Constructivism is an approach to knowledge and learning that focuses on the active role of knowers. Sanchez and Loredo propose a classification of constructivist thinkers and address what they perceive to be internal problems of present-day constructivism. The remedy they propose is a return to the genetic constructivism of James Mark Baldwin, Jean Piaget and Lev Vygotsky. In this article we first raise the question of whether thinkers like Baldwin, Vygotsky, Maturana and Varela are adequately depicted as constructivists, and subsequently argue that constructivism is caught in an overly epistemic version of the subject/object dichotomy. We then introduce a genetic logic that is not based on the Hegelian dialectics of negation and mediation, but rather on the idea of the recursive consensual coordination of actions that give rise to stylized cultural practices. We argue that a genuinely genetic and generative psychology should be concerned with the multifarious and ever-changing nature of human “life” and not merely with the construction of knowledge about life. Relevance: The article deals with perceived “internal” problems of constructivist approaches and proposes a genetic and generative psychology that is centrally concerned with human life-as-lived and not merely with life-as-known. The article furthermore raises the question whether key thinkers like Vygotsky, Maturana and Varela and are adequately depicted as constructivists.

Key words: Constructivism, genetic logic, generativity, expressivism, enactivism.

At the occasion of their fortieth anniversary, the Archives Jean Piaget, a foundation created by Bärbel Inhelder in 1974 for the preservation and promulgation of Piaget’s oeuvre, invited in Geneva ten among the most prominent and influential developmental psychologists to the first Jean Piaget Conferences. Cognitive developmental psychology has undergone radical changes during these last four decades since the last formulations of Piaget’s constructivism. In this double special issue, the invitees of the Jean Piaget Conferences elaborate on their own conception of developmental changes in a variety of domains and functions, offering a comprehensive overview of current theories of cognitive development.

Key words: theories of cognitive development, piaget, archives jean piaget.

We characterize Rolando García’s view on science, as outlined on his writings on science and university policy, and then we trace this view on his constructivist epistemology. Through this lens, we analyze his review and reformulation of Jean Piaget’s constructivist theory, his subsequent reflection on interdisciplinary research of complex systems. Based on this analysis, we outline the current challenges for a constructivist epistemology.

Context: Constructivist epistemology is not a doctrinal set of clear and consistent theses and assumptions but a movement full of tensions, with minimally integrated lines of discussions. Problem: This situation explains why it is so difficult to come up with a general definition of constructivist epistemology that could serve as a starting point to study its several research programs systematically and comparatively. Method: We compare the constructivist epistemologies of Jean Piaget, Ernst von Glasersfeld, Humberto Maturana, and Niklas Luhmann regarding tensions between knowledge/reality and individual/society. Results: Our comparison leads to a general definition of constructivist epistemology as a heterogeneous movement problematizing certain dualities - such as subject/object, knowledge/reality, or individual/society - that have been shown to be central for epistemological inquiry. We argue that such dualisms can be used as dimensions for critical analysis, comparison, and discussion among the different research programs, and that, at the same time, they would allow us to analyze the general strategies characterizing such programs. The comparative and critical analysis of the programs by way of the aforementioned tensions results in an organized presentation highlighting their convergences, divergences, and singularities.

Context: Radical Constructivism is an issue that deeply divides the cognitive science community: most researchers reject it, but an increasing number do not. Problem: Constructivists stress that our knowledge starts from experience. Some (“ontic” constructivists) deny the existence of a mind-independent world, while others (“radical” constructivists) claim merely that, if such a world exists, we can know nothing about it. Both positions conflict with scientific realism. It is not clear that the conflict can be resolved. Method: This paper uses philosophical argument to ask whether constructivism can be rationally preferred over realism in science. Results: Ontic constructivism cannot be disproved by any knock-down argument. Nevertheless, it is irrational to accept it, because it ignores the strategy of “inference to the best explanation”: realism is the best explanation of the successes of science. Radical constructivism, too, fails to explain these successes. Some radical constructivists have tried to offer theories more sympathetic to realism. For instance, Ernst von Glasersfeld sees science as a coherent ordering of experience, and appeals to Piagetian psychology as support. There are close similarities. But Piaget was also caught in a constructivist anti-realism, despite his attempt to evade it. Implications: The constructivist’s claim that scientific concepts and theories are generated by human minds is correct. But this important insight should not be used to deny realism, which is the best explanation of the many undeniable successes of science and engineering.

