Archetypal codes, genetic codes and neural codes represent different levels of illustrating the concepts of consciousness and unconsciousness. Symbolisations taking the form of myths tell us something about the development of the mutual relationship of the two realms. As a third element, myths represent a transitional space located between the individual and the collective. An outline will be given on the approaches developed by Jung, Neumann, Bischof, Jaynes, Singer and Reich. The dramatic increase in replacing natural processes by artificial ones and in the extent to which man is capable of interfering in such processes today leads to a situation where the side of the objects and the objective (as the natural laws that are given) is constantly receding and is thereby strengthening the productive character of the objective: there is no thing-in-itself any more, only its absence or presence. In both quality and quantity, it is the result of a man-made decision. At the same time, the part of the subjective is getting ever more differentiated: it is itself becoming the object of its own productive endeavours and is no longer identical with itself. It achieves its identity by recognizing the other as being different. The author draws up the myth of a ‘Zwitschermaschine’ (twittering machine; Paul Klee, 1922) as a present-day paradigm of intersubjectivity, centering the concepts of self-authorization and autopoiesis as the stock of existing problems: man is becoming an effect of the very discourses he gives on himself.

Key words: myth, archetypical code, autopoiesis, intersubjectivity, self-authorisation

Discusses H. R. Maturana’s (1980) theory of structure determinism and the implications of this theory for family therapy. Propositions of Maturana’s theory are outlined, and implications for the understanding of causality, descriptions of life’s purposes, and clinical practice are described. Maturana’s theory suggests that all problems are in language and that symptoms cannot be seen as having objective meanings or absolute purposes. Another implication is that family therapists cannot speak to families, but only to an individual or to several individuals. The operation of Alcoholics Anonymous is offered as an illustration of Maturana’s theory. It is concluded that a future challenge for family therapists is to shed the myth that they directly instruct, change, control, treat, or cure people.

Excerpt: Countless worlds made from nothing by use of symbols – so might a satirist summarize some of Cassirer’s major themes. These themes – the multiplicity of worlds, the speciousness of ‘the given’, the creative power of the understanding, the variety and formative function of symbols – are also integral to my own thinking. Sometimes, though, I forget that they have been so eloquently set forth by Cassirer, 1 partly perhaps because his emphasis on myth, his concern with the comparative study of cultures, and his talk of the human spirit have been mistakenly associated with current trends toward mystical obscurantism, anti-intellectual intuition ism, or anti-scientific humanism. Acutally these attitudes are as alien to Cassirer as to my own skeptical, analytic, constructionalist orientation. My aim in what follows is less to defend certain theses that Cassirer and I share than to take a hard look at some crucial questions they raise. In just what sense are there many worlds? What distinguishes genuine from spurious worlds? What are worlds made of? How are they made, and what role do symbols play in the making? And how is worldmaking related to knowing? These questions must be faced even if full and final answers are far off.

This article contrasts the positivist epistemology of modern thought with the social constructivism of postmodern thought. It makes a thorough analysis of the four myths on which positivist epistemology has its basis: the myth of knowledge as representation, the myth of the object, the myth of reality and the myth of truth. It concludes suggesting applications of the new constructivist epistemology for psychology.

It is shown that the definition of the subject area of Haugenian ecolinguistics is methodologically inconsistent because of the implicit biomorphic metaphor, the language myth, and indiscrimination between the two different approaches to language known as cognitive internalism and cognitive externalism. A more consistent definition of language ecology is given, based on the biology of cognition as a theory of living systems; consequently, the subject area of ecolinguistics is defined differently, with a focus on the nature and function of language as a mode of organization of the living system (society) and its role in the development of the brain, thought, and mind. Relevance: Language ecology is defined, based on the biology of cognition

Some misconceptions about language and communication are pointed out as part of the rationalist language myth, and the need for naturalizing language is emphasized. The crucial importance of the concept of languaging as a consensual domain of interactions, in which the signifying function of linguistic signs arises, is discussed. It is argued that the ease of language acquisition by infants stems from the intrinsic indexicality of linguistic signs – their perceptual groundedness in the first- order consensual domain. As indices, linguistic signs cue human understanding with regard to the diverse aspects of the context of dialogical interactions. It is shown how approaching grammar as a perceptually grounded semiotic mechanism that underlies languaging facilitates instructed foreign language acquisition, dispelling the myth about language complexity.

In this reflective dialogue, Humberto Maturana speaks about his understanding of living systems and its implications for psychotherapy. Dismissing the myth of “instructive interaction,” Maturana argues that a simple causal conceptualization of therapeutic procedures producing precise and predictable effects in clients is incoherent with a theory of structure-determined systems. Instead, he contends that every therapeutic action is embedded in a network of relationships, whose dynamics must be appreciated by therapists in order for them to participate in the client’s system and at the same time maintain the distance necessary to relate reflectively and in a noncontrolling fashion. Maturana contends that the profound and un­biased understanding that can follow from this stance fosters an awareness of the observer-dependent nature of “pathology,” and provides grounds for a critique of larger cultural systems in shaping the distress or liberation of their members.

How do journalistic realities arise? Do journalists simply record events, or are they inevitably involved participants? Is objectivity a useful ideal or a myth? This essay offers a compact introduction to the discourse of constructivism, which is based on the assumption that absolute knowledge of truth is impossible, i.e. that we as human beings are inescapably biased. Following a general introduction to constructivist thinking, short interviews with principal thinkers of constructivism – Heinz von Foerster and Paul Watzlawick – will highlight the main ideas of the approach.

Upshot: Massumi innovatively interlinks poststructuralist theory with ideas from cognitive psychology and Luhmann’s systems theory to deconstruct rational choice as the founding myth of the liberal economy. His politically charged constructivism explores socio-economic reproduction as a process of constant re-stabilization between the openness of affective response and the closure of rationality. Defying social determination, Massumi shows how affect can constitute a source of potential change when modulated trans-individually in response to political events.

Abstract: Much recent work on cognition is characterized by an augmentation of the role of action coupled with an attenuation of the role of representation. This coupling is no accident. The appeal to action is seen either as a way of explaining representation or explaining it away. This paper argues that the appeal to action as a way of explaining, supplementing, or even supplanting, representation can lead to a serious dilemma. On the one hand, the concept of action to which we appeal cannot, on pain of circularity, be a representational concept. Such an appeal would presuppose representation and therefore can neither explain it nor explain it away. On the other hand, I shall argue, if the concept of action to which we appeal is not a representational one, there is every reason for supposing that it will not be the sort of thing that can explain, or supplement, let alone supplant, representation. The resulting dilemma, I shall argue, is not fatal. But avoiding it requires us to embrace a certain thesis about the nature of action, a thesis whose broad outline this paper delineates. Anyone who wishes to employ action as a way of explaining or explaining away representation should, I shall argue, take this conception of action very seriously indeed. I am going to discuss these issues with respect to a influential recent contribution to this debate: the sensorimotor or enactive model of perception developed by Kevin O’Regan and Alva Noë.

Key words: action, representation, perception, sensorimotor, myth of the giving.