This paper defines a theoretical framework aiming to support the actions and reflections of researchers looking for a “method” in order to critically conceive the complexity of a scientific process of research. First, it starts with a brief overview of the core assumptions framing Morin’s “paradigm of complexity” and Le Moigne’s “general system theory.” Distinguishing “methodology” and “method,” the framework is conceived based on three moments, which represent recurring stages of the spiraling development of research. The first moment focuses on the definition of the research process and its sub-systems (author, system of ideas, object of study and method) understood as a complex form of organization finalized in a specific environment. The second moment introduces a matrix aiming to model the research process and nine core methodological issues, according to a programmatic and critical approach. Using the matrix previously modeled, the third moment suggests conceiving of the research process following a strategic mindset that focuses on contingencies, in order to locate, share and communicate the path followed throughout the inquiry. Relevance: This paper provides the readers with a constructivist methodology of research inspired by Morin’s paradigm of complexity and Le Moigne’s general system theory.

The course on nature coincides with the re-working of Merleau-Ponty’s breakthrough towards an ontology and therefore plays a primordial role. The appearance of an interrogation of nature is inscribed in the movement of thought that comes after the Phenomenology of Perception. What is at issue is to show that the ontological mode of the perceived object – not the unity of a positive sense but the unity of a style that shows through in filigree in the sensible aspects has a universal meaning, that the description of the perceived world can give way to a philosophy of perception and therefore to a theory of truth. The analysis of linguistic expression to which the philosophy of perception leads opens out onto a definition of meaning as institution, understood as what inaugurates an open series of expressive appropriations. It is this theory of institution that turns the analysis of the perceived in the direction of a reflection on nature: the perceived is no longer the originary in its difference from the derived but the natural in its difference from the instituted. Nature is the “non-constructed, non-instituted,” and thereby, the source of expression: “nature is what has a sense without this sense having been posited by thought.”\\The first part of the course, which consists in a historical overview, must not be considered as a mere introduction. In fact, the problem of nature is brought out into the open by means of the history of Western metaphysics, in which Descartes is the emblematic figure. The problem consists in the duality at once unsatisfactory and unsurpassable – between two approaches to nature: the one which accentuates its determinability and therefore its transparency to the understanding; the other which emphasizes the irreducible facticity of nature and tends therefore to valorize the viewpoint of the senses. To conceive nature is to constitute a concept of it that allows us to “take possession” of this duality, that is, to found the duality. The second part of the course attempts to develop this concept of nature by drawing upon the results of contemporary science. Thus a philosophy of nature is sketched that can be summarized in four propositions: 1) the totality is no less real than the parts; 2) there is a reality of the negative and therefore no alternative between being and nothingmess; 3) a natural event is not assigned to a unique spatio-temporal localization; and 4) there is generality only as generativity.

At the occasion of their fortieth anniversary, the Archives Jean Piaget, a foundation created by Bärbel Inhelder in 1974 for the preservation and promulgation of Piaget’s oeuvre, invited in Geneva ten among the most prominent and influential developmental psychologists to the first Jean Piaget Conferences. Cognitive developmental psychology has undergone radical changes during these last four decades since the last formulations of Piaget’s constructivism. In this double special issue, the invitees of the Jean Piaget Conferences elaborate on their own conception of developmental changes in a variety of domains and functions, offering a comprehensive overview of current theories of cognitive development.

Key words: theories of cognitive development, piaget, archives jean piaget.

Embodied cognition (EC) views propose that cognition is shaped by the kind of body that organisms possess. We give an overview of recent literature on EC, highlighting the differences between stronger and weaker versions of the theory. We also illustrate the debates on the notions of simulation, of representation, and on the role of the motor system for cognition, and we address some of the most important research topics. Future challenges concern the understanding of how abstract concepts and words are represented, and the relationship between EC and other promising approaches, the distributional views of meaning and the extended mind views.

Key words: affordances, cognitivism, distributional views, embodied cognition, emotion, enactivism, extended mind, grounded cognition, language comprehension, mental representation, mirror neurons, radical embodied cognition, representation, simulation, situated cog

Purpose: This paper seeks to present a comprehensive overview of the supply chain as an autopoietic system. The new autopoietic approach suggests a transition from traditional cognitivist epistemology to the theory of learning as a creational matter, and this type of thinking can potentially shed light on the role of knowledge creation as a part of supply chain management. Design/methodology/approach – The paper is structured as follows: the first section describes the theoretical background of the concept of knowledge management in the supply chain. After that, the paper examines the general systems theory and the role of an autopoietic system within it. Then the paper addresses autopoietic epistemology. In particular, the notions of knowledge, learning, and knowledge flows are described so that the focus is on the context of the supply chain and supply chain management at operational level. Findings: The supplier’s, customer’s, and firm’s own organization and parts of the organization have autonomy system memories, which ultimately formulate how the intended development ideas are in fact realized and how they are adopted by the organization. Supply chain managers should take into account the fact that the routines and norms of the node are part of the system that are not controlled from outside. Instead, the system can modify its objectives internally as part of its autonomous operation, which should be taken into consideration in the knowledge sharing process. Originality/value – The description of a supply chain as an autopoietic knowledge system is a new way to examine knowledge sharing in a supply chain.

