Historically, the suspension of presuppositions (the epoché, or bracketing) arose as part of the philosophical procedure of the transcendental reduction which, Husserl taught, led to the distinct realm of phenomenological research: pure consciousness. With such an origin, it may seem surprising that bracketing remains a methodological concept of modern phenomenological psychology, in which the focus is on the life-world. Such a focus of investigation is, on the face of it, incompatible with transcendental idealism. \\The gap was bridged largely by Merleau-Ponty, who found it possible to interpret Husserl’s later work in an existentialist way, and thus enabled the process of bracketing to refer, not to a turning away from the world and a concentration on detached consciousness, but to the resolve to set aside theories, research presuppositions, ready-made interpretations, etc., in order to reveal engaged, lived experience. \\This paper outlines the history of the suspension of presuppositions and discusses the scope and limitations of bracketing in its new sense within existential phenomenology. The emphasis is on research practice and on the phenomenological quest for entry into the life-world of the research participant. It is argued that the bracketing of presuppositions throughout the process of research should be a cardinal feature of phenomenological psychology. \\Of equal importance is the investigator’s sensitive awareness that the investigation of the life-world and the phenomena which appear within it is a thoroughly interpersonal process, necessarily entailing the taken-for-granted assumptions implicit in all social interaction. These presuppositions are not open to bracketing.

There are many varieties of epistemological and cognitive constructivism. They have in common an appreciation of the failures of centuries of attempts to realize a correspondence notion of truth and representation, and they all propose some constructivist programme as an alternative. The programmatic proposals, however, can differ greatly. Some contemporary constructivisms that are being vigorously advocated propose a social form of idealism with a consequent relativism. Such proposals risk giving constructivism a bad name. The main burden of this article is to show that such an idealism and relativism is not forced by constructivism, but, instead, is the result of an additional and questionable presupposition. Constructivism per se is a strong epistemological position that is fully compatible with realism.

Key words: cognition, constructivism, correspondence, encoding, epistemology, idealism, realism, relativism, representation

Diverse forms of constructivism can be found in the literature today. They exhibit a commonality regarding certain classical positions that they oppose – a unity in their negative identities – but a sometimes wild multiplicity and incompatibility regarding the positive proposals that they put forward. In particular, some constructivisms propose an epistemological idealism, with a concomitant relativism, while others are explicitly opposed to such positions, and move in multifarious different directions. This is a potentially confusing situation, and has resulted in some critics branding all constructivisms with the charge of relativism, and throwing out the baby with the bath water. In addition, since the epistemological foundations of even non-relativist constructivisms are not as familiar as the classical positions, there is a risk of mis-interpretation of constructivisms and their consequences, even by some who endorse them, not to mention those who criticize. Because I urge that some version of constructivism is an epistemological necessity, this situation strikes me as seriously unfortunate for philosophy, and potentially dangerous for the practice of education.

Key words: realism, idealism, empiricism, innatism, constructivism, relativism, representation, epistemology, scaffolding.

Francisco Varela’s neurophenomenological research program is still ahead of us. It therefore needs some further philosophical reflections in order to become fully understood, and to avoid mixing it up with other views. Neurophenomenology shares so many features with the mind-brain identity theory that it has sometimes been mistaken for it, and that it also shares some of its explanatory virtues. But it also parts company with the identity theory on a crucial point, so that it is immune of several defects of the latter conception. The major difference is that it deflects theoretical issues onto a methodological plane; it does not state a mind-brain identity, but rather tries to institute a close relationship between the two corresponding methods of investigation. Besides, some sentences of Varela were strongly suggestive of idealism. But once again, this is wrong. Varela does not hold the ontological primacy of lived experience. He only advocates the importance for science of taking into account in its practice all the aspects of experience, be they subjective or objective. A final parallel with evolutionary biology and quantum physics shows that neurophenomenology has reached a high level of epistemological universality.

Context: In his work on neurophenomenology, the late Francisco Varela overtly tackled the well-known “hard problem” of the (physical) origin of phenomenal consciousness. Problem: Did he have a theory for solving this problem? No, he declared, only a “remedy.” Yet this declaration has been overlooked: Varela has been considered (successively or simultaneously) as an idealist, a dualist, or an identity theorist. Results: These primarily theoretical characterizations of Varela’s position are first shown to be incorrect. Then it is argued that there exists a stance (let’s call it the Varelian stance) in which the problem of the physical origin of primary consciousness, or pure experience, does not even arise. Implications: The nature of the “hard problem” of consciousness is changed from an intellectual puzzle to an existential option. Constructivist content: The role of ontological prejudice about what the world is made of (a prejudice that determines the very form of the “hard problem” as the issue of the origin of consciousness out of a pre-existing material organization) is downplayed, and methodologies and attitudes are put to the fore.

Key words: First-person approaches, non-dualism, idealism, Francisco Varela, Edmund Husserl.

