Barandiaran X. & Moreno A. (2006) On what makes certain dynamical systems cognitive: A minimally cognitive organization program. Adaptive Behavior 14(2): 171–185. https://cepa.info/4513
Dynamicism has provided cognitive science with important tools to understand some aspects of “how cognitive agents work” but the issue of “what makes something cognitive” has not been sufficiently addressed yet and, we argue, the former will never be complete without the latter. Behavioristic characterizations of cognitive properties are criticized in favor of an organizational approach focused on the internal dynamic relationships that constitute cognitive systems. A definition of cognition as adaptive-autonomy in the embodied and situated neurodynamic domain is provided: the compensatory regulation of a web of stability dependencies between sensorimotor structures is created and pre served during a historical/developmental process. We highlight the functional role of emotional embodiment: internal bioregulatory processes coupled to the formation and adaptive regulation of neurodynamic autonomy. Finally, we discuss a “minimally cognitive behavior program” in evolutionary simulation modeling suggesting that much is to be learned from a complementary “minimally cognitive organization program”
Buhrmann T., Di Paolo E. & Barandiaran X. (2013) A dynamical systems account of sensorimotor contingencies. Frontiers in Psychology 4: 285. https://cepa.info/2386
According to the sensorimotor approach, perception is a form of embodied know-how, constituted by lawful regularities in the sensorimotor flow or in sensorimotor contingencies (SMCs) in an active and situated agent. Despite the attention that this approach has attracted, there have been few attempts to define its core concepts formally. In this paper, we examine the idea of SMCs and argue that its use involves notions that need to be distinguished. We introduce four distinct kinds of SMCs, which we define operationally. These are the notions of sensorimotor environment (open-loop motor-induced sensory variations), sensorimotor habitat (closed-loop sensorimotor trajectories), sensorimotor coordination (reliable sensorimotor patterns playing a functional role), and sensorimotor strategy (normative organization of sensorimotor coordinations). We make use of a minimal dynamical model of visually guided categorization to test the explanatory value of the different kinds of SMCs. Finally, we discuss the impact of our definitions on the conceptual development and empirical as well as model-based testing of the claims of the sensorimotor approach.
Damiano L. & Stano P. (2018) Synthetic biology and artificial intelligence: Grounding a cross-disciplinary approach to the synthetic exploration of (embodied) cognition. Complex Systems 27: 199–228. https://cepa.info/7614
Recent scientific developments – the emergence in the 1990s of a “body- centered” artificial intelligence (AI) and the birth in the 2000s of synthetic biology (SB) – allow and require the constitution of a new cross-disciplinary synergy, that elsewhere we called “SB-AI.” In this paper, we define the motivation, possibilities, limits and methodologies of this line of research. Based on the insufficiencies of embodied AI, we draw on frontier developments in synthetic cells SB to introduce a promising research program in SB-AI, which we define as Chemical Autopoietic AI. As we emphasize, the promise of this approach is twofold: building organizationally relevant wetware models of minimal biological-like systems, and contributing to the exploration of (embodied) cognition and to the full realization of the “embodiment turn” in contemporary AI.
Damiano L. & Stano P. (2021) A wetware embodied AI? Towards an autopoietic organizational approach grounded in synthetic biology. Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology 9: 724023. https://cepa.info/7615
Damiano L. & Stano P. (2021) Towards autopoietic SB-AI. In: Cejkova J., Holler S., Soros L. & Witkowski O. (eds.) Proceedings of the Artificial Life Conference 2021 (ALIFE 2021). MIT Press, Cambridge MA: 179–181. https://cepa.info/7612
This programmatic paper continues a series of works that we are dedicating to introduce a novel research program in AI, which we call Autopoietic SB-AI to indicate two basic elements of its procedural architecture. (1) The first element is the innovative methodological option of synthetically studying the cognitive domain based on the construction and experimental exploration of wetware – i.e., chemical – models of cognitive processes, using techniques defined in the field of Synthetic Biology (SB). (2) The second element is the theoretical option of developing SB models of cognitive processes based on the theory of autopoiesis. In our previous works we focused on the epistemological and theoretical groundings of Autopoietic SB-AI. In this contribution, after a general presentation of this research program, we introduce the SB technical framework that we are developing to orient Autopoietic SB-AI towards a twofold goal: building organizationally relevant wetware models of minimal biological-like systems (i.e., synthetic cells), and, on this basis, contributing to the scientific exploration of minimal cognition.
