Working for decades as both theorist and teacher, Ranulph Glanville came to believe that cybernetics and design are two sides of the same coin. Working as both practitioners and teachers, the authors present their understanding of Glanville and the relationships between cybernetics and design. We believe cybernetics offers a foundation for 21st-century design practice. We offer this rationale: – If design, then systems: Due in part to the rise of computing technology and its role in human communications, the domain of design has expanded from giving form to creating systems that support human interactions, thus, systems literacy becomes a necessary foundation for design. – If systems, then cybernetics: Interaction involves goals, feedback, and learning, the science of which is cybernetics. – If cybernetics, then second-order cybernetics: Framing wicked problems requires explicit values and viewpoints, accompanied by the responsibility to justify them with explicit arguments, thus incorporating subjectivity and the epistemology of second-order cybernetics. – If second-order cybernetics, then conversation: Design grounded in argumentation requires conversation so that participants may understand, agree, and collaborate on effective action. Second-order cybernetics frames design as conversation for learning together, and order design creates possibilities for others to have conversations, to learn, and to act.

Key words: conversation, cybernetics, design knowledge, design methods, design rationale, design, systems, ethics, language, models, second-order cybernetics

Psychology – the way learning is defined, studied, and understood – underlies much of the curricular and instructional decision-making that occurs in education. Constructivism, perhaps the most current psychology oflearning, is no exception. Initially based on the work ofJean Piaget and LevVygotsky, and then supported and extended by contemporary biologists andcognitive scientists as they studied complexity and emergence, it is having major ramifications on the goals that teachers set for the learners with whomthey work, the instructional strategies teachers employ in working towardthese goals, and the methods of assessment used by school personnel to document genuine learning. What is this theory of learning and develop-ment that is the basis of the current reform movement and how is it different from other models of psychology?

In sociology, there has been a controversy about whether there is any essential difference between a human being and a tool, or if the tool–user relationship can be defined by co-actor symmetry. This issue becomes more complex when we consider examples of AI and robots, and even more so following progress in the development of various bio-machine hybrid technologies, such as robots that include organic parts, human brain implants, and adaptive prosthetics. It is argued that a concept of autonomous agency based on organismic embodiment helps to clarify the situation. On this view, agency consists of an asymmetrical relationship between an organism and its environment, because the continuous metabolic and regulatory activity of the organism gives rise to its own existence, and hence its specific behavioral domain. Accordingly, most (if not all) of current technologies are excluded from the class of autonomous agents. Instead, they are better conceptualized as interfaces that mediate our interactions with the world. This has important implications for design: Rather than trying to help humans to achieve their goals by duplicating their agency in artificial systems, it would be better to empower humans directly by enhancing their existing agency and lived experience with technological interfaces that can be incorporated into their embodiment. This incorporation might be especially facilitated by bio-machine hybrid technology that is designed according the principles of biological autonomy and multi-agent coordination dynamics.

Key words: Embodiment, consciousness, human–computer interface, agency

This paper introduces an original model to provide software agents and robots with the capacity of learning by interpreting regularities in their stream of sensorimotor experience rather than by exploiting data that would give them ontological information about a predefined domain. Specifically, this model pulls inspiration from: a) the movement of embodied cognition, b) the philosophy of knowledge, c) constructivist epistemology, and d) the theory of enaction. Respectively to these four influences: a) Our agents discover their environment through their body’s active capacity of experimentation. b) They do not know their environment “ as such” but only “ as they can experience it”. c) They construct knowledge from regularities of sensorimotor experience. d) They have some level of constitutive autonomy. Technically, this model differs from the traditional perception / cognition/ action model in that it rests upon atomic sensorimotor experiences rather than separating percepts from actions. We present algorithms that implement this model, and we describe experiments to validate these algorithms. These experiments show that the agents exhibit a certain form of intelligence through their behaviors, as they construct proto-ontological knowledge of the phenomena that appear to them when they observe persistent possibilities of sensorimotor experiences in time and space. These results promote a theory of artificial intelligence without ontological data about a presupposed reality. An application includes a more robust way of creating robots capable of constructing their own knowledge and goals in the real world, which could be initially unknown to them and un-modeled by their designers.

