Embodied cognition (EC) views propose that cognition is shaped by the kind of body that organisms possess. We give an overview of recent literature on EC, highlighting the differences between stronger and weaker versions of the theory. We also illustrate the debates on the notions of simulation, of representation, and on the role of the motor system for cognition, and we address some of the most important research topics. Future challenges concern the understanding of how abstract concepts and words are represented, and the relationship between EC and other promising approaches, the distributional views of meaning and the extended mind views.

Key words: affordances, cognitivism, distributional views, embodied cognition, emotion, enactivism, extended mind, grounded cognition, language comprehension, mental representation, mirror neurons, radical embodied cognition, representation, simulation, situated cog

Science has changed many of our dearly held and commonsensical (but incorrect) beliefs. For example, few still believe the world is flat, and few still believe the sun orbits the earth. Few still believe humans are unrelated to the rest of the animal kingdom, and soon few will believe human thinking is computer-like. Instead, as with all animals, our thoughts are based on bodily experiences, and our thoughts and behaviors are controlled by bodily and neural systems of perception, action, and emotion interacting with the physical and social environments. We are embodied; nothing more. Embodied cognition is about cognition formatted in sensorimotor experience, and sensorimotor systems make those thoughts dynamic. Even processes that seem abstract, such as language comprehension and goal understanding, are embodied. Thus, embodied cognition is not limited to 1 type of thought or another: It is cognition.