In this paper, I propose a neo-Heideggerian framework for A-Life. Following an explanation of some key Heideggerian ideas, I endorse the view that persistent problems in orthodox cognitive science result from a commitment to a Cartesian subject-object divide. Heidegger rejects the primacy of the subject-object dichotomy; and I set about the task of showing how, by adopting a Heideggerian view, A-Life can avoid the problems that have plagued cognitive science. This requires that we extend the standard Heideggerian frame-work by introducing the notion of a biological background, a set of evolutionarily determined practices which structure the norms of animal worlds. I argue that optimality/ESS models in behavioural ecology provide a set of tools for identifying these norms, and, to secure this idea, I defend a form of adaptationism against enactivist worries. Finally, I show how A-Life can assist in the process of mapping out biological backgrounds, and how recent dynamical systems approaches in A-Life fit in with the neo-Heideggerian conceptual framework.

Key words: adaptationism, Cartesian, enactivism, Heidegger, significance, subject-object dichotomy.

Spencer-Browns Calculus of Forms is based on an elementary operation, distinction. Reading this effort as a contribution to philosophy, means to concentrate on the concept of distinction. In this perspective, the first step must be to question the abstraction of a form of distinction. Our practices of distinguishing are manifold and at least four practices of distinguishing play an elementary role in common sense and scientific life: first distinguishing in a narrower sense as contrasting two or more sides, second dividing, third determining and fourth differentiating. The article shows, that SpencerBrown identifies the form of distinction with the practice of determining. This procedure is dependent on a philosophical development of the net of practices of distinguishing, their interrelations and dependencies. The theories of difference and their most important philosophical sources, like Platos Sophist, provide arguments for this task.

Key words: Distinction, Plato, Spencer-Brown, difference, theories of difference

Gibson once suggested that his ecological approach could provide architecture and design with a new theoretical basis. Erik Rietveld takes up this suggestion – the concept of affordances figures prominently not only in his philosophical and scientific work but also in the design practices he is engaged in. However, as Gibson introduced affordances as a functional concept, it seems ill-suited to capture the many dimensions of our lived experience of the (manufactured) environment. Can the concept of affordances also take on the expressive and aesthetic qualities of artifacts and buildings?

Key words: affordances, architecture

I re-examine Kuhn’s account of scientific revolutions. I argue that the sorts of events Kuhn regards as scientific revolutions are a diverse lot, differing in significant ways. But, I also argue that Kuhn does provide us with a principled way to distinguish revolutionary changes from non-revolutionary changes in science. Scientific revolutions are those changes in science that (1) involve taxonomic changes, (2) are precipitated by disappointment with existing practices, and (3) cannot be resolved by appealing to shared standards. I argue that an important and often overlooked dimension of the Kuhnian account of scientific change is the shift in focus from theories to research communities. Failing to make this shift in perspective might lead one to think that when individual scientists change theories a scientific revolution has occurred. But, according to Kuhn, it is research communities that undergo revolutionary changes, not individual scientists. I show that the change in early modern astronomy is aptly characterized as a Kuhnian revolution.

Key words: kuhn scientific revolution scientific change research communities taxonomic change

Based on an enactivist perspective on learning mathematics, we articulate three key processes of designing mathematics-grounding activities (MGAs) where students’ mathematical thinking can be motivated and shaped with the interactions between their enactments and the evolving tasks in the activities. Then, evaluation criteria and design steps will be derived in terms of the key processes. The key processes of designing MGAs, the criteria for evaluating quality MGAs and the design steps also emerged from the reciprocal relationships between theories and practices in the context of the Just Do Math (JDM) program. The processes and steps of designing MGAs suggested in this article can benefit researchers and educators to develop original activities for advancing the learning of mathematics in line with the enactivist perspective. Additionally, the key processes can be further referred to for explanations of how metaphorical grounds of mathematics can emerge under systemic interactions between learners, tasks and social contexts, and how learners’ motivation is integrated into the evolving tasks. Criteria could be applied for not only evaluating the potential of MGAs but also for identifying the weaknesses needed to be modified.

Key words: enactivist, game, mathematics, metaphorical

This article provides an overview of constructivism and its implications for classroom practices. To that end, it first describes the basic features of constructivism along with its major forms or variations. It then elucidates the constructivist view of knowledge, learning, teach- ing, and the relationship among these constructs. More specifically, it explains the assumptions and principles of constructivist pedagogy, bringing to the fore its core characteristics that differ fundamentally from other instructional paradigms. Last, the article presents how con- structivism as a learning theory can guide the process of learning and teaching in real classroom settings.

We deal with the general question of how culture affects cognition by looking at numerical cognition. After presenting radical enactivism, according to which contentful cognition arises only with the emergence of truth telling practices, we confront recent research about the origins of numerical cognition. We contest readings of some of the empirical data, according to which numerical cognition predates culture. We argue that REC-friendly interpretations of the data are not only possible but preferable, as they avoid the staunch theoretical problems which plague cognitivist readings.

This paper provides a brief overview of the constructivist learning theories and explains their significance in the design of the ESP digital learning environment. Constructivism provides a unique and challenging learning environment, and coupled with modern technology shows the potential for great advancement in learning practices. Together they provide the opportunity for new possibilities in the learning process. In other words, they allow ESP students to learn to their fullest potential. Complete understanding of ESP needs an increasing research input, including social interaction and intercultural communication competence. The purpose of ESP is to prepare a student (future specialist) to communicate effectively in the professional field and real-life situations. The ultimate goal is to become operational in any learning situation.

Key words: constructivist theories, esp, digital learning environment.