Excerpt: My purpose in this paper is to show that the two major options on which the current debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics relies, namely realism and empiricism (or instrumentalism), are far from being exhaustive. There is at least one more position available; a position which has been widely known in the history of philosophy during the past two centuries but which, in spite of some momentous exceptions, has only attracted little interest until recently in relation to the foundational problems of quantum mechanics. According to this third position, one may provide a theory with much stronger justifications than mere a posteriori empirical adequacy, without invoking the slightest degree of isomorphism between this theory and the elusive things out there. Such an intermediate attitude, which is metaphysically as agnostic as empiricism, but which shares with realism a commitment to considering the structure of theories as highly significant, has been named transcendentalism after Kant. Of course, I have no intention in this paper to rehearse the procedures and concepts developed by Kant himself; for these particular procedures and concepts were mostly adapted to the state of physics in his time, namely to Newtonian mechanics. I rather wish to formulate a generalized version of his method and show how this can yield a reasoning that one is entitled to call a transcendental deduction of quantum mechanics. This will be done in three steps. To begin with, I shall define carefully the word “transcendental,” and the procedure of “transcendental deduction,” in terms which will make clear how they can have a much broader field of application than Kant ever dared to imagine. Then, I shall show briefly that the main structural features of quantum mechanics can indeed be transcendentally deduced in this modern sense. Finally, I shall discuss the significance, and also the limits, of these results.

My purpose in this paper is to show that the transcendental approach, first formulated by Kant, and then elaborated by generations of neo-Kantian thinkers and phenomenologists, provides Buddhism in its highest intellectual achievement with a natural philosophy of science. I take this highest achievement to be the Madhyamaka dialectic and soteriology,{1} which was developed in India from the second century C.E. to the seventh century C.E. by masters such as Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, and Candrakīrti. Relevance: This is an anti-realist interpretation of quantum mechanics related to the work of Francisco Varela.

Context: Luhmann’s theory of autopoietic social systems is increasingly receiving attention in the scholarly dispute about constructivism. Problem: The paper explores the transition from Kant’s “transcendental/empirical” to Luhmann’s “system/environment” distinction to provide a deepened understanding of Luhmann’s constructivist approach. Method: Luhmann’s construction of reality via the system/environment distinction is discussed with respect to preceding concepts provided by philosophical and system/cybernetic scholars such as Kant, Husserl, Piaget, von Glasersfeld, von Foerster, and Maturana & Varela. The innovativeness of Luhmann’s approach is then critically evaluated. Results: Luhmann’s contribution to constructivism is innovative only in the context of his stringent theory architecture of autopoietic meaning-based systems. Implications: The text is a contribution to the positioning of this approach as part of the philosophical and systems/cybernetics constructivist heritage.

Key words: Theory of social systems (TSS), observation, autopoiesis, self-reference & hetero-reference, meaning

In the middle of the nineteenth century, advances in experimental psychology and the physiology of the sense organs inspired so-called ‘Back to Kant’ Neo-Kantians to articulate robustly psychologistic visions of Kantian epistemology. But their accounts of the thing in itself were fraught with deep tension: they wanted to conceive of things in themselves as the causes of our sensations, while their own accounts of causal inference ruled that claim out. This paper diagnoses the source of that problem in views of one Neo-Kantan, F. A. Lange, and argues that it is solved only by Ernst Mach. No less than Lange and other Neo-Kantians, Mach was inspired to develop a psychologistic account of the foundations of knowledge, but his account also includes a coherent denial of things in themselves’ existence. Finally, this paper uses this account of Lange and Mach on things in themselves to illuminate Mach’s relation to a certain strain of the Neo-Kantian philosophy of his own time: his views constitute a more fully coherent version of the psychologistic theory of knowledge Back to Kant figures tried to articulate.

Key words: ernst mach, f. a. lange, things in themselves, causality, explanation, neo-kantianism

Current research on spontaneous, self-generated brain rhythms and dynamic neural network coordination cast new light on Immanuel Kant’s idea of the ‘spontaneity’ of cognition, that is, the mind’s capacity to organize and synthesize sensory stimuli in novel, unprecedented ways. Nevertheless, determining the precise nature of the brain-cognition mapping remains an outstanding challenge. Neurophenomenology, which uses phenomenological information about the variability of subjective experience in order to illuminate the variability of brain dynamics, offers a promising method for addressing this challenge.

Excerpt: The point has been made that Humberto Maturana’s “radical constructivism” is in many respects neo-Kantian. There are also definite parallels between aspects of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre and Maturana’s biological epistemology. On the other hand, it should not be overlooked that idealist authors like Kant and Fichte were still entangled in several metaphysical paradigms, which can no longer be supported by constructivist theories. For political and ethical reasons, this seems especially important, when it comes to idealist philosophies of history. Kant, for instance, continued the tradition of a teleology of history, even though he did it by way of his famous “as-if” relativization. He felt that his critical philosophy had to act as if there were a telos and potentially describable purpose to history, although it could never be proved. Eschatology was, therefore, considered to be more than just a necessity of human reason. (On that level – as a principle of reason, log¬ics, and the construction of meaning – teleology is, of course, important for constructivism as well.) One had to act as though it were a law of nature as well, or else there would ultimately be no reason.

