Tschacher W. & Scheier C. (2001) Embodied cognitive science: Concepts, methods and implications for psychology. In: Matthies M., Malchow H. & Kriz J. (eds.) Integrative systems approaches to natural and social dynamics. Springer, Berlin: 551–567.
Since the “cognitive shift” of psychology, a close association between psychology and the advances in computer technology and artificial intelligence research has evolved. According to the ‘computational’ symbol processing approach, cognition consists of a series of sequentially ordered processing stages. Between perception and action, input is processed by higher cognitive functions, such as categorization, memory, and planning. These cognitive functions are conceived as independent modules lacking a direct interface with the environment. This approach is criticized due to its inherent fundamental problems. Alternative research programs, such as embodied cognitive science, primarily address the issues of embodied cognition, i. e., cognition is viewed as originating from the interaction of body and environment. The methods of the corresponding “new AI” encompass robotics and the use of autonomous agents. It is investigated here which implications for psychology may arise. A theoretical conceptualization of autonomous agents based on dynamical systems theory and synergetics is outlined. Within this context, the cognitive system is conceived as a complex system comprising numerous sensorimotor loops; coherent and adaptive perceptionaction processes emerge from the influence of affordances. Examples cited from the field of applied psychology indicate that these perspectives lead to the formulation of new research questions and reinterpretation of empirical findings.
The enactive account of cognition is the most mysterious strand of current thinking in this area. At its heart lie notions of embodiment, self-organisation, the environment and the proposition that we enact the world. As interesting as this is, enaction comes into its own when we discuss episodic memory, mental time travelling and niche creation. This chapter introduces the key ideas underpinning enaction and then illustrates their relevance to human-computer interaction. For example, when we recall the experiences offered by technology we rely on our episodic memories which provide us with a personal perspective. We do not just remember facts, we re-experience the events. This is an enactive perspective on memory. Similarly when we imagine how an item of technology might behave, it is likely that we are using our episodic memories to construct this. Finally, we construct niches – cognitive and technological – where we feel in control and safe and do so in a manner which is very similar to bringing forth (or enacting) the world. Enaction offers quite a different and very promising perspective on cognition and interactive technology.
Valenzuela-Moguillansky C. & Demšar E. (2021) Toward a science of experience: Outlining some challenges and future directions. Adaptive Behavior Online first.
In recent decades, empirical study of experience has been installed as a relevant and necessary element in researching cognitive phenomena. However, its incorporation into cognitive science has been largely done by following an objectivist frame of reference, without reconsidering the practices and standards involved in the process of research and the interpretation and validation of the results. This has given rise to a number of issues that reveal inconsistencies in the understanding and treatment of some crucial aspects of first-person research. In this article, we will outline a research direction aiming at contributing to the establishment of a framework for the study of experience that addresses these inconsistencies. Specifically, we will identify some challenges facing the study of experience – in particular those linked to the understanding of memory, expression and description, and intersubjectivity in exploring experience – and propose to reframe them under the epistemological framework of the enactive approach. Moreover, we will explore the prospect of gaining insight into theoretical and methodological strategies for dealing with these issues by extending our vision beyond the field of cognitive science to its neighboring fields, focusing in particular on the field of somatic practices.
Network approaches have had little impact on immunology because they have addressed the wrong questions. They have concentrated on the regulation of clonal immune responses rather than on the supraclonal properties of the immune system that emerge from its network organization, such as natural tolerance and memory. Theoretical advances, observations in unimmunized mice and humans, and the success of novel therapeutics in autoimmune diseases have recently promoted a new burst of research on the structure, temporal dynamics and metadynamical plasticity of immune networks.
Varela F. J. & Shear J. (1999) First-person methodologies: Why, when and how? Journal of Consciousness Studies 6(2–3): 1–14. https://cepa.info/2080
Excerpt: By first-person events we mean the lived experience associated with cognitive and mental events. Sometimes terms such as ‘phenomenal consciousness’ and even ‘qualia’ are also used, but it is natural to speak of ‘conscious experience’ or simply ‘experience’. These terms imply here that the process being studied (vision, pain, memory, imagination, etc.) appears as relevant and manifest for a ‘self’ or ‘subject’ that can provide an account, they have a ‘subjective’ side. In contrast, third-person descriptions concern the descriptive experiences associated with the study of other natural phenomena. Although there are always human agents in science who provide and produce descriptions, the contents of such descriptions (i.e. of biochemical reactions, black holes or synaptic voltages) are not clearly or immediately linked to the human agents who come up with them. Their defining characteristics refer to properties of world events without a direct manifestation in the experiential-mental sphere, they can only be linked to this sphere indirectly (via the actual laboratory life, the modes of scientific communication and so on). Such ‘objective’ descriptions do have a subjective-social dimension, but this dimension is hidden within the social practices of science. The ostensive, direct reference is to the ‘objective’, the ‘outside’, the content of current science that we have today concerning various natural phenomena, such as physics and biology.
