The book uses the method and categories of systems theory (inspired by Niklas Luhmann) in a scrutiny of the evolution of the main semantic trends of modern society and its influence in the formation of the systemic boundaries of the social systems of society. The book is an investigation of the meaning of the functional differentiation according to its semantic symptoms and evolution. In order to reconstruct the semantic evolution of basic modern socio-economic categories the book is divided according to the three classic branches of the political philosophy of the classic tradition, the Aristotelian division also conserved in Hegel’s own distribution of the themes of his “Sittlichkeit” – family, civil society and the state. Thus, in “The Individuation of Modern Society” the author explores the classic notion of oikós and its opposition to the pólis, the evolution of the concept of utility in modern times and its importance to the formation of the modern political economy and the economic system as an autonomous functional system, the idea of “civil society,” its meaning in the Hegelian description of the social modernity, the fragmentation of XVIIIth century civil society according to the use of the term “Entzweiung” in the Hegelian philosophical vocabulary, and the formation of the concept of the nation as a self-referential condition of the political system. The book finishes with a discussion of Niklas Luhmann’s theory of functional differentiation and his concept of the political system. Relevance: The book applies second-order cybernetics to the analysis of the evolution of modern social systems, especially in the case of the formation of self-referential conditions for the observation and reproduction of the systems.

Clear similarities may be found between enaction and Simondon’s philosophy of individuation. In this article, and in the wake of recent research in the field of enaction, I argue that Simondon’s work is relevant to our understanding of the articulation between life, subjectivity, and technics. In line with John Stewart, I define enaction as the dynamic relation whereby living organisms and their environment co-emerge, a process in which technics is revealed as “anthropologically constitutive.” I show that this process is truly enlightened by Simondon’s theory of imagination and invention.

Key words: life, subjectivity, technics, cultural integration, individuation, transduction, dialectic, co-emergence, imagination, invention, affectivity, enactivism, maurice merleau-ponty, gilbert simondon

Jakob Johann von Uexkull theory of meaning and his concept of the Umwelt help a lot in furthering relational perspectives, new ontologies, and new scientific thinking, that give due justice to living (co)existence in fragile surroundings. Uexkull is right to point to dynamic Gestalt forms of meaning as the evidence that scientism is keen to ignore. The future of Uexkull is open and exciting, although probably also riddled with conflicts and contradictions. One of the most active and innovative strands of embodied cognition in the 21st century is the enactive approach, which predicates the relation between agents and worlds in terms of participation and enactments. Lacks and surpluses make relational processes meaningful, but for needs and excesses to exist objectively, it is necessary for material self-individuation to be in place and for vital norms to emerge in processes of organic life, sensorimotor agency, interpersonal relations, and collective history.

I discuss the notion of bodies proposed by Villalobos and Razeto-Barry. I consider it a good move in a direction away from overly formal aspects of autopoietic theory, but in need of refinement. I suggest that because organismic boundaries are dialectical processes and not immanent walls, some autopoietic bodies can extend by incorporating parts of their environment as in the case of insects that use trapped air bubbles to breathe underwater.

Key words: autopoiesis, individuation, boundary, incorporation, dialectics.

This paper takes a new look at an old question: what is the human self? It offers a proposal for theorizing the self from an enactive perspective as an autonomous system that is constituted through interpersonal relations. It addresses a prevalent issue in the philosophy of cognitive science: the body-social problem. Embodied and social approaches to cognitive identity are in mutual tension. On the one hand, embodied cognitive science risks a new form of methodological individualism, implying a dichotomy not between the outside world of objects and the brain-bound individual but rather between body-bound individuals and the outside social world. On the other hand, approaches that emphasize the constitutive relevance of social interaction processes for cognitive identity run the risk of losing the individual in the interaction dynamics and of downplaying the role of embodiment. This paper adopts a middle way and outlines an enactive approach to individuation that is neither individualistic nor disembodied but integrates both approaches. Elaborating on Jonas’ notion of needful freedom it outlines an enactive proposal to understanding the self as co-generated in interactions and relations with others. I argue that the human self is a social existence that is organized in terms of a back and forth between social distinction and participation processes. On this view, the body, rather than being identical with the social self, becomes its mediator.

