Anderson M., Deely J., Krampen M., Ransdell J., Sebeok T. A. & von Uexküll T. (1984) A semiotic perspective on the sciences: Steps toward a new paradigm. Semiotica 52(1/2): 7–47.
Semiotics has itself thrived in a generative atmosphere of specialization and synthesis. Now, in an expanding intellectual universe, we converge with several other strains of scholarship. In this brief paper, we not only acknowledge this convergence and complementarity, but actively welcome the emerging rapprochement, which we interpret as representing a radical shift in scientific paradigm. This conceptual revolution transcends a dichotomous Cartesian, analytic view of the world, in the direction of a view embracing the whole, respecting complexity, and fostering synthesis.
While structured as an autobiography, this memoir exemplifies ways in which classic contributions to cybernetics (e.g., by Wiener, McCulloch & Pitts, and von Neumann) have fed into a diversity of current research areas, including the mathematical theory of systems and computation, artificial intelligence and robotics, computational neuroscience, linguistics, and cognitive science. The challenges of brain theory receive special emphasis. Action-oriented perception and schema theory complement neural network modeling in analyzing cerebral cortex, cerebellum, hippocampus, and basal ganglia. Comparative studies of frog, rat, monkey, ape and human not only deepen insights into the human brain but also ground an EvoDevoSocio view of “how the brain got language.” The rapprochement between neuroscience and architecture provides a recent challenge. The essay also assesses some of the social and theological implications of this broad perspective.
Context: Radical constructivism claims that we have no final truth criteria for establishing one ontology over another. This leaves us with the question of how we can come to know anything in a viable manner. According to von Glasersfeld, radical constructivism is a theory of knowledge rather than a philosophy of the world in itself because we do not have access to a human-independent world. He considers knowledge as the ordering of experience to cope with situations in a satisfactory way. Problem: Von Foerster and Krippendorff show that the central goal of a constructivist theory of knowing must be to find a way of putting the knower into a known that is constructed so as to keep the knower, as well as the knowing process, viable in practice. Method: The conceptual and philosophical analysis of present theories and their necessary prerequisites suggests that such foundation for viable knowing can be built on the analysis of what the ontological prerequisites are for establishing viable observing, cognition, communication and observer-communicators, and communication media and vehicles. Results: The moment an observer chooses to accept his/her own embodied conscious presence in this world as well as language, he/she must accept other humans as partly independently existing conversation partners; if knowledge and knowing has to make sense, he/she must also accept as prerequisites for our observation and conversation a pre-linguistic reality from which our bodies come and which our conversation is often about. Furthermore, we can no longer claim that there is a reality that we do not know anything about: From being here in conversation, we know that the world can produce more or less stable embodied consciousnesses that can exchange and construct conceptual meanings through embodied conversations and actions that last over time and exist in space-time and mind, and are correlated to our embodied practices. We can also see that our communication works through signs for all living systems as well as in human language, understood as a structured and progressively developed system of communication. The prerequisite for this social semiotic production of meaning is the fourfold “semiotic star of cybersemiotics,” which includes at least four different worlds: our bodies, the combination of society, culture and language, our consciousness, and also an outer nature. Implications: The semiotic star in cybersemiotics claims that the internal subjective, the intersubjective linguistic, our living bodies, and nature are irreducible and equally necessary as epistemological prerequisites for knowing. The viable reality of any of them cannot be denied without self-refuting paradoxes. There is an obvious connectedness between the four worlds, which Peirce called “synechism.” It also points to Peirce’s conclusion that logic and rationality are part of the process of semiosis, and that meaning in the form of semiosis is a fundamental aspect of reality, not just a construction in our heads. Erratum: The paper erroneously refers to “pleroma.” The correct term is “plemora.”
Purpose: In the tradition of Spencer Brown’s Laws of Form, observation was defined in Luhmann’s social systems theory as the designation of a distinction. In the sociological design, however, the designation specifies only a category for the observation. The distinction between observation and expectation enables the sociologist to appreciate the processing of meaning in social systems. Seeks to address this issue. Design/methodology/approach – The specification of “the observer” in the tradition of systems theory is analyzed in historical detail. Inconsistencies and differences in perspectives are explicated, and the specificity of human language is further specified. The processing of meaning in social systems adds another layer to the communication. Findings: Reflexivity about the different perspectives of participant observers and an external observer is fundamental to the sociological discourse. The ranges of possible observations from different perspectives can be considered as second‐order observations or, equivalently, as the specification of an uncertainty in the observations. This specification of an uncertainty provides an expectation. The expectation can be provided with (one or more) values by observations. The significance of observations can be tested when the expectations are properly specified. Originality/value – The expectations (second‐order observations) are structured and therefore systemic attributes to the discourse. However, the metaphor of a (meta‐)biological observer has disturbed the translation of social systems theory into sociological discourse. Different discourses specify other expectations about possible observations. By specifying second‐order observations as expectations, social systems theory and sociocybernetics can combine the constructivist with an empirical approach.
