Context: There is still no detailed defence of Goodman’s starmaking constructivism against the objection Boghossian presented in his 2006 book, Fear of Knowledge. Problem: I defend Goodman’s constructivism against the problem of stuff raised by Boghossian, that is, that constructivism requires unconstructed stuff and thus cannot explain all features in the world. Method: I argue that there is a way out for constructivists when they face the problem of stuff. Constructivists can choose to accept a constructivist-friendly worldview and the problem of stuff does not hold in this worldview. Goodman already provides hints for such a worldview in his works. I articulate the worldview in detail and argue that it does not have obvious faults. Results: I show that starmaking constructivism does not have the problem of stuff at least under a certain tenable worldview. Implications: The constructivist-friendly worldview and related novel ideas could be used to defend starmaking constructivism against other objections in Boghossian’s book and is helpful in answering other philosophical questions such as the mind-matter problem and modality. Constructivist content: This article may contribute to reviving Goodman’s starmaking constructivism.

Key words: Anti-foundationalism, bundle theory, constructivism, phenomenalism.

Excerpt: One of the most important themes in Goodman’s book [WOW] is that there is no privileged basis. Reducing sense data to physical objects or events is an admissible research program for Goodman; it is no more (and no less) reasonable than reducing physical objects to sense data. As research programs, there is nothing wrong with either physicalism or phenomenalism; as dogmatic monisms there is everything wrong with both of them. This is decidedly not the fashionable opinion today. Physicalism and “realism” are at the high tide of fashion; phenomenalism has sunk out of sight in a slough of philosophical disesteem and neglect. Goodman’s assumption that physicalism and phenomenalism are analogous would be disputed by many philosophers. It is this assumption that I wish to explain and defend before considering other aspects of WoW. Because it runs so counter to the fashion, it may be of great importance to see that it is correct. At the same time, the analogy leads directly to the heart of Goodman’s book, which is its defense of pluralism.

Open peer commentary on the article “A Defence of Starmaking Constructivism: The Problem of Stuff” by Bin Liu. Abstract: Bin Liu defends a theory he calls “starmaking constructivism,” according to which all features of the world are constructed by us. I will first show that the general way Liu defends and argues for constructivism is strongly reminiscent of the tradition of inductive metaphysics, a tradition that emerged in the mid- and late 19th century and the early 20th century in Germany. I will then highlight an argument from this tradition against phenomenalism and for realism. Then I will argue that this argument is at least in part an objection that also applies to starmaking constructivism, thereby shifting the burden of arguing back to the constructivist’s side.

Recently, a number of neuroscientists and philosophers have taken the so-called predictive coding approach to support a form of radical neuro-representationalism, according to which the content of our conscious experiences is a neural construct, a brain-generated simulation. There is remarkable similarity between this account and ideas found in and developed by German neo-Kantians in the mid-nineteenth century. Some of the neo-Kantians eventually came to have doubts about the cogency and internal consistency of the representationalist framework they were operating within. In this paper, I will first argue that some of these concerns ought to be taken seriously by contemporary proponents of predictive coding. After having done so, I will turn to phenomenology. As we shall see, Husserl’s endorsement of transcendental idealism was partially motivated by his rejection of representationalism and phenomenalism and by his attempt to safeguard the objectivity of the world of experience. This confronts us with an intriguing question. Which position is best able to accommodate our natural inclination for realism: Contemporary neuro-representationalism or Husserl’s transcendental idealism?