This paper aims at shedding light on what students can “construct” when they learn science and how this construction process may be supported. Constructivism is a pluralist theory of science education. As a consequence, I support, there are several points of view concerning this construction process. Firstly, I stress that constructivism is rooted in two fields, psychology of cognitive development and epistemology, which leads to two ways of describing the construction process: either as a process of enrichment and/or reorganization of the cognitive structures at the mental level, or as a process of building or development of models or theories at the symbolic level. Secondly, I argue that the usual distinction between “personal constructivism” (PC) and “social constructivism” (SC) originates in a difference of model of reference: the one of PC is Piaget’s description of “spontaneous” concepts, assumed to be constructed by students on their own when interacting with their material environment, the one of SC is Vygotsky’s description of scientific concepts, assumed to be introduced by the teacher by means of verbal communication. Thirdly, I support the idea that, within SC, there are in fact two trends: one, in line with Piaget’s work, demonstrates how cooperation among students affects the development of each individual’s cognitive structures; the other, in line with Vygotsky’s work, claims that students can understand and master new models only if they are introduced to the scientific culture by their teacher. Fourthly, I draw attention to the process of “problem construction” identified by some French authors. Finally, I advocate for an integrated approach in science education, taking into account all the facets of science learning and teaching mentioned above and emphasizing their differences as well as their interrelations. Some suggestions intended to improve the efficiency of science teaching are made.

Key words: science learning science teaching, personal constructivism, social constructivism, cooperation, enculturation, problem construction.

The Tree of Knowledge, by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, is a landmark attempt to integrate biology, cognition, and epistemology into a single science, reversing the dualism of fact and value, and of observer and observed, that has haunted the West since the seventeenth century. The authors see perception as a reciprocal and interacting phenomenon, a “dance of congruity” that takes place between a living entity and its environment. This, they argue, implies a relativity of worldviews (there are no certainties), as well as the existence of a biology of cooperation going back millions of years. Recognition of a lack of absolutes, and of the nature of perception itself, they assert, make it possible for us today to change things for the better, as a deliberate and conscious act. What is overlooked in this discussion, however, are the origins and nature of conflict. By being pointedly apolitical, the authors wind up implying that one worldview is as good as the next. Cognitively speaking, the substitution of Buddhism for politics is a serious error, leaving, as it does, too many crucial questions unanswered. It is thus doubtful whether the biological argument being advanced here can stand up to serious scrutiny, and whether the dualism of modern science has indeed been overcome. Yet The Tree of Knowledge remains an important milestone in our current efforts to recognize that science is not value-free, and that fact and value are inevitably tied together. We are finally going to have to create a science that does not split the two apart, and that puts the human being back into the world as an involved participant, not as an alienated observer.

Emergence is the process by which new structures and functions come into being. There are two fundamental, but complementary, conceptions of emergence: combinatoric emergence, wherein novelty arises by new combinations of pre-existing elements, and creative emergence, wherein novelty arises by de novo creation of new kinds of elements. Combinatoric emergence is exemplified by new strings constructed from existing alphabetic letters, whereas creative emergence is exemplified by the addition of new kinds of letters to an alphabet. The two conceptions are complementary, providing two modes for describing and understanding change: as the unfolding consequences of a fixed set of rules or as new processes and interactions that come into play over time. Within an observer-centered, operational framework, the two kinds of emergent novelty can be distinguished by what an external observer must do in order to successfully predict the behavior of an evolving system. Combinatoric and creative emergence can be operationally distinguished by changes in apparent effective dimensionality. Whenever a new independent observable is added to a model, its dimensionality increases by one. A system that only recombines requires no new observables, and does not expand in effective dimension. In contrast, a system that creates new primitives requires new observables for its description, such that its apparent dimensionality increases over time. Dimensional analysis can be applied to signaling systems. Signals have two basic functional properties: signal-type (category, variable, type) and signal-value (state, value, token). These properties can be conveyed by a variety of means: by the signal’s physical channel, by the internal form of the signal (waveform, Fourier spectrum), by its time of arrival, and by its magnitude (average power). Neural coding schemes can similarly be based on which neurons fire, which temporal patterns of spikes are produced, when volleys of spikes arrive, or how many spikes are produced. Traditional connectionist networks are discussed in terms of their assumptions about signal-roles and neural codes. For the most part, connectionist networks are conceptualized in terms of new linkage combinations rather than in terms of new types of signals being created. Neural networks that increase their effective dimensionalities can be envisioned. Some kinds of neural codes, such as temporal pattern and time-of-arrival codes, permit encoding and transmission of multidimensional information by the same elements (multiplexing). We outline how synchronous time-division and asynchronous code-division multiplexing might be realized in neural pulse codes. Multidimensional temporal codes permit different kinds of information to be encoded in different time patterns. Broadcast-based coordination strategies that obviate the need for precise, specified point-to-point connections are then made possible. In such systems new signal types arise from temporal interactions between time-coded signals, without necessarily forming new connections. Pitches of complex tones are given as examples of temporally-coded, emergent Gestalts that can be seen either as the sums of constituent micro-patterns (combinatoric emergence) or as the creation of new ones. Within these temporally-coded systems, interacting sets of neural assemblies might ramify existing, circulating signals to construct new kinds of signal primitives in an apparently open-ended manner.