The paper presents a discussion of the epistemological and ontological problems of attempts to found information concepts on the often implicit mechanistic idea that the physical sciences hold the key to the nature of reality and information. It is furthermore shown through an analysis of the ethological and the Batesonian understanding of cognition and behavior that it is impossible to remove the fundamental epistemological position of the observer through a definition of information as neg-entropy. Instead Maturana and Varela’s concepts of autopoiesis and multiverse are invoked. But where the idea to derive information from the concept of negentropy is too physicalistic Maturana’s idea of a multiverse seems to be too close to a constructivistic idealism. To develop a more fruitful non-reductionistic world view it is shown that the more pragmatic understanding of physics, where thermodynamics is understood as the basic discipline and mechanics as an idealization, opens for a non-reductionistic con-ceptualization of chaos. Attention is drawn to C. S. Peirce’s conception of pure chance as living spontaneity which is to some degree regular as a realistic but non-reductionistic theory, which comprises a solution to the different world view problems of Bateson and Maturana. A fruitful connection between second order cybernetics and semiotics will then be possible and a bridge between the technical-scientific and the humanistic-social parts of cybernetics can be developed.

In the last years, we observed a proliferation of the term constructivism in disciplines such as Psychology, Education, Sociology and Philosophy of Mind. Nervertheless, if we took this concept in its strict sense, as the position that defends an active role of the subject in his relation with knowledge object and in the construction of their reality representations, we see that several positions self-named constructivists adopts theories that contradicts the spirit of this philosophical tradition. This article makes a brief investigation on the most influential contemporary uses of this term, like Piagetian Constructivism, Social Construcionism, Social Constructivism and Radical Constructivism. It concludes that these last three currents are not strict sense constructivists, because they dissolve the epistemic subject. After that, it demonstrates that Constructivism does not implicate idealism, and that the Critical Rationalism and Piagetian Constructivism are the legitimate representatives of the constructivist tradition that, adhering to realism, behold in Modern Science field.

Key words: epistemology, constructivism, social constructivism, radical constructivism, critical rationalism.

Excerpt: First, one is impressed by the successes of science, endorsing materialism about everything and so about the mind. Second, one is moved by problem of consciousness to see a gap between physics and consciousness, thereby endorsing dualism, where both matter and consciousness are fundamental. Third, one is moved by the inscrutability of matter to realize that science reveals at most the structure of matter and not its underlying nature, and to speculate that this nature may involve consciousness, thereby endorsing panpsychism. Fourth, one comes to think that there is little reason to believe in anything beyond consciousness and that the physical world is wholly constituted by consciousness, thereby endorsing idealism. Some recent strands in philosophical discussion of the mind–body problem have recapitulated this progression: the rise of materialism in the 1950s and 1960s, the dualist response in the 1980s and 1990s, the festival of panpsychism in the 2000s, and some recent stirrings of idealism. In my own work, I have taken the first two steps and have flirted heavily with the third. In this paper I want to examine the prospects for the fourth step: the move to idealism.

In his recent article in Educational Researcher, “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The Many Faces of Constructivism,” D. C. Phillips sets out to provide a clear understanding of the range of various positions involving “constructivism.” According to Phillips, there is a very broad and loose sense in which all of us these days are constructivists. In Part I, we present Phillips’ “way of the viewing the various forms of constructivism”; we consider Phillips’ framework for comparing the constructivisms. We will argue that it is important that Phillips finds Karl Popper to be situated at about the middle of the constructivists. In Part II, we argue that Phillips has not presented a full array of the significant possibilities at all. In developing the argument, we develop a framework that primarily takes into account the interrelations among epistemology, ontology, and (theories of) truth. We defend a form of constructivism in which “realism and idealism come together”. We also suggest that these matters are themselves related to theories of the person. To illustrate a broader framework, we present some of the features of a Hconstructivist view and then critically compare Hconstructivism with the Popperian viewpoint. In Part III, we use the Hconstructivist view to consider some of the important educational issues for the specialist in science and for the general student.

Key words: science, epistemology, constructivism (ontic), realism

Purpose: To develop a realistic view that integrates the idea that knowledge is a constructive process. Problem: In the controversy between realism and constructivism, both sides have often misunderstood each other. Many realists still consider constructivism as a kind of idealism. And constructivists often assume that realists believe they have direct access to things as they really are. It seems necessary to clarify the statements of either side, to rule out some misunderstandings, and then to discuss anew the central epistemological problems. Solution: A version of realism is proposed that takes into account constructivist ideas and objections. Realism as presented here is not opposed to the idea that cognition is a constructive process. According to this view, reality is something we presuppose in any attempt to attain knowledge though we can never be certain how things really are. Having knowledge amounts to the preliminary judgment that some hypotheses seem to correspond to reality better than others. In addition, it is demonstrated that a constructivist position that reduces the claim to knowledge even further does not solve the problems better but creates new ones. Finally, Mitterer’s non-dualizing view of descriptions is discussed. It is argued that description necessarily presupposes something different from language.

Key words: realism, constructivism, idealism, fallibilism, self-refutation, description, non-dualizing philosophy