Excerpt: Recent experimental work on imitation in infancy has challenged Piaget’s theory and timetable. Two aspects of Piaget’s work have been criticized: his contention that imitation of invisible gestures (i.e., gestures the imitator cannot see when he or she performs them) could not occur until the third quarter of the first year, and his contention that deferred imitation of novel sequences of actions could not occur until the beginning of the second year. The critics have marshalled empirical research that they interpret as showing invisible imitation in the neonatal period and deferred imitation at 6–9 months. This chapter argues that in both areas the empirical criticism of Piaget is not well founded. It removes a source of support for theories that attribute mental representation to young infants. In turn, it provides support for Piagetian theories that see mental representation as evolving gradually in the course of the first year. The chapter starts with a brief summary of Piaget’s theory to provide a context for his work on imitation. This summary is followed by an examination of the work on invisible imitation and deferred imitation.

We propose a new version of the “theory theory” grounded in the computational framework of probabilistic causal models and Bayesian learning. Probabilistic models allow a constructivist but rigorous and detailed approach to cognitive development. They also explain the learning of both more specific causal hypotheses and more abstract framework theories. We outline the new theoretical ideas, explain the computational framework in an intuitive and nontechnical way, and review an extensive but relatively recent body of empirical results that supports these ideas. These include new studies of the mechanisms of learning. Children infer causal structure from statistical information, through their own actions on the world and through observations of the actions of others. Studies demonstrate these learning mechanisms in children from 16 months to 4 years old and include research on causal statistical learning, informal experimentation through play, and imitation and informal pedagogy. They also include studies of the variability and progressive character of intuitive theory change, particularly theory of mind. These studies investigate both the physical and the psychological and social domains. We conclude with suggestions for further collaborative projects between developmental and computational cognitive scientists.

Key words: Cognitive development, Bayesian inference, theory of mind, causal knowledge, intuitive theories

A constructivist approach to cognition assumes the minimal and the simplest set of initial principles or mechanisms, embeds them in realistic circumstances, and lets the entire system evolve under close observation. This paper presents a line of research along this approach trying to connect embodiment to social cognition. First, we show that a mere physical body, when driven toward some task goal, provides a clear information structure, for action execution and perception. As a mechanism of autonomous exploration of such structure, “embodiment as a coupled chaotic field” is proposed, with experiments showing emergent and adaptive behavior. Scaling up the principles, a simulation of the fetal/neonatal motor development is presented. The musculo-skeletal system, basic nervous system, and the uterus environment are simulated. The neural-body dynamics exhibit spontaneous exploration of a variety of motor patterns. Lastly, a robotic experiment is presented to show that visual-motor self-learning can lead to neonatal imitation.

Key words: embodiment, actions, symbols, information structure, emergent behavior, learning, imitation, fetus, cortical maps, body schema/image, coupled chaos system

Dans ce chapitre, Piaget montre comment le bébé passe d’un sentiment indifférencié de causalité (ou d’”efficace”) immédiatement saisie dans le couple indissocié que forment alors l’action propre et son “objet” à de premières formes de causalité objectives attribuées aux rapports entre objets, ou entre l’action propre et les objets, l’action propre étant alors mise sur le même plan que les rapports des choses entre elles – en passant par une étape intermédiaire dans laquelle les rapports de causalité sont tous assimilés au rapport de l’action propre avec un objet extérieur encore incomplètement dissocié de celle-ci. Lors de cette étape intermédiaire, ces rapports de causalité sensori-motrice se caractérisent par une sorte de magico-phénoménisme similaire à celui détecté, sur le plan de la représentation, lors des travaux sur “La causalité physique chez l’enfant” publiés 10 ans avant l’ouvrage sur “La construction du réel chez l’enfant”. On trouve aussi dans ces pages de précieuses indications sur l’importance accordée par Piaget aux contacts du bébé avec autrui dans les “processus d’objectivation et d’extériorisation” du réel. Autrui est saisi par le bébé comme le premier centre de causalité distinct de l’action propre (p. 220 et p. 278), et ceci s’esquisse dès le 3e stade du sensori-moteur, grâce à l’assimilation des actions d’autrui à ses propres actions ainsi qu’à l’imitation des actions d’autrui (c’est cependant au 4e stade que la différenciation entre action propre et action d’autrui sera suffisamment complète pour qu’il y ait un début d’attribution de causalité indépendante à cet être particulier qu’est une personne). Piaget expose également dans ce chapitre la façon dont la causalité physique et la causalité psychologique (ou l’intentionnalité) en viennent à se différencier dans les derniers stades de construction de causalité sensori-motrice. Enfin, dans les conclusions de ce chapitre, Piaget prend appui sur les observations faites sur ses trois enfants entre 0 et 2 ans pour discuter les thèses classiques ou récentes de philosophie des sciences sur la causalité (l’associationnisme de Hume, le vitalisme ou subjectivisme de Maine de Biran, l’apriorisme de Kant, le conventionnalisme), et, tout en reconnaissant leur part de vérité, leur opposer le relativisme ou interactionnisme sujet-objet, seul à même de rendre compte de ces observations.