Recent work on skin-brain thesis (de Wiljes et al. 2015; Keijzer 2015; Keijzer et al. 2013) suggests the possibility of empirical evidence that empiricism is false. It implies that early animals need no traditional sensory receptors to be engaged in cognitive activity. The neural structure required to coordinate extensive sheets of contractile tissue for motility provides the starting point for a new multicellular organized form of sensing. Moving a body by muscle contraction provides the basis for a multicellular organization that is sensitive to external surface structure at the scale of the animal body. In other words, the nervous system first evolved for action, not for receiving sensory input. Thus, sensory input is not required for minimal cognition; only action is. The whole body of an organism, in particular its highly specific animal sensorimotor organization, reflects the bodily and environmental spatiotemporal structure. The skin-brain thesis suggests that, in contrast to empiricist claims that cognition is constituted by sensory systems, cognition may be also constituted by action-oriented feedback mechanisms. Instead of positing the reflex arc as the elementary building block of nervous systems, it proposes that endogenous motor activity is crucial for cognitive processes. In the paper, I discuss the issue whether the skin-brain thesis and its supporting evidence can be really used to overthrow the main tenet of empiricism empirically, by pointing out to cognizing agents that fail to have any sensory apparatus.
Morse A. F., Herrera C., Clowes R., Montebelli A. & Ziemke T. (2011) The role of robotic modelling in cognitive science. New Ideas in Psychology 29(3): 312–324. https://cepa.info/7230
From the perspective of cognitive robotics, this paper presents a modern interpretation of Newell’s (1973) reasoning and suggestions for why and how cognitive psychologists should develop models of cognitive phenomena. We argue that the shortcomings of current cognitive modelling approaches are due in significant part to a lack of exactly the kind of integration required for the development of embodied autonomous robotics. Moreover we suggest that considerations of embodiment, situatedness, and autonomy, intrinsic to cognitive robotics, provide an appropriate basis for the integration and theoretic cumulation that Newell argued was necessary for psychology to mature. From this perspective we analyse the role of embodiment and modes of situatedness in terms of integration, cognition, emotion, and autonomy. Four complementary perspectives on embodied and situated cognitive science are considered in terms of their potential to contribute to cognitive robotics, cognitive science, and psychological theorizing: minimal cognition and organization, enactive perception and sensorimotor contingency, homeostasis and emotion, and social embedding. In combination these perspectives provide a framework for cognitive robotics, not only wholly compatible with the original aims of cognitive modelling, but as a more appropriate methodology than those currently in common use within psychology.
On the 4th of September 2017, the 14th European Conference on Artificial Life (ECAL 2017, Lyon, France) hosted a satellite workshop dedicated to a frontier research question: ‘What can Synthetic Biology offer to (Embodied) Artificial Intelligence (and vice versa)?’ This workshop, as the previous three of the ‘Synthetic Biology (SB)–Artificial Intelligence (AI)’ workshop series, brought together specialists from different disciplines to address the contemporary debate on the evolution of embodied artificial intelligence from a new angle. In a few words: defining the possible roles that SB – an emerging research line combining biology and engineering – can play in the process of establishment of the so-called ‘Embodied paradigm’ in the scientific exploration of cognition and, in particular, in artificial intelligence.
van Duijn M. V., Keijzer F. A. & Franken D. (2006) Principles of minimal cognition: Casting cognition as sensorimotor coordination. Adaptive Behavior 14(2): 157–170.
Within the cognitive sciences, cognition tends to be interpreted from an anthropocentric perspective, involving a stringent set of human capabilities. Instead, we suggest that cognition is better explicated as a much more general biological phenomenon, allowing the lower bound of cognition to extend much further down the phylogenetic scale. We argue that elementary forms of cognition can already be witnessed in prokaryotes possessing a functional sensorimotor analogue of the nervous system. Building on a case-study of the Escherichia coli bacterium and its sensorimotor system, the TCSTsystem, we home in on the characteristics of minimal cognition, and distinguish it from more basic forms of ontogenetic adaptation. In our view, minimal cognition requires an embodiment consisting of a sensorimotor coupling mechanism that subsumes an autopoietic organization; this forms the basis of the growing consensus that the core of cognition revolves around sensorimotor coupling. We discuss the relevance of our interpretation of minimal cognition for the study of cognition in general.
Walmsley L. D. (2019) Lessons from a virtual slime: Marginal mechanisms, minimal cognition and radical enactivism. Adaptive Behavior Online First: 1059712318824544. https://cepa.info/5966
Radical enactivism (REC) and similar embodied and enactive approaches to the mind deny that cognition is fundamentally representational, skull-bound and mechanistic in its organisation. In this article, I argue that modellers may still adopt a mechanistic strategy to produce explanations that are compatible with REC. This argument is scaffolded by a multi-agent model of the true slime mould Physarum polycephalum.