Key word "interpersonal interaction"
Di Paolo E. A. & De Jaegher H. (2012) The interactive brain hypothesis. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6: 163. https://cepa.info/761
Di Paolo E. A. & De Jaegher H.
(
2012)
The interactive brain hypothesis.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6: 163.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/761
Enactive approaches foreground the role of interpersonal interaction in explanations of social understanding. This motivates, in combination with a recent interest in neuroscientific studies involving actual interactions, the question of how interactive processes relate to neural mechanisms involved in social understanding. We introduce the Interactive Brain Hypothesis (IBH) in order to map the spectrum of possible relations between social interaction and neural processes. The hypothesis states that interactive experience and skills play enabling roles in both the development and current function of social brain mechanisms, even in the absence of immediate interaction. We examine the plausibility of this hypothesis against developmental and neurobiological evidence and contrast it with the widespread assumption that mindreading is crucial to all social cognition. We describe the elements of social interaction that bear most directly on this hypothesis and discuss the empirical possibilities open to social neuroscience. The link between coordination dynamics and social understanding can be grasped by studying transitions between coordination states. These transitions form part of the self-organization of interaction processes that characterize the dynamics of social engagement. The patterns of this self-organization help explain how individuals understand each other. Various possibilities for role-taking emerge during interaction, determining a spectrum of participation. This view contrasts sharply with the observational stance that has guided research in social neuroscience until recently. We also introduce the concept of readiness to interact to describe the practices and dispositions that are summoned in situations of social significance. Relevance: The paper derives in explicit form some of the empirical neuroscientific implications of the enactive approach to intersubjectivity.
Scott B. (2007) The Co-Emergence of Parts and Wholes in Psychological Individuation. Constructivist Foundations 2(2-3): 65–71. https://cepa.info/31
Scott B.
(
2007)
The Co-Emergence of Parts and Wholes in Psychological Individuation.
Constructivist Foundations 2(2-3): 65–71.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/31
Purpose: The purpose of the paper is to provide a constructivist account of the “self as subject” that avoids the need for any metaphysical assumptions. Findings: The thesis developed in this paper is that the human “psychological individual,” “self” or “subject” is an emergent within the nexus of human social interaction. With respect to psychological and social wholes (composites) there is no distinction between the form of the elements and the form of the composites they constitute i.e., all elements have the form of composites. Further, recursively, composites may serve as elements within higher order composites. Implications for a rational theory of ethics are discussed. Original Value: The thesis contributes in a fundamental way to the research programme of radical constructivism by demonstrating that metaphysical assumptions about the nature of the “subject” are not an a priori necessity. Although the thesis in itself is not original, the paper offers a useful synthesis of ideas from a number of key thinkers in the disciplines of cybernetics, biology, psychology and philosophy.
Sridharan V. (2015) Beyond consensual domains: Enactivism, social representations and third-order unities. Culture & Psychology 21(2): 259–275.
Sridharan V.
(
2015)
Beyond consensual domains: Enactivism, social representations and third-order unities.
Culture & Psychology 21(2): 259–275.
Although Enactivism and cultural anthropology share many core principles, a satisfactory Enactivist approach to culture has not yet been articulated. While the Enactivist embraces the cultural anthropologist’s skepticism with respect to a pregiven world described through objective truths, one of its stumbling blocks has been its difficulty in accounting for the normative background of interpersonal interaction, or what Wolfgang Wagner has referred to as “Social Representations.” This article argues that in order for the Enactivist to provide the conceptual tools necessary for this analysis, she must make use of what Varela and others refer to as “third-order unities.” The same principles that the Enactivist uses to explain the emergent properties of cells and organisms – autopiesis and identity-production – must be applied at the level of a society in order to understand how cultural meanings emerge and how they influence individual behavior. By applying these concepts at the supra-individual level, we get a more lucid picture of the fundamental features of an Enactivist account of culture, and can better understand the fundamental principles that Enactivism claims underlie all living systems both simple and complex.
Export result page as:
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·