Upshot: Michael Tomasello is Director of the Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology and Co-Director of the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig. He completed his PhD with Ernst as his supervisor in 1980. In his reminiscence essay he describes the “total enculturation” he experienced on encountering Ernst von Glasersfeld.
Tomasello M. & Glasersfeld E. von (1975) The concepts of appearance, disappearance, and reappearance: A developmental semantic analysis. Follow Through Report #17. Follow Through Publications, Athens GA.
Open peer commentary on the target article “Who Conceives of Society?” by Ernst von Glasersfeld. Excerpt: In the light of the almost brilliant equilibrium of the author, who manages to compose a resourceful explanation, switching between the notional conditionality and the expected contextual understanding, I intend to focus on the interdisciplinary potential of some suggestions that offer new perspectives on conceiving society, which are driven by a non-analytical and holistic vision.
Uden L., Liu K. & Shank G. (2001) Linking radical constructivism and semiotics to design a constructivist learning environment. Journal of Computing in Higher Education 12(2): 34–51.
Radical constructvists believe that knowledge is not disembodied but intimately related to the action and experience the learner. It is always contextual and never separated from the knower. There is no objective reality that is independent of human mental activity. Radical constructivism shares many philosophical perspectives with the semiotic model of Stamper (1993) Semiotics claims that knowledge of the wodd is mediated through signs. A radical subjective synthesis of semiotics and radical constructivism leads to two axioms: There is no known reality without an agent, and the agent constructs reality through his action. This paper begins with a brief review of the philosophies of radical constructivism and semiotics, followed by a discussion of the implications of semiotics for radical constructivist leaming. It concludes with the design of a constructivist learning environment using the semiotic perspective as manifested by Stamper.
Ulrich C., Tillema E. S., Hackenberg A. J. & Norton A. (2014) Constructivist Model Building: Empirical Examples From Mathematics Education. Constructivist Foundations 9(3): 328–339. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/1084
Context: This paper outlines how radical constructivist theory has led to a particular methodological technique, developing second-order models of student thinking, that has helped mathematics educators to be more effective teachers of their students. Problem: The paper addresses the problem of how radical constructivist theory has been used to explain and engender more viable adaptations to the complexities of teaching and learning. Method: The paper presents empirical data from teaching experiments that illustrate the process of second-order model building. Results: The result of the paper is an illustration of how second-order models are developed and how this process, as it progresses, supports teachers to be more effective. Implications: This paper has the implication that radical constructivism has the potential to impact practice.
First paragraph: In the 1980s I went through a phase of writing limericks during idle moments when I lacked something to read. The result was a set of 27 limericks about cybernetics (Umpleby 1992). I occasionally use the limericks in class to restate a theoretical point. Limericks bring a smile and demonstrate that cybernetics can be approached in a variety of ways. Below are three limericks from this collection. The last was written by Ernst von Glasersfeld. It seems Ernst believed that I was overly concerned with “reality” as opposed to perception, or at least that I had not captured the point that he was trying to make.
Context: Philosophy of science is the branch of philosophy that deals with methods, foundations, and implications of science. It is a theory of how to create scientific knowledge. Presently, there is widespread agreement on how to do science, namely conjectures, ideally in the form of a mathematical model, and refutations, testing the model using empirical evidence. Problem: Many social scientists are using a conception of science created for the physical sciences. Expanding philosophy of science so that it more successfully encompasses social systems would create new avenues of inquiry. Two dimensions could be added to philosophy of science: the amount of attention paid to the observer and the amount of impact of a theory on the system described. Method: My approach is to illuminate underlying assumptions. I claim that there are at least three epistemologies and that they can be combined to form a more robust conception of knowledge and of how to do research. There are at least four models and four basic elements (i.e., ideas, groups, events, variables) being used by (social) scientists. Results: The article identifies the logical propositions underlying second-order science. It suggests strategies for developing second-order science. And it describes several methods that can be used to practice second-order science, including how past theories have not only described but also changed the phenomenon being studied. Implications: The task for members of the scientific community, particularly social scientists, is to practice second-order science and to develop further its theories and methods. A practical implication is to accept methods for acting as well as theories as a contribution to science, since methods explicitly define the role of an observer/ participant. Constructivist content: The paper is an extension of the work of Heinz von Foerster and other second-order cyberneticians.
Usó-Doménech J. L., Nescolarde-Selva J. A. & Gash H. (2018) Six principles of ontological metaphysics. In: Lasker G. E. (ed.) Personal & spiritual development in the world of cultural diversity. Volume XV. International Institute for Advanced Studies, Tecumseh ON: 13–16. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5524
The so-called ontological naturalism is the thesis that ontological work – that is, the investigation of what exists – constitutes a purely scientific task. Philosophy (metaphysics, in particular) has little or nothing to contribute to this research. The authors argue that this is not viable.
Van Kerkhove B. (2011) Dialectics in Action, World at Stake. Review of “Bridges to the World. A Dialogue on the Construction of Knowledge, Education, and Truth” by David Kenneth Johnson & Matthew R. Silliman. Constructivist Foundations 7(1): 78–80. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/246
Upshot: This is a deceptively profound, compact book that can be inscribed in the grand tradition of philosophical dialogue. It confronts naive realism and radical constructivism, arriving at a seemingly workable conciliatory position.
Völker J. & Scholl A. (2014) Do the Media Fail to Represent Reality? A Constructivist and Second-order Critique of the Research on Environmental Media Coverage and Its Normative Implications. Constructivist Foundations 10(1): 140–149. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/1185
Problem: First-order scientific research is often not aware of the hidden assumptions provided by an epistemological perspective based upon realism. Beyond philosophical considerations about the epistemological foundations, some practical normative implications deriving from them are crucial: in the field of communication and media studies, some scholars criticize media coverage, e.g., on climate change, as biased and distorted from reality. Method: From a constructivist perspective, the article presents a detailed meta-analysis of the course of argumentation provided by two empirical communication studies that follow an objectivist approach. Result: With the help of a second-order research strategy, it is possible to uncover their ontological assumptions and criticize their normative implications. Implications: Social scientists should be careful with normative suggestions for the system under study (e.g., journalists) unless they are applied within these systems themselves.