David O., Garnero L. & Varela F. J. (2001) A new approach to the MEG/EEG inverse problem for the recovery of cortical phase-synchrony. In: Insana M. F. & Leahy R. M. (eds.) Information processing in medical imaging. Lecture Notes in Computer Science Volume 2082. Springer, Berlin: 272–285.
Little has been done yet to study the synchronization properties of the sources estimated from the MEG/EEG inverse problem, despite the growing interest in the role of phase relations in brain functions. In order to achieve this aim, we propose a novel approach to the MEG/EEG inverse problem based on some regularization using spectral priors: The MEG/EEG raw data are filtered in a frequency band of interest and blurred with some specific “regularization noise” prior to the inversion process. This formalism uses non quadratic regularization and a deterministic optimization algorithm. We proceed to Monte Carlo simulations using the chaotic Rössler oscillators to model the neural generators. Our results demonstate that it is possible to reveal some phase-locking between brain sources with great accuracy following the computation of the inverse problem based on scalp MEG/EEG measurements.
Friston K. (2018) Does predictive coding have a future? Nature Neuroscience 21(8): 1019–1021. https://cepa.info/6699
In the 20th century we thought the brain extracted knowledge from sensations. The 21st century witnessed a ‘strange inversion’, in which the brain became an organ of inference, actively constructing explanations for what’s going on ‘out there’, beyond its sensory epithelia. One paper played a key role in this paradigm shift.
Glanville R. (1997) A ship without a rudder. In: Glanville R. & de Zeeuw G. (eds.) Problems of excavating cybernetics and systems. BKS+, Southsea. https://cepa.info/2846
In order to excavate something of cybernetics, I look at the notion of stability. Stability is related to the basic cybernetic concept goal. It is shown that every goal must have a goal of its own. It is also shown that the determination that the goal is a goal is observer dependent. By an inversion, it is shown that every stable system must be assumed to have an internal goal of its own. Thus, apparently random behaviour (viewed from the outside) is entirely stable (viewed from the inside). Several ways of handling these potentially difficult concepts are indicated. A codification is given in an appendix.
Izquierdo-Torres E. & Di Paolo E. A. (2005) Is an embodied system ever purely reactive? In: Capcarrere M. et al. (ed.) ECAL 2005: Proceedings of the 8th European Conference on Artificial Life. Springer, Berlin: 252–261. https://cepa.info/4905
This paper explores the performance of a simple model agent using a reactive controller in situations where, from an external perspective, a solution that relies on internal states would seem to be required. In a visually-guided orientation task with sensory inversion and an object discrimination task a study of the instantaneous response properties and time-extended dynamics explain the non-reactive performance. The results question common intuitions about the capabilities of reactive controllers and highlight the significance of the agent’s recent history of interactions with its environment in generating behaviour. This work reinforces the idea that embodied behaviour exhibits properties that cannot be deduced directly from those of the controller by itself.
Purpose: This conceptual-epistemological paper deals with the old problem of inversion of thinking, as typified by traditional metaphysics-ontology. It is proposed that a thorough constructivism – which views structures of mind, nature, and all, as not derived from (not referring to) any pre-structured given mind-independent reality (zero-derivation, 0-D) – can go beyond this conceptual impasse; it can also serve as a fall-back position for positive ontologies. Practical implications: The practical result of 0-D is that all structures of experience are understood as tools serving individual and collective subjects. Conclusion: This conceptual correction results in a simplification for the understanding of some conceptual puzzles, such as the mind-brain relation, but also in a considerable increase of responsibility, because entities and agents formerly considered responsible, and outside the mind, are recognized to be extensions of the subjects.
This paper provides a conceptual framework to accommodate important recent developments in immunology (genetic determination, cellular interactions, suppression). The basic idea is to look at the immune system as a closed network of interactions which self-determines its ongoing pattern of stability and its capacities of interaction with its environment. Thus, all immune events are understood as a form of self-recognition, and whatever falls outside this domain, shaped by genetics and ontogeny, is simply non-sensical. This paradigm, stemming from the ideas of Jerne, represents almost a logical inversion of the Burnetian idea of self-discrimination. A detailed discussion of the immunological evidence that substantiates this view is presented, together with some new concepts (eigenbehavior, cognitive domains). Although the paper is addressed to biologists and immunologists, we make extensive use of system-theoretic notions in a non-mathematical form (recursion, nets and trees, self-organization).