A theory of the embodiment of action is proposed. Reflections on relations between human intentions, the human body and the notion of agency lead us to argue that phenomenological analysis is not sufficient for such a theory. Our consideration, that the most fundamental level of embodied agency is that of life itself, brings us to the philosophy of biology and the theory of the organism: briefly, certain parts of the natural environment are intrinsic to the constitution of organisms and, in their more sophisticated configuration, as agents. Action is embodied in the sense that certain physiological processes are internal in relation to it and play a constitutive role in its performance. The way in which environment, context and consciousness affect and constitute the nature of agency at personal and sub-personal levels is elaborated. We see that human agents perceive and act upon their world through a complex shifting between those levels. A summary of the ways in which the social sciences can be enriched by this more comprehensive view of human agency provides the basis of justification for claiming Actor-Network Theory (ANT), originally developed by sociologists studying science and technology, as a promising framework for the continuation of this reasoning.

Key words: actor network theory, agency, autopoiesis, consciousness, external scaffolding, intention, perception, phenomenology

Open peer commentary on the article “Précis of The Philosophy of Affordances” by Manuel Heras-Escribano. Abstract: I argue that any approach to affordances that stays close to the letter of the law (of traditional Gibsonian ecological psychology) is not able to account for human agency and meaningful experience. I sketch how an approach that follows the spirit of the law can account for these phenomena.

This essay intends to recover human agency from holistic, abstract, even oppressive conceptions of social organization, common in the social sciences, social systems theory in particular. To do so, I am taking the use of language as simultaneously accompanying the performance of and constructing reality (my version of social constructivism). The essay starts with a definition of human agency in terms of its linguistic manifestation. It then sketches several leading conceptions of social organization, their metaphorical origin and entailments. Finally, it contextualizes the use of these metaphors in conversation, which leads to the main thesis of this essay that the reconstitutability of networks of conversation precedes all other criteria of the viability of organizational forms. The paper transcends the traditional second-order cybernetic preoccupation with individual cognition – observation and description – into the social domain of participation

In my answer to Ernst von Glasersfeld’s (2008) question “Who conceives Society?” I proposed a radically social constructivism (Krippendorff, 2008a) that overcomes what I perceive to be an unfortunate cognitivism in von Glasersfeld’s, Heinz von Foerster’s, and Humberto Maturana’s work. Since then, I published two other papers on the subject. One (2008b) moves the notion of human agency into the center of my project, focusing on its role in conceptions of social organizations – a concept less grand than “society” and one (2008c) teases out several reflexive turns that have grown in cybernetics but cannot be subsumed by the epistemology of radical constructivism and second-order cybernetics, which privileges observation and a representational theory of language over participation in conversation and cooperative constructions of reality. In all of these efforts, conversation has become the starting point of my conceptualizations of being human. In this essay, I wish to discuss what conversation entails, how it is maintained, and under which conditions it degenerates into something else.

This article narrates how I discovered cybernetics, who inspired me to make the contributions of which I am proud, and the ideas that led me to recognize the importance of understanding the social world we live in as a consequence of what we do in language. It took me some time before I recognized that circular causality and digitalization that made cybernetics the driver of the current revolution toward a computationally autonomous information society had serious limitations. When used to explain human involvements, the mathematics of cybernetics trivializes what we do to each other and blinds us to recognize how cybernetics transformed society. Studying conversations and discourses made me aware of how cybernetic vocabularies, guiding concepts, and computational metaphors were enacted. By contrast to (first- or second-order) cybernetics, I learned that a cybernetics that is practiced in conversations and acknowledges the social consequences of what it generates had to be reflexive. Shifting attention from causal circularities to reflexive circularities opens up huge new areas for exploring socially meaningful contributions and criticizing the epistemologies of mindless discursive practices (e, g., of claiming the superiority of artificial intelligence and the power of computers). Such claims merely entrap their believers into inaction.

Key words: inter-disciplinarity, reflexive conversation, cybernetic discourse, algorithmic literacy, mindless submission, epistemological pathology, human agency, critical cybernetics.

I argue in this paper that by taking a biosemiotic point of view, human “agency” may be defined as the ability of an individual to direct the incoming and internal streams of semioses and the ability to create an integrative and superordinate new stream of semiosis in addition to the upwardly and downwardly component ones, and I argue how such a view might open a new door for research into the concept of human “personality” and “agency.” Obviously, these are key concepts in constructivist approaches and a better understanding of them can shed light on other aspects.

Explaining agency is a significant challenge for those who are interested in the sciences of the mind, and non-representationalists are no exception to this. Even though both ecological psychologists and enactivists agree that agency is to be explained by focusing on the relation between the organism and the environment, they have approached it by focusing on different aspects of the organism-environment relation. In this paper, I offer a suggestion for a radical embodied account of agency that combines ecological psychology with recent trends in enactive cognitive science. According to this proposal, while enactivism focuses primarily on describing how our acquired sensorimotor schemes and habits mutually equilibrate, affecting our tendency to act upon some affordances instead of others, ecological psychology focuses on studying how perceptual information contributes to the actualization of the sensorimotor schemes and habits without mediating representations, inferences, and computations. The paper concludes by briefly exploring how this ecological-enactive theory of agency can account for how socio-cultural norms shape human agency.

Key words: agency, ecological psychology, enactivism, affordances, habits, sensorimotor schemes, information

In the following article we first present the growing trend of incorporating neuroscience into the law, and the growing acceptance of and trust in neuroscience’s mechanistic and reductionistic explanations of the human mind. We then present and discuss some studies that show how nudging peoples’ beliefs about matters related to human agency (such as free will, decision-making, or self-control) towards a more deterministic, mechanistic and/or reductionistic conception, exerts an influence on their very actions, mentality, and brain processes. We suggest that the neuroscientific view of the human mind exerts an influence on the very cognitive phenomena neuroscience falsely believes to be studying objectively. This holds especially when we consider the systematic integration of neuroscience into the public domain, such as the law. For, such an integration acts as a reinforcement of the public’s and legal decision-makers’ endorsement of and trust in neuroscience’s view of human nature that further changes how people think and act. Such looping effects of neurolaw are probably inevitable. Accordingly, we should be aware of the scope of neuroscientific explanations and be careful not to overstate neuroscientific evidence and findings in legal contexts.

Key words: agency, belief, looping effects, natural and human kinds, moral responsibility, neurolaw, self-control