Key words: combinatoric and creative emergence, dimensionality, observables, signaling systems, temporal coding, neural assemblies.

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to outline an integrative, high-level, neurocomputational theory of brain function based on temporal codes, neural timing nets, and active regeneration of temporal patterns of spikes within recurrent neural circuits that provides a time-domain alternative to connectionist approaches. Design/methodology/approach – This conceptual-theoretical paper draws from cybernetics, theoretical biology, neurophysiology, integrative and computational neuroscience, psychology, and consciousness studies. Findings: The high-level functional organization of the brain involves adaptive cybernetic, goal-seeking, switching, and steering mechanisms embedded in percept-action-environment loops. The cerebral cortex is conceived as a network of reciprocally connected, re-entrant loops within which circulate neuronal signals that build up, decay, and/or actively regenerate. The basic signals themselves are temporal patterns of spikes (temporal codes), held in the spike correlation mass-statistics of both local and global neuronal ensembles. Complex temporal codes afford multidimensional vectorial representations, multiplexing of multiple signals in spike trains, broadcast strategies of neural coordination, and mutually reinforcing, autopoiesis-like dynamics. Our working hypothesis is that complex temporal codes form multidimensional vectorial representations that interact with each other such that a few basic processes and operations may account for the vast majority of both lowand high-level neural informational functions. These operational primitives include mutual amplification/inhibition of temporal pattern vectors, extraction of common signal dimensions, formation of neural assemblies that generate new temporal pattern primitive “tags” from meaningful, recurring combinations of features (perceptual symbols), active regeneration of temporal patterns, content-addressable temporal pattern memory, and long-term storage and retrieval of temporal patterns via a common synaptic and/or molecular mechanism. The result is a relatively simplified, signal-centric view of the brain that utilizes universal coding schemes and pattern-resonance processing operations. In neurophenomenal terms, waking consciousness requires regeneration and build up of temporal pattern signals in global loops, whose form determines the contents of conscious experience at any moment. Practical implications: Understanding how brains work as informational engines has manifold long-reaching practical implications for design of autonomous, adaptive robotic systems. By proposing how new concepts might arise in brains, the theory bears potential implications for constructivist theories of mind, i.e. how observer-actors interacting with one another can self-organize and complexify. Originality/value – The theory is highly original and heterodox in its neural coding and neurocomputational assumptions. By providing a possible alternative to standard connectionist theory of brain function, it expands the scope of thinking about how brains might work as informational systems.

Key words: Cognition, consciousness, neural nets, cybernetics, autopoiesis, brain.

Open peer commentary on the article “Studying Conceptual Change in Classrooms: Using Association Rule Mining to Detect Changes in Students’ Explanations of the Effects of Urban Planning and Social Policy” by Arthur Hjorth & Uri Wilensky. Abstract: What could be more important than exploring how students construct knowledge? The authors have taken a major step in using constructionist tools to analyze how students change their concepts after interacting with a multiagent model in a course on urban design. I will address what I consider to be several missed opportunities in their presentation.

Most accounts of functionality are based in etiology, either design or selection. In this paper I give an account of function as serving autonomy, which is the closure of self-maintaining processes, including those interacting with the environment. Autonomy is inherently dynamic, being based entirely on interacting processes, whose organization constitutes the integrity of the autonomous system. The etiological account focuses on external factors, either intentions in design or outcomes in selection. It ignores any but idiosyncratic organizational requirements within the biological entity and in its interactions with its environment, even though these may play a central role in the functionality of the trait in question. In particular, there is no simple relation between adaptation on the etiological account and adaptability, a higher order emergent trait that plays a central role in behavior and the evolutionary and developmental genesis of intelligence. I propose redefining adaptiveness in terms of autonomy. The definition naturally extends to adaptability and focuses on the organizational character of adaptiveness, forcing attention on this central biological characteristic, which is easily ignored in the etiological account. The result is a much richer account of both adaptation and selection.