Maturana H. R., Mpodozis J. & Letelier J. C. (1995) Brain, language and the origin of human mental functions. Biological Research 28(1): 15–26. https://cepa.info/642
We propose that to understand the biological and neurophysiological processes that give rise to human mental phenomena it is necessary to consider them as behavioral relational phenomena. In particular, we propose that: a) these phenomena take place in the relational manner of living that human language constitutes, and b) that they arise as recursive operations in such behavioral domain. Accordingly, we maintain that these phenomena do not take place in the brain, nor are they the result of a unique operation of a human brain, but arise with the participation of the brain as it generates the behavioral relational dynamics that constitutes language.
Raimondi V. (2022) La matrice operazionale del languaging: Un approccio radicalmente relazionale del linguaggio. Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio 15(2): 49–58. https://cepa.info/7792
Languaging is interactional and relational in nature. The aim of this paper is to explore the constitutive conditions of human language from a «bio-logic» perspective. The main claim is that the notion of languaging contributes to expanding the post-cognitivist understanding of social interaction and linguistic activity. From both a phylogenetic and an ontogenetic perspective, the emergence of language needs to be traced to a species-specific form of sociality and distributed agency. By connecting individual agency to social interdependence, the approach of languaging shows that language arises from patterns of concerted actions. It follows that not only is linguistic activity inherently distributed, but also cannot be separated from the activities and practices it brings into being.
Reagan T. (2006) Learning theories as metaphorical discourse: Reflections on second language learning and constructivist epistemology. Semiotica 161(1/4): 291–308.
Metaphors and, more broadly, metaphorical discourse, are widely recognized as not merely significant aspects of human language use, but also as both pervasive and essential elements of the communicative process as we understand it. Metaphors are important to understand for a variety of reasons, and their use and analysis has important implications for many disciplines. Nowhere, though, is this more true than in the case of semiotics. In this article, it is suggested that both historical and contemporary learning theories in general, and theories of language learning in particular, are in fact examples of metaphorical discourse. The case of constructivist epistemology will be examined in particular. The implications of the use of metaphor in such contexts will be explored, and suggestions will be o¤ered for how educators might more carefully discuss and apply metaphorical models of learning.
Sánchez-Flores M. J. (2020) Human language as trans-actional autopoiesis. In: Morgner C. (ed.) John Dewey and the notion of trans-action. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham: 253–283. https://cepa.info/6573
Human language, according to Humberto Maturana, can be seen as existing in the relationality of human organisms who in turn emerge as persons from autopoietic co-constitutive relationships. I propose that this autopoietic conception of language is eminently trans-actional in the Deweyan sense. A trans-actional presentation of knowledge means that everything that we seek to explain as observers exists in continuity with everything else. Such trans-actional continuity is grounded on a physical continuity that I propose is best exemplified by entanglement in quantum physics; which is quite counter-intuitive to our deterministic Newtonian-Cartesian “habits of mind.” This illustrates why we need finer tools, such as trans-actional autopoiesis, to approach our experience. Maturana explains how human language is made possible by our nervous system, embodied in an autopoietic manner; in constant trans-action with human embodiment and other humans and non-humans, as well as embedded in and having an effect on our environment.
Varela F. J. (1971) Self-consciousness: Adaptation or epiphenomenon? Studium Generale 24: 426–439. https://cepa.info/1899
This paper is an attempt to arrive at a species-specific characterization of human consciousness by considering its value as a biological adaptation. The analysis considers conscious phenomena in animals to motivate the distinction between self-consciousness and consciousness; the distinction is substantiated with neurological data. The relation between self-consciousness and language is considered in the light of the evolution of human language. Finally, a mechanism is postulated, based on current neurobiological knowledge, which makes it possible to account for self-consciousness as an epiphenomenon of language.
Vaz N. M. (2011) Immunology and intentionality – Observing immunologists. Neurociências 7(3): 140–146. https://cepa.info/7764
When we consider the immune system as a cognitive system, as most immunologists do, our questions and the criteria we use to validate the answers to these questions, will inevitably follow what we understand as cognition. An alternative is to ascribe cognition to what immunologists do when they operate as human observers and generate descriptions of immunological activities. In this uncommon way of seeing, which I prefer, we ascribe the specificity of immunological observations to what we do as humans observers operating in human language, rather than to what cells and molecules, such as lymphocytes and immunoglobulins, do as components of the immune system. In this alternative way of seeing, we, immunologists, are the true cognitive entities in immunology.