We present a socio-human cognitive framework that radically deemphasizes the role of individual human agents required for both the formation of social systems and their ongoing operation thereafter. Our point of departure is Simondon’s (1992) theory of individuation, which we integrate with the enactive theory of cognition (Di Paolo et al., 2010) and Luhmann’s (1996) theory of social systems. This forges a novel view of social systems as complex, individuating sequences of communicative interactions that together constitute distributed yet distinct cognitive agencies, acquiring a capacity to exert influence over their human-constituted environment. We conclude that the resulting framework suggests several different paths of integrating AI agents into human society. One path suggests the emulation of a largely simplified version of the human mind, reduced in its functions to a specific triple selection-making which is necessary for sustaining social systems. Another one conceives AI systems that follow the distributed, autonomous architecture of social systems, instead that of humans.

Key words: social systems, individuation, cognition, self-organization, communication, cognitive architecture

The notions of collective autocatalysis and of autopoiesis are clear¬ly related; equally clearly, they are not quite the same. The purpose of this paper is to try to clarify the relationship. Specifically I suggest that autopoiesis can be at least roughly characterized as collective autocatalysis plus spatial individuation. Although some mechanism of spatial confinement or concentra¬tion is probably necessary to the effective operation of any collectively autocat¬alytic reaction network, autopoiesis requires, in addition, that the mechanism for maintaining this confinement should itself be a product of the reaction net¬work – and should thus (?) be capable of separating or individuating otherwise identically organized networks. I suggest an informal heuristic test to discrim¬inate the (merely) collectively autocatalytic from the (properly) autopoietic. Finally, in the light of this, I review a variety of published abstract or model sys¬tems, Alchemy, α-universes, Tierra, and SCL.

This chapter offers an overview of the theoretical and philosophical tradition that, during the last two centuries, has emphasised the central role of circularities in biological phenomena. In this tradition, organisms realise a circular causal regime insofar as their existence depends on the effects of their own activity: they determine themselves. In turn, self-determination is the grounding of several biological properties and dimensions, as individuation, teleology, normativity and functionality. We show how this general idea has been theorised sometimes through concepts, sometimes through models, and sometimes through both. We analyse the main differences between the various contributions, by emphasising their strengths and weaknesses. Lastly, we conclude by mentioning some contemporary developments, as well ass some future research directions.

Key words: circularity, robert rosen, cybernetics, constraints, autopoiesis, biological organization

The received view is that computational states are individuated at least in part by their semantic properties. I offer an alternative, according to which computational states are individuated by their functional properties. Functional properties are specified by a mechanistic explanation without appealing to any semantic properties. The primary purpose of this paper is to formulate the alternative view of computational individuation, point out that it supports a robust notion of computational explanation, and defend it on the grounds of how computational states are individuated within computability theory and computer science. A secondary purpose is to show that existing arguments for the semantic view are defective.

Key words: Computational state, mechanistic explanation, semantic property, semantic view, syntactic property.

Purpose: The purpose of the paper is to provide a constructivist account of the “self as subject” that avoids the need for any metaphysical assumptions. Findings: The thesis developed in this paper is that the human “psychological individual,” “self” or “subject” is an emergent within the nexus of human social interaction. With respect to psychological and social wholes (composites) there is no distinction between the form of the elements and the form of the composites they constitute i.e., all elements have the form of composites. Further, recursively, composites may serve as elements within higher order composites. Implications for a rational theory of ethics are discussed. Original Value: The thesis contributes in a fundamental way to the research programme of radical constructivism by demonstrating that metaphysical assumptions about the nature of the “subject” are not an a priori necessity. Although the thesis in itself is not original, the paper offers a useful synthesis of ideas from a number of key thinkers in the disciplines of cybernetics, biology, psychology and philosophy.

Key words: psychological individuation, co-emergence, collective, self-consciousness, interpersonal interaction, theory of mind, conversation theory, conscience