At present, due in part to our insufficient understanding of the traumatic experience, we are unable to account for the fact that while some people develop post-traumatic symptoms following a traumatic event, others do not. This article suggests that by adopting the enactive approach to perception – according to which perceiving is a way of acting – we may be able to improve our understanding of the traumatic experience and the factors which result in the development of post-traumatic symptoms. The central argument presented in this paper is that when the options of flight or fight are unavailable as a coping/defense mechanism, one freezes (freeze response). In this situation, the ability to master one’s movements is damaged and, in radical cases, the ability to move is lost altogether; as a result the sensorimotor loop may collapse. This, in turn, leads to distorted perception and, in consequence, memory disorders may develop.

Key words: trauma, ptsd, enactivism, knowing-how, freeze response, dissociation

Excerpt: Many of us share the conviction that constructivist learning theories have the potential to inspire the development of new models of instructional practice. We also believe that knowing how people learn will influence how we help them learn. However, constructivist learning theories should not, and do not, privilege or endorse any particular mode of instruction. The best way to teach will be one that helps students learn a specific subject or a skill most effectively, whether it be invention, reproduction, replication, memorization, or mimicry. This paper addresses two issues: the basic assumptions and characteristics of constructivist theories of learning (CTL), and the circumstances under which they may be applied to guide instruction. In order to answer questions related to the above issues, it is necessary to clarify the differences between the major concepts of objectivism and constructivism. Also, it is necessary to understand the differences between various schools of CTL before drawing on any of them to guide instruction.

The binary divide between traditional cognitivist and enactivist paradigms is tied to their respective commitments to understanding cognition as based on knowing that as opposed to knowing how. Using O’Regan’s and Noë‘s landmark sensorimotor contingency theory of perceptual experience as a foil, I demonstrate how easy it is to fall into conservative thinking. Although their account is advertised as decidedly ‘skill-based’, on close inspection it shows itself to be riddled with suppositions threatening to reduce it to a rules-and-representations approach. To remain properly enactivist it must be purged of such commitments and indeed all commitment to mediating knowledge: it must embrace a more radical enactivism

Key words: Cognitivism, Consciousness, Enactivism, Experience, Knowledge, Perception

“Knowing how we know” is the subject of this book. Its authors present a new view of cognition that has important social and ethical implications, for, they assert, the only world we humans can have is the one we create together through the actions of our coexistence. Written for a general audience as well as for students, scholars, and scientists and abundantly illustrated with examples from biology, linguistics, and social and“tultural phenomena, this revised edition includes a new afterword by Dr. Varela, in which he discusses the effect the book has had in the y ears since its first publication.

Excerpt: I propose then to mean when I say cybernetics, the art and science of reflexive understanding, for this makes clear the circularity that has been the hallmark of cybernetics by specifying what cyberneticians most generally do. Please note that reflexive is generally understood in two ways, both involving a turning back into a self. The distinction hinges on the circuit through which this turning back takes place. Reflex actions (such as the knee-jerk), as we usually think of them, involve being in a situation without reflecting. We are certainly interested in this kind of understanding, the kind that emerges from immersing yourself in a situation and knowing how to behave. Such a circuit might be thought of as a small-circuit reflexivity. On the other hand, second-order cybernetics has certainly allowed a long-circuit reflexivity, including a reflective knower in the act of understanding in a situation, for it is this reflexivity that has allowed cybernetics to indeed be applied to itself. In fact, it is precisely through a long-circuit reflexivity that assumptions embedded in a small circuit can be questioned – perhaps allowing the small-circuit reflexivity to become “short-circuited” and exploding our assumed and tacit world.