplinary, non-Cartesian and non-reductionistic framework for information studies in natural, social, and technological systems. To confront, in a scientific way, the problems of modern information technology where phenomenological man is dealing with socially constructed texts in algorithmically based digital bit-machines we need a theoretical framework spanning from physics over biology and technological design to phenomenological and social production of signification and meaning. I am working with such pragmatic theories as second order cybernetics (coupled with autopolesis theory), Lakoffs biologically oriented cognitive semantics, Peirce’s triadic semiotics, and Wittgenstein’s pragmatic language game theory. A coherent synthesis of these theories is what the cybersemiotic framework attempts to accomplish.

Key words: cybersemiotics, information science, second order cybernetics, autopoiesis, triadic sign

Excerpt: I want to show how important Uexküll’s Umwelt idea was for Konrad Lorenz ethology, how Maturana and Varela’s autopoietic concept of cognitive domain is an attempt to give a modern second order cybernetic and functionalistic development of important aspects of Uexküll’s idea with its biological theory of the observer in a general system’s evolutionary framework. Interestingly, Luhmann extended this theory into the social and linguistic domain, making it the foundation of a general theory of communication and cognition. But even this cybernetics theory of the living system’s cognition and communication do not have a true phenomenological theory of signification/semantics, which was immanent in Uexküll’s concept. Hence I work to unite second order cybernetics with Peirce’s pragmaticist semiotics within the area of biosemiotics, combining them with Wittgenstein’s language game theory and Lakoff s cognitive semantics in order to make a new transdisciplinary framework for information, cognitive, and communication sciences. I call this new framework Cybersemiotics.

An instance of fruitful cross-disciplinary contacts is examined in detail. The ideas involved include (1) the double-bind hypothesis for schizophrenia, (2) the critique of game theory from the viewpoint of anthropology and psychiatry, and (3) the application of concepts of communication theory and theory of logical types to an interpretation of psychoanalytic practice. The protagonists of the interchange are Gregory Bateson and the two mathematicians Norbert Wiener and John von Neuman; the date, March 1946. This interchange and its sequels are described. While the interchanges between Bateson and Wiener were fruitful, those between Bateson and von Neumann were much less so. The latter two held conflicting premises concerning what is significant in science; Bateson’s and Wiener’s were compatible. In 1946, Wiener suggested that information and communication might be appropriate central concepts for psychoanalytic theory – a vague general idea which Bateson (with Ruesch) related to contemporary clinical practice. For Bateson, Wiener, and von Neumann, the cross-disciplinary interactions foreshadowed a shift in activities and new roles in society, to which the post-World War II period was conducive. Von Neumann became a high-level government advisor; Wiener, an interpreter of science and technology for the general public; and Bateson, a counter-culture figure.

Our perceptual systems are products of evolution and have been shaped, in part, by natural selection. It is widely assumed that natural selection favors veridical perceptions – that is, perceptions that accurately describe aspects of the objective world relevant to fitness. This assumption has been tested using the mathematics of evolutionary game theory. It is false. Monte Carlo simulations reveal that veridical perceptions are never more fit, and generically are less fit, than nonveridical perceptions of equal complexity that are tuned to fitness. Veridical perceptions go extinct, and their extinction rate increases as complexity increases. These results motivate a new theory of perceptual systems – as species-specific interfaces shaped by natural selection to hide objective reality and guide adaptive behavior. For Homo sapiens, space-time is the desktop of the interface and physical objects are icons on the desktop. The shapes and colors of physical objects no more resemble objective reality than the shapes and colors of desktop icons resemble files in a computer.

Key words: evolution, natural selection, evolutionary game theory, perception, bayesian inference, veridical perception, illusion.

Marr proposed that human vision constructs “a true description of what is there”. He argued that to understand human vision one must discover the features of the world it recovers and the constraints it uses in the process. Bayesian decision theory (BDT) is used in modern vision research as a probabilistic framework for understanding human vision along the lines laid out by Marr. Marr’s contribution to vision research is substantial and justly influential. We propose, however, that evolution by natural selection does not, in general, favor perceptions that are true descriptions of the objective world. Instead, research with evolutionary games shows that perceptual systems tuned solely to fitness routinely outcompete those tuned to truth. Fitness functions depend not just on the true state of the world, but also on the organism, its state, and the type of action. Thus, fitness and truth are distinct. Natural selection depends only on expected fitness. It shapes perceptual systems to guide fitter behavior, not to estimate truth. To study perception in an evolutionary context, we introduce the framework of Computational Evolutionary Perception (CEP). We show that CEP subsumes BDT, and reinterprets BDT as evaluating expected fitness rather than estimating truth.

Key words: evolution, fitness, natural selection, bayesian decision theory, vision, evolutionary game theory.

Does natural selection favor veridical perceptions, those that more accurately depict the objective environment? Students of perception often claim that it does. But this claim, though influential, has not been adequately tested. Here we formalize the claim and a few alternatives. To test them, we introduce “interface games,” a class of evolutionary games in which perceptual strategies compete. We explore, in closed-form solutions and Monte Carlo simulations, some simpler games that assume frequency-dependent selection and complete mixing in infinite populations. We find that veridical perceptions can be driven to extinction by non-veridical strategies that are tuned to utility rather than objective reality. This suggests that natural selection need not favor veridical perceptions, and that the effects of selection on sensory perception deserve further study.

Key words: evolution, replicator dynamics, interface games, sensation, game theory.

Key words: self-organization, game theory

Key words: Self-organization, game theory

Open peer commentary on the article “Consciousness as Self-Description in Differences” by Diana Gasparyan. Upshot: The aim of my commentary is to support some of Gasparyan’s ideas and to reformulate them in a more constructive way in terms of both formalized hermeneutical procedures and networks and in the light of game-theory approaches.