This paper introduces an original model to provide software agents and robots with the capacity of learning by interpreting regularities in their stream of sensorimotor experience rather than by exploiting data that would give them ontological information about a predefined domain. Specifically, this model pulls inspiration from: a) the movement of embodied cognition, b) the philosophy of knowledge, c) constructivist epistemology, and d) the theory of enaction. Respectively to these four influences: a) Our agents discover their environment through their body’s active capacity of experimentation. b) They do not know their environment “as such” but only “as they can experience it.” c) They construct knowledge from regularities of sensorimotor experience. d) They have some level of constitutive autonomy. Technically, this model differs from the traditional perception/cognition/action model in that it rests upon atomic sensorimotor experiences rather than separating percepts from actions. We present algorithms that implement this model, and we describe experiments to validate these algorithms. These experiments show that the agents exhibit a certain form of intelligence through their behaviors, as they construct proto-ontological knowledge of the phenomena that appear to them when they observe persistent possibilities of sensorimotor experiences in time and space. These results promote a theory of artificial intelligence without ontological data about a presupposed reality. An application includes a more robust way of creating robots capable of constructing their own knowledge and goals in the real world, which could be initially unknown to them and un-modeled by their designers.

Key words: artificial intelligence, embodied cognition, constructivist learning, enaction, hierarchical sequence learning, trace-based reasoning, cognitive architecture, self-motivation

This paper introduces an original model to provide software agents and robots with the capacity of learning by interpreting regularities in their stream of sensorimotor experience rather than by exploiting data that would give them ontological information about a predefined domain. Specifically, this model pulls inspiration from: a) the movement of embodied cognition, b) the philosophy of knowledge, c) constructivist epistemology, and d) the theory of enaction. Respectively to these four influences: a) Our agents discover their environment through their body’s active capacity of experimentation. b) They do not know their environment “as such” but only “as they can experience it.” c) They construct knowledge from regularities of sensorimotor experience. d) They have some level of constitutive autonomy. Technically, this model differs from the traditional perception/cognition/action model in that it rests upon atomic sensorimotor experiences rather than separating percepts from actions. We present algorithms that implement this model, and we describe experiments to validate these algorithms. These experiments show that the agents exhibit a certain form of intelligence through their behaviors, as they construct proto-ontological knowledge of the phenomena that appear to them when they observe persistent possibilities of sensorimotor experiences in time and space. These results promote a theory of artificial intelligence without ontological data about a presupposed reality. An application includes a more robust way of creating robots capable of constructing their own knowledge and goals in the real world, which could be initially unknown to them and un-modeled by their designers.

Key words: artificial intelligence, embodied cognition, constructivist learning, enaction, hierarchical sequence learning, trace-based reasoning, cognitive architecture, self-motivation.

Bindra’s proposal is still an attempt at “minor revision” that does not get away from the traditional tenet that living organisms are passive receivers of stimuli to which they react according to pseudo-mechanical principles A detailed analysis of what is covered by the term “gnostic organization” would, I believe, reveal the indispensability of induction and of inductively built-up representations of desirable and undesirable states and events that can then serve as goals in the assembly of adaptively modifiable behaviors

Key words: cognition, cybernetics, feedback

At the end of my talk at the symposium in Paderborn, Humberto MATURANA raised the question of “goals.” The discussion that followed was not conclusive and the question, I felt, was left hanging in the air. Since it is an important question and particularly relevant to any theory of equilibration, I shall try to begin this written version of my talk by explaining the connections I see between the concepts of perturbation, equilibration, and goal-directedness.

Key words: radical constructivism, cognition

Parker Palmer is correct in his claims that good teaching depends more on the capacity for connectedness than on technique and that helping teacher candidates cultivate a strong sense of personal identity is crucial. However, to what extent are Palmer’s claims compatible with the various constructivist models of learning that are now prevalent in many colleges of education? Moreover, how are the goals of Palmer’s approach integrated with those of constructivism? This essay responds to these questions and negotiates between constructivism and Palmer’s educational approach. First the author lays out a predominant constructivist model of teaching and learning. Next, he explores some potential limitations facing constructivism and argues that Palmer’s notion of connectedness can help mitigate against some of the shortcomings of constructivism. Finally, the author examines a specific example from an English methods course that represents an attempt to integrate the virtues of Palmer’s approach with those of constructivism.

Key words: constructivism, connectedness, palmer, learning, teaching.

Constructivism, a multifaceted philosophical position on the nature of knowledge and educational practice, has recently emerged both in the literature on learning and in school reform efforts, despite no strong supporting research base. At present, four major perspectives on constructivism in classrooms may be identified. They are the perspectives of Piaget and Vygotsky as well as social and holistic constructivism. Because school psychologists may be asked to work in a constructivist framework, one purpose of this article is to describe the essential characteristics and difficult issues associated with implementing this approach for classroom practice. Included are goals, assumptions about learners, essential teacher skills, and research concerns. A second purpose is a discussion of the implications for school psychologists, highlighting currently recommended school psychology practices that may address important concerns within a constructivist approach. Recommendations for consultation and intervention, needs of students with learning difficulties, and assessment issues are addressed.