The article briefly describes the relatively young field of cognitive science dedicated to the research of lived human experience – the so-called phenomenological inquiry (or first-person research). It enumerates the reasons for the renewed interest in the study of experience and outlines the field’s relation to the rest of cognitive science. With the help of an example (phenomenology of thinking), the article attempts to illustrate the importance of systematic study of experience and addresses some open questions emerging from such an enterprise.

Key words: phenomenological inquiry, first-person perspective, experience, thoughts

Phenomenology and empirical research are not naturally compatible and devising an empirical technique aiming at researching experience is a challenge. This article presents second-person in-depth phenomenological inquiry – a technique that tries to meet this challenge by allowing the transformation of a participant greatly interested in the investigation of their own subjective experience, into a co-researcher. It then provides an example of this technique being used in a study on enaction of beliefs, more closely showing the cooperative research process of researcher and co-researcher and its result: a grounded theory. The article ends with a discussion on the techniques strengths and weaknesses.

Key words: phenomenological inquiry, first-person perspective, experience, enaction, belief

The present article concentrates on second-person in- depth phenomenological inquiry (SIPI) into human experience. In order to delineate important characteristics of SIPI we use an example of a phenomenological case study. The study comprised of descriptive experience sampling, writing of diary, and a series of elicitation interviews.

Open peer commentary on the article “Meeting You for the First Time: Descriptive Categories of an Intersubjective Experience” by Magali Ollagnier-Beldame & Christophe Coupé. Abstract: We aim to provide the basis for some conceptual work, designed to serve as a ground for future phenomenological investigation of first encounters. We argue that there is more than one standard by which an intersection ought to be regarded as an encounter. Hence, there are various notions of “first encounter,” each of which deserves independent phenomenological inquiry.