Key words: cognitive science, mind-independent world, genetic fallacy, intentionality, epigenesis, Jean Piaget, Ernst von Glasersfeld

Ever since we wrote a paper on the constructivist theory of knowledge for the Journal, fifteen years ago, chemists and chemical educators have asked: Do you really believe in the constructivist theory? The answer is: Yes. As we talk to colleagues we have become convinced that the source of their concern about this theory is the version to which they have been exposed. As we note in this paper, even critics of this theory argue “that there is a very broad and loose sense in which all of us these days are constructivists.… ” This paper outlines the different forms of the constructivist theory and describes a version proposed by the clinical psychologist, George Kelly, that avoids some of the controversial elements of the radical constructivist theory developed as an extension of the work of Jean Piaget.

Although the core of Jean Piaget’s scientific legacy is his stage model of intellectual ontogenesis and his studies of the reasoning skills that figure in those stages, his impact on education, especially American education, has been vast. Thirty years ago, his theory of cognitive development stimulated revolutionary changes in preschool and elementary school curriculum practices, and in the ensuing decades, Piagetian thought has continued to foment major changes in American education, with the whole language approach to reading instruction being a recent illustration. The aim of the present chapter is to focus attention on those aspects of Piaget’s contributions that have proven to be of greatest significance for educational psychology. The chapter begins with a biographical sketch. The rest of the chapter deals with Piaget’s views on learning. This material is divided into 2 sections. The first section presents Piagetian ideas about the relation between cognitive development and learning, and it summarizes findings from classical experiments that tested those ideas. The second section presents Piagetian ideas about instructional methodology and also summarizes findings from classical experiments that tested those ideas.

In arguing that the philosophical works of Jean Piaget could be used as a `remedy’ for the flaws in those of Thomas Kuhn, Tsou overlooked some crucial aspects of the problem: the early history between them, the biological foundation supporting Piaget’s method, and a preexisting suggestion regarding the intended future extension of his work. There was also no mention of the existence of a `lost’ manuscript by Kuhn, which supposedly presents the mature articulation of his theory. This comment therefore proposes some `friendly amendments’ to Tsou’s exposition, with a view to helping achieve his synthetic vision once the `lost’ work has finally been published. Yet the basic message, in anticipation of this future endeavor, is also exceedingly simple: the implicit direction of Piaget’s (and Kuhn’s) epistemological constructivism can be characterized as evolutionary-developmental `progress from, ’ rather than vitalist-teleological `progress toward. '

This essay takes – as its point of departure – Cavicchi’s (2006) argument that knowledge develops through experimentation, both in science and in educational settings. In attempting to support and extend her conclusions, which are drawn in part from the replication of some early tasks in the history of developmental psychology, the late realist-constructivist theory of Jean Piaget is presented and summarized. This is then turned back on the subjects of Cavicchi’s larger enquiry (education and science) to offer a firmer foundation for future debate. Several of Piaget’s “forgotten works” are discussed; their theoretical contributions synthesized to form a single interdisciplinary, crosspollinating narrative describing how it is that both children and scientists grow into the world. (In addition, translated excerpts from two related historical documents have been provided in an appendix, while detailed footnotes add further context and integrate the discussion with current advances in related fields.)

‘Constructivism’ is a term adopted by many contemporary philosophical approaches. It appeared with the work of Piaget, and since then it has been appropriated by many approaches with different ontological and epistemological orientations. This article examines some of these major contemporary appropriations on three issues: the problem of realism and the problems of possibility and source of knowledge. Piagetian constructivism, socioconstructivism, logical constructivism, radical constructivism and social constructivism are analyzed. The purpose of this study || is to provide a better definition of the term, maintaining its link to its historical origin, and at the same time to be helpful in clarifying its indiscriminate use. A part of the conceptual confusion surrounding the term is solved with the dissolution of the false polarities between realism and constructivism, and between objectivism and skepticism. The conclusion is that the positions vary between realism and antirealism, and between criticism and relativism. It finds in the problem of the source of knowledge the common denominators of all allegations of constructivism: the rejection of empiricist objectivism and the adoption of the Kantian sense of the construction metaphor. We can positively define constructivism as the epistemological thesis that supports the active role of the subject in creating and modifying his representations of the object of knowledge.

Key words: constructivism, social constructivism, radical constructivism, jean piaget, objectivism.