Purpose: This paper sets out to provide arguments and examples supporting the idea that some “wicked” design problems may be usefully approached through the process of bringing forth a self – observing collective, i.e., a community of observers capable of generating and dynamically adjusting a collective standpoint from where new observations can be made. Design/methodology/approach – Interactions within a community of observers can be designed to generate a collective standpoint from where new observations can be made and fed back to the interacting observers, thus ensuring that the collective standpoint also extends the observers’ capacity to observe. Instances of this process are discussed to demonstrate its contribution towards dealing with some wicked design problems. Findings: The paper suggests that one’s capacity to observe, feel, reflect, communicate, and act can be systematically harnessed in a self – observing collective in order to strengthen each member in the face of complex and unstructured problem situations. However, the continued success of the process depends on the effective construction and dynamic maintenance of the collective standpoint that gives the self – observing collective its unique power. Originality/value – The paper borrows certain insights from second – order cybernetics to suggest a way of dealing with ill – structured (and wicked) design problems by facilitating a process of interaction within a community of observers who must be enabled to live with the wickedness of the problem with minimum harm. Relevance: The idea of self – observation in research is a gift from cybernetics, especially from the work of Heinz von Foerster, where the idea was central to the framework of second – order cybernetics or cybernetics of observing systems (as opposed to first – order cybernetics, which is the cybernetics of observed systems). The subject matter of the present paper deals with demonstrating the possibility of coordinating interaction of observers in a group setting so that the group itself acquires the dual status of being an observed system as well as an observing system. Such a group can generate new standpoints or schemata based on the inputs from its members, thus giving rise to new viewpoints.

I outline five criteria for an enactive account of intersubjectivity. First, it should do justice to social interaction processes and to subjectivity in its experiential, bodily, existential, and historico-sociocultural complexity. Second, an integrative intersubjectivity framework should connect physiological, neural, interactional, linguistic, and societal aspects and levels of explanation. This requires concepts and methodologies that span several different disciplines. Third, it should encourage applications and dialogue with experts in other sectors, such as teachers and therapists. Fourth, it should recognize the values that underlie it, so it can serve critical awareness of how it influences and is influenced by societal institutions and norms. Finally, because its subject matter is the ways in which people understand and deal with each other, it should be prepared to deal with ethical questions and dimensions. Then, I investigate how the state of the art in enactive intersubjectivity research fares in the face of these criteria.

Key words: social interaction, subjectivity, experience, connection, interacting, autonomy, sense-making, participatory sense-making, social understanding, constitutive factor

Underlying the recent focus on embodied and interactive aspects of social understanding are several intuitions about what roles the body, interaction processes, and interpersonal experience play. In this paper, we introduce a systematic, hands-on method for investigating the experience of interacting and its role in intersubjectivity. Special about this method is that it starts from the idea that researchers of social understanding are themselves one of the best tools for their own investigations. The method provides ways for researchers to calibrate and to trust themselves as sophisticated instruments to help generate novel insights into human interactive experience. We present the basics of the method, and two empirical studies. The first is a video-study on autism, which shows greater refinement in the way people with autism embody their social interactions than previously thought. The second is a study of thinking in live interactions, which provides insight into the common feeling that too much thinking can hamper interaction, and into how this kind of interactional awkwardness might be unblocked.

Key words: experience of interacting, first-person methods, second-person methods, embodied methodology, embodiment, enaction, researcher as instrument, practical phenomenology, autism interacting and thinking, participatory sense-making.

Exerpt: In this essay, we provide an overview of the various claims defended by the enactive approach to intersubjectivity, from how social interactions can be defined operationally to how social understanding is rooted in participatory sense-making, even when we are not interacting with others. In contrast to prevailing views, the enactive approach does not put all the emphasis on individual capabilities to explain forms of social understanding and social action. This has often been interpreted as adopting an interactionist stance on intersubjectivity. It is indeed the case that social interaction patterns have not played a prevalent role in cognitive science and social neuroscience until recently, and in the light of this, a participatory as opposed to spectatorial stance still needs to be presented and defended.

Key words: Enactive approach, Intersubjectivity, Participatory sense-making, Social cognition, Social interaction