Context: This target article combats some psychologists’ and phenomenologists’ blind stereotyped vision of Piaget’s ideas on early development and the growing ignorance of his works. Problem: The article tackles the issue of the body in Piaget’s manuscript works on infants in comparison to the contemporary theories endorsed by Gallagher. Method: I analyze an unknown source, Jean and Valentine Piaget’s manuscript notebooks on their first child, and compare it to the contemporary theories. Results: The method revealed itself as largely heuristic. Piaget built new relevant categories during the investigation, such as observing the child’s gaze, and the main category of observation was longitudinal paths of behavior. He carefully observed transformations in the specific behaviors of each path that led to stabilize imitation in infants and he discussed self-cognition of the body, i.e., the child’s knowledge of her body, as either a curious object or her own body. Implications: Comparing the contemporary nativist approach on early competences and Gallagher’s phenomenology to Piaget’s constructivist approach highlighted the contrast between several categories, competence versus paths and age versus processes. The investigation detected implicit epistemologies relying on priority given to age and competences over processes and path in the nativist approach, while Piaget adopted an explicit epistemology prioritizing processes and path over age and competence. A strong implication is the need to look below the surface and go beyond stereotypes towards a complex metaphor for qualifying Piaget’s works. Against stereotypes and reification, Piaget worked mainly on paths and processes and the best metaphor to capture his conception of development is to conceive it as a temporal puzzle with new fitting pieces that shape the human subject as a multilinked network of paths. Constructivist Content: Analyzing the founder of constructivism’s early works with a historical constructivist method led me to propose the temporal puzzle as a cognitive metaphor that synthesizes his early-development constructivist approach, both methodological and theoretical. Moreover, since Piaget’s experimental system has never been reproduced as a whole and early development follows an implicit epistemology that is the opposite of Piaget’s, his constructivist multiple longitudinal approach remains unchallenged.

Key words: Jean Piaget, Valentine Piaget, Shaun Gallagher, manuscript notebooks, constructivism, imitation, body, early development.

Excerpt: In order to show the relevance of using “insoluble problems” as a means of approaching the educational problematic of problem solving, we must first frame the constructivist approach which characterizes this research work.’ This theoretical contribution is to be located in the socioconstructivist current which advocates a ternary model according to which the relationship of an ego to the world and its objects is always mediated by a real or potential alter (Gilly, 1991). It is within this psychosocial current, which challenges the validity of a constructivist perspective conceived of within an “individualistic” framework, that we join with other authors (Perret-Clermont and Nic-olet, 1988) in: (1) refusing to limit the debate to the classic oppositions between “innate/acquired, imitation/construction, the working out of answers hic et nunc/actualization of preexisting potentialities”; and (2) advocating “that cognitive answers acquire the status of construction” (Iannaccone and Perret-Clermont, 1990). By no means the easy way out, such a choice indeed entails approaching the problem of knowledge via the observable, ad hoc situations in which the answers of individuals manifest. The status of answers is at that point analyzed in accordance with the postulate that “while an answer is never totally new, it is articulated in the hic et nunc of the social situation with which the individual is confronted and is based both on the experience which he or she has acquired and the ‘cultural heredity’ which he or she has available to him or her” (ibid.). Hence, as a form of behavior, the observed answer is referred to the problem of its meaning, which, in this case is threefold – that is, meaning must be conceived of from the point of view of: the person whose actions took the form of an answer; the person who formulated the question; and, finally, the researcher who studies the phenomenon and interprets this series of actions in order to describe and explain them.

How is the transition between intersubjectivity and subjectivity accomplished? While many developmental theorists have argued that social interaction gives rise to individualistic capacities (e.g. representation, language, consciousness), relatively few theorists have attempted to identify the precise mechanisms that might be responsible for this transformation. The present paper addresses this gap by drawing attention to the central role played by emotional intimacy. It is argued that subjectivity arises out of intimate engagement with others, and particular attention is given to the role of imitation in fostering such intimacy. While the primary focus is on infant development, links are made to work with atypical populations because they offer valuable insights into the developmental processes under consideration here. The ultimate aim of the paper is to demonstrate that by recognizing the emotional intimacy inherent within adult–infant interactions, new solutions are offered to theoretical problems that developmental psychology continues to face in accounting for the origins of subjectivity.

Key words: imitation, affect attunement, intimacy, emotion, oxytocin, intersubjectivity, representation, self-awareness