Varela F. J., Coutinho A. & Stewart J. (1993) What is the immune network for? In: Stein W. & Varela F. J. (eds.) Thinking about biology: An introduction to theoretical biology. Addison-Wesley, Reading MA: 213–228. https://cepa.info/1978
Excerpt: In recent years, immunology has undergone an important change by admitting that immune components might operate as a network. Initially the concept was applied restrictedly to a web of variable regions (V-regions) in immunoglobulin molecules (Ig), and had little significance other than some form of regulation of immune responses. More recently, this view of the network has been fleshed out to include not only antibodies that link to other antibodies (i.e., anti-idiotypic antibodies), but also V-regions expressed on the surface of B and T lymphocytes at various development stages, as well as components of the somatic self (i.e., markers on cell surfaces and soluble macromolecules circulating in the body fluids). The initial ideas on immune networks (IN) were incomplete because they concentrated on the regulation of clonal immune responses, which are a manifestation of the system’s capacity to defend the body from infections, rather than on properties of the immune system (IS) that emerge from its network organization, such as natural tolerance and memory. We have called second generation immune networks this wave of research that includes theoretical advances, observations in unimmunized mice and humans, and novel therapeutics in autoimmune diseases, these generating a new burst of interest on IN. The main point of the present chapter is to consider the next step; one that follows naturally from assuming the second generation stance, i.e., that INs are a biological reality. In this perspective, the focus of interests change quite drastically from the previous paradigm. Classically, immune responses represent the bulk of immunological lore. In the new perspective, immune responses are relegated to a peripheral role since infections are not always present and, when they are, the corresponding specific responses are mounted by an array of normally inactive, disconnected B and T cells. These stand in high contrast to the naturally or internally activated, highly connected lymphocytes, the core of the IN. We speak, therefore, of a peripheral immune system, which is concerned with “conventional” immune responses to microbial antigens, accountable by the clonal selection theory. This contrast with the central immune system concerned with internally activated cells, tightly arranged in an interacting network.
Vaz N. M. (2011) The Specificity of Immunologic Observations. Constructivist Foundations 6(3): 334–342. https://constructivist.info/6/3/334
Context: Immunity includes cognitive concepts: the organism is thought to specifically recognize foreign materials and develop a memory of these encounters. Vaccines are thought to work by enhancing this immunological memory. Lymphocytes are key cells and specific antibodies are key molecules in immune recognition. Antibodies are blood proteins called “immunoglobulins.” Spontaneously formed immunoglobulins are seen as “natural” antibodies to dietary components and commensal bacteria. Immune cognition is used simply as a didactic metaphor. Problem: Do the cognitive aspects of immunology stem from the activities of cells and molecules, or are they ascribed by the immunologist operating as a human observer? (1) An immense variety of immunoglobulins may bind to the same antigen with different binding energies. It is the immunologist who arbitrates the boundary between those that are specific (and declared antibodies) and those that are not. Specific antibodies serve as functional labels pasted onto natural immunoglobulins, as if they were recognizing elements. Is this “arbitration” the true cognitive event ascribed to immunoglobulins and lymphocytes? (2) A major impasse exists between progress in experimental immunology and its translation into clinical results. A proper understanding of immunological activity demands a wider view of an organism’s biology and, also, of the interference of human observers in delineating experimental realities, such as the specificity of immune recognition. Maturana’s biology of cognition and language provides one such approach. Method: Use of Maturana’s biology of cognition and language concepts to describe immunological activity. Results: A whole new understanding of immunological activity is suggested. Implications: A major change in the way of seeing is proposed that may eventually help the translation of this knowledge into clinical results. Furthermore, the immune system may also become a proper model for cognitive analyses.
The main objective of this article is to capitalise on many years of research, and of practice, relating to the use of introspection in a research context, and thus to provide an initial outline description of introspection, while developing an introspection of introspection. After a description of the context of this research, I define the institutional conditions which would enable the renewal of introspection as a research methodology. Then I describe three aspects of introspective practice: 1) introspection as a process of becoming aware, theorized through Husserl’s model of consciousness modes; 2) introspection as recollection, through the model of retention and awakening in Husserl’s theory of memory; 3) the use of universal descriptive categories for the description of all lived experiences, as a guide for skilled practice of introspection in research. Finally I examine the question of the validation of introspective data, suggesting a strong distinction between the ethical criterion and the epistemic criterion of truth.
Open peer commentary on the article “Excavating Belief About Past Experience: Experiential Dynamics of the Reflective Act” by Urban Kordeš & Ema Demšar. Upshot: I discuss four points: (1) The “excavation fallacy” is a skeptical assertion, therefore, it is not a valid argument; (2) Nisbett & Wilson’s results are experimental artefacts; (3) Guiding to recall enables the exceeding of limits ruled by experimental psychology of memory; (4) A typology of research situations must be introduced to the way we consider methodology.
Wheeler M. (2016) The rest is science: What does phenomenology tell us about cognition. In: Reynolds J. & Sebold R. (eds.) Phenomenology and science. Palgrave Macmillan, New York: 87–101. https://cepa.info/6195
Let me put up my hand straight away: I am a naturalist about cognition. What does this mean? First things first: I take ‘cognition’ to be a catch-all term encompassing the various states and processes that we typically identify as psychological phenomena (the states and processes of memory, perception, reasoning, etc.). The guiding thought of naturalism is that philosophy should be continuous with empirical science. So the naturalist about cognition (that’s me) thinks that the philosophical understanding of cognition (of the states and processes of memory, perception, reasoning, etc.) should be continuous with cognitive science. I take the naturalist notion of continuity with empirical science to be determined by the following principle of conflict resolution (Wheeler 2013): if and when there is a genuine clash between philosophy and some eminently well-supported (by the data) empirical science, then that is a good reason for the philosopher to at least revisit her claims, with a view to withdrawal or revision. The envisaged clash, on its own anyway, puts no such pressure upon the scientist. So where phenomenology (as a branch of philosophy) and well-supported cognitive science conflict, it is the phenomenologist, and not the cognitive scientist, who should revisit her claims.