In 1781, Immanuel Kant argued that cognitive agents ignored the underlying structure of their world “as such” (the noumenal reality), and could only know phenomenal reality (the world “as it appears” through their experience). We introduce design principles to implement these theoretical ideas. Our agent’s input data is not a direct function of the environment’s state as it is in most symbolic or reinforcement-learning models. The agent is designed to discover and learn regularities in its stream of experience and to construct knowledge about phenomena whose hypothetical presence in the environment explains these regularities. We report a proof-of-concept experiment in which the agent constructs categories of phenomena, and exploits this knowledge to satisfy innate preferences. This work suggests a new approach to cognitive modeling that focuses on the agent’s internal stream of experience. We argue that this approach complies with theories of embodied cognition and enaction.

Within the limits of one chapter, an unconventional way of thinking can certainly not be thoroughly justified, but it can, perhaps, be presented in its most characteristic features anchored here and there in single points. There is, of course, the danger of being misunderstood. In the case of constructivism, there is the additional risk that it will be discarded at first sight because, like skepticism – with which it has a certain amount in common – it might seem too cool and critical, or simply incompatible with ordinary common sense. The proponents of an idea, as a rule, explain its nonacceptance differently than do the critics and opponents. Being myself much involved, it seems to me that the resistance met in the 18th century by Giambattista Vico, the first true constructivist, and by Silvio Ceccato and Jean Piaget in the more recent past, is not so much due to inconsistencies or gaps in their argumentation, as to the justifiable suspicion that constructivism intends to undermine too large a part of the traditional view of the world. Indeed, one need not enter very far into constructivist thought to realize that it inevitably leads to the contention that man – and man alone – is responsible for his thinking, his knowledge and, therefore, also for what he does. Today, when behaviorists are still intent on pushing all responsibility into the environment, and sociobiologists are trying to place much of it into genes, a doctrine may well seem uncomfortable if it suggests that we have no one but ourselves to thank for the world in which we appear to be living. That is precisely what constructivism intends to say – but it says a good deal more. We build that world for the most part unawares, simply because we do not know how we do it. That ignorance is quite unnecessary. Radical constructivism maintains – not unlike Kant in his Critique – that the operations by means of which we assemble our experiential world can be explored, and that an awareness of this operating (which Ceccato in Italian so nicely called consapevolezza operativa) can help us do it differently and, perhaps, better.

Purpose: Radical constructivism holds that experiential reality is created by each individual. As a way of thinking, it unquestionably belongs to the theories of knowledge that are called “subjectivist” and “relativist.” This paper deals with the Italian philosopher Adriano Tilgher’s analysis of the relation between relativism and fascism and examines the possible impact of this connection on constructivism and its view of ethics. Approach: Conceptual analysis and the demonstration of a contradiction in Tilgher’s argumentation. Findings: A review of the ethics inherent in Kant’s categorical imperative shows a tendency towards a subjectivism that may hint at anarchism but in no way implies fascism. Implications: This investigation should make it more difficult for critics of constructivism to relate it to fascism.

Key words: relativism, subjectivism, ethics, categorical imperative

Context: The idea to write this paper sprang up in a casual conversation that led to the question of how the word “experience” would be translated into German. Distinctions between the German “Erleben” and “Erfahren,” and their intricacies with “Erkennen” and “Anerkennen,” soon led to the conviction that this was a thread worth pursuing.  Problem: Much has been written about the nature of experience, but there is little consensus, to this day, regarding the role of consciousness in the process of experiencing. Although RC acknowledges the significance of tacit or sensorimotor knowledge in the individual’s practical operating, it cannot admit it as a basis to the formation of conceptual structures that, by definition, are conscious. Method: Drawing from our backgrounds in epistemology and psychology, and a shared interest in Piaget’s psychogenetic approach, we investigate the origins and development of human experience, in this case the mastery of space, time, causation, and object-permanency. We focus on how “noticeable encounters” are gauged, reflected upon, and ultimately worked through, consciously or unconsciously, by the “experiencer.” Results: A child’s abilities to enact a certain action pattern in a given situation no more demonstrates a re-presentation of the pattern than does recognition in the case of objects. In his studies with children, Piaget has shown that the Kantian categories of space, time object, and “causality” are co-constitutive of the child’s own motion – and its felt impact – as a means to make the world cohere. Of importance here are the concepts of “effective causality,” felicitous encounters, and agency. Implications: Understanding the circumstances under which some “lived” events, whether self-initiated or striking as if out of nowhere, become noticeable and able affect a person’s life is a daunting task. This joint essay is no more than a conversation-starter and an invitation to further explore the intricacies between agency and causation, sensation and cognition, and, yes, motions and emotions in the making of consciousness itself.

Key words: psychogenesis, space-time, effective causality, empiricism, Immanuel Kant, William James, Jean Piaget