Problem: First-order scientific research is often not aware of the hidden assumptions provided by an epistemological perspective based upon realism. Beyond philosophical considerations about the epistemological foundations, some practical normative implications deriving from them are crucial: in the field of communication and media studies, some scholars criticize media coverage, e.g., on climate change, as biased and distorted from reality. Method: From a constructivist perspective, the article presents a detailed meta-analysis of the course of argumentation provided by two empirical communication studies that follow an objectivist approach. Result: With the help of a second-order research strategy, it is possible to uncover their ontological assumptions and criticize their normative implications. Implications: Social scientists should be careful with normative suggestions for the system under study (e.g., journalists) unless they are applied within these systems themselves.

Key words: Meta-analysis, second-order research, epistemology, communication studies, climate change, bias.

Context: The burgeoning field of consciousness studies has recently witnessed a revival of first-person approaches based on phenomenology in general and Husserlian phenomenology in particular. However, the attempts to introduce phenomenological methods into cognitive science have raised serious doubts as to the feasibility of such projects. Much of the current debate has revolved around the issue of the naturalisation of phenomenology, i.e., of the possibility of integrating phenomenology into the naturalistic paradigm. Significantly less attention has been devoted to the complementary process of the phenomenologisation of nature, i.e., of a (potentially radical) transformation of the theoretical and existential underpinnings of the naturalist framework. Problem: The aim of this article is twofold. First, it provides a general overview of the resurgence of first-person methodologies in cognitive sciences, with a special emphasis on a circular process of naturalising phenomenology and phenomenologising nature. Secondly, it tries to elucidate what theoretical (conceptual) and practical (existential) implications phenomenological approaches might have for the current understanding of nature and consciousness. Results: It is argued that, in order for the integration of phenomenological and scientific approaches to prove successful, it is not enough merely to provide a firm naturalistic grounding for phenomenology. An equally, if not even more important, process of phenomenological contextualisation of science must also be considered, which might have far-reaching implications for its theoretical underpinnings (move from disembodied to embodied models) and our existential stance towards nature and consciousness (cultivation of a non-dual way of being. Implications: The broader theoretical framework brought about by the circular exchange between natural sciences and phenomenology can contribute to a more holistic conception of science, one that is in accord with the cybernetic idea of second-order science and based on a close interconnection between (abstract) reflection and (lived) experience. Constructivist content: The (re)introduction of first-person approaches into cognitive science and consciousness studies evokes the fundamental circularity that is characteristic of second-order cybernetics. It provides a rich framework for a dialogue between science and lived experience, where scientific endeavour merges with the underlying existential structures, while the latter remains reflectively open to scientific findings and proposals.

Key words: Cognitive science, phenomenology, first-person approaches, naturalisation, phenomenologisation, lived experience, non-dualism

Excerpt: Ernst von Glasersfeld has succeeded in finding a viable fit between the man and the scientist and in embodying a Haltung (attitude) that represents constructivism. He was prepared to get involved with a “different way of thinking” and to deal with a matter that is often “demanding and uncomfortable” for those affected. Ernst von Glasersfeld, in an interview with me on questions of constructivism and school.

Key words: Ernst von Glasersfeld, education

Daß Radikaler Konstruktivismus und relationale Theologie nur auf den ersten Blick unversöhnlich erscheinen, wird in dem hier skizzierten interdisziplinären Dialog deutlich werden. Da der Basissatz der relationalen Theologie “Gott ist die Liebe” (1. Joh 4, 16b) lautet, da also von der mitmenschlichen Beziehung Gott ausgesagt wird, berührt der Dialog über den Dialog kein theologisches Randthema, sondern die zentrale Frage nach der Denkund Erfahrbarkeit Gottes innerhalb des konstruktivisitschen Paradigmas. Relationale Theologie, die Dialogizität in ihren Letztmöglichkeiten zu begreifen sucht, führt das Erkennen bis an die Grenze seiner Konstruktivität, zu der Dimension der Nichtmachbarkeit, des Geschenks. Ihr Insistieren auf dem Moment des Unverfügbaren innerhalb der mitmenschlichen Beziehung, auf dem Paradox des Unbedingten im Bedingten, begründet ihre Relevanz für den Radikalen Konstruktivismus, so daß relationale Theologie als theologische Grundlagenforschung und allgemein-humane Orientierungswissenschaft einen Platz innerhalb des radikalkonstruktivistischen Diskurses erhalten kann. Matthias Wallich gelingt eine übergreifende Analyse konstruktivistischer Denkansätze von Heinz von Foerster und Humberto R. Maturana bis zu Gebhard Ruschs Verstehenskonzept. Neben der Differenzlogik George Spencer Browns wird u. a. auch das Dialogverständnis der Systemischen Therapie, von Paul Watzlawick, Gregoty Bateson, Klaus Krippendorff und Niklas Luhmann diskutiert…

Radical constructivism was defined by von Glasersfeld as a theory of knowing that provides a pragmatic approach to questions about reality, truth, and human understanding. Radical constructivism draws heavily on Jean Piaget’s constructivism, but also on ideas about epistemology, or how we come to acquire knowledge, from British empiricism, Kant’s idealism, and Saussure’s structuralism, among others. Following Piaget, von Glasersfeld argued that we construct our concepts and our understanding of the world, developmentally. Knowledge is categorized by its viability in the domain of experience, rather than by the traditional philosophical position that it is constitutive of Truth, that is, that it corresponds to an objective reality. The two basic principles of radical constructivism are that knowledge is not passively received through the senses but is actively constructed by the cognizing subject, the learner, and that the function of cognition is organization of the experiential world rather than discovery of an independent reality. This chapter gives an overview of the theory underpinning radical constructivism and explores its implications for science education. It also examines critiques of radical constructivism, such as it neglects the social aspect of cognition and that it leads to an anti-realist stance on science teaching and learning.

Key words: radical constructivism, constructivism, active learning, learning progressions, scientific knowledge, epistemology, mathematics, piaget, genetic epistemology, relativism.

Open peer commentary on the target article “From Objects to Processes: A Proposal to Rewrite Radical Constructivism” by Siegfried J. Schmidt. Upshot: This commentary asks if Schmidt’s latest process-orientated philosophy is based on a vicious infinite regress argument. The commentator uses recent literature on the distinction of vicious and benign infinite regresses (from Claude Gratton and Nicholas Rescher) and tries to show that – taken verbatim – there is a serious logical problem in Schmidt’s argumentation.

Context: Numerous analyses emphasize the historical variability and social construction of the autism category. As a result, many beliefs and stereotypes about autism function unconsciously in social awareness as background knowledge. Problem: We present the results of a survey concerning the social perception of autism and we draw attention to the possible impact of the specific ways in which people with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are perceived, as revealed in the survey, on how this social identity might be created. Method: A