Key words: supply chain, knowledge creation, autopoietic epistemology, autopoietic system, system thinking.

This collection presents a comprehensive overview of established and emerging techniques for collecting and analyzing data for constructivists, derived from Personal Construct psychology. It looks at both qualitative and quantitative research methods, as well as ones useful in clinical and counseling settings. Methods include content analysis, repertory grids, narrative assessments and drawings, and the laddering and ABC techniques, providing easy to follow descriptions and examples of applications in clinical and nonclinical settings.

This essay offers an overview of the issues addressed in our volume Emergence and Embodiment: New Essays in Second-Order Systems Theory (Clarke & Hansen, 2009), a collective effort to update the legacy of second-order thinking in systems theory. We review the history that has unfolded secondfrom first-order cybernetics, and take exception to some recent accounts that discount the importance of the second-order or neocybernetic line of development. We argue that neocybernetic concepts in the line from von Foerster to Maturana, Varela, and Luhmann challenge not just the rigidities of AI and first-order mechanical and social systems engineering, but also, and more profoundly, the epistemological foundations of philosophical humanism. We join Dirk Baecker and others’ calls for a slowing down of systems theorizations, and acknowledge a similar need for a slowing down, in our case of everything that has recently come together under the rubric of the posthuman, for the purpose of careful neocybernetic consideration. To understand today’s hyper-acceleration of technoscientific incursions into the human, and to arrive at more highly articulated observations of the systemic situatedness of cognition, we correlate epistemological closure with the phenomena of ontological emergence. If the human is and has always already been posthuman, this understanding demands the perspective afforded by neocybernetic recursion.

Excerpt: In inviting me to write this chapter on philosophical issues in mathematics education, the editor has given me the leeway to present a personal perspective rather than to develop a comprehensive overview of currently influential philosophical positions as they relate to mathematics education. I invoke this privilege by taking as my primary focus an issue that has been the subject of considerable debate in both mathematics education and the broader educational research community, that of coping with multiple and frequently conflicting theoretical perspectives. The theoretical perspectives currently on offer include radical constructivism, sociocultural theory, symbolic interactionism, distributed cognition, information-processing psychology, situated cognition, critical theory, critical race theory, and discourse theory. To add to the mix, experimental psychology has emerged with a renewed vigor in the last few years. Proponents of various perspectives frequently advocate their viewpoint with what can only be described as ideological fervor, generating more heat than light in the process. In the face of this sometimes bewildering array of theoretical alternatives, the issue I seek to address in this chapter is that of how we might make and justify our decision to adopt one theoretical perspective rather than another. In doing so, I put philosophy to work by drawing on the analyses of a number of thinkers who have grappled with the thorny problem of making reasoned decisions about competing theoretical perspectives.

Our aim in this chapter is to bring emotion theory and the embodied view of cognition closer to each other. We first present an overview of classical (pre-Jamesian) theories of emotion and show that they were all psychosomatic. We then turn to the disembodied stance of cognitivism and trace how and why emotion theory came to lose the body. We argue that cognitivism not only neglected the body, but also tended to classify previous theories of emotion as either cognitive or physiological. This tendency has fostered a tension between these two features of emotion that exists to this day. The main manifestation of this tension in current emotion theory is the tendency to see cognitive and bodily processes as separate aspects or constituents of emotions. Finally, in the remainder of the article, we sketch an embodied approach to emotion, drawing especially on the “enactive approach” in cognitive science. Relevance: It develops ideas for an enactive approach to emotion.

Exerpt: In this essay, we provide an overview of the various claims defended by the enactive approach to intersubjectivity, from how social interactions can be defined operationally to how social understanding is rooted in participatory sense-making, even when we are not interacting with others. In contrast to prevailing views, the enactive approach does not put all the emphasis on individual capabilities to explain forms of social understanding and social action. This has often been interpreted as adopting an interactionist stance on intersubjectivity. It is indeed the case that social interaction patterns have not played a prevalent role in cognitive science and social neuroscience until recently, and in the light of this, a participatory as opposed to spectatorial stance still needs to be presented and defended.

Key words: Enactive approach, Intersubjectivity, Participatory sense-making, Social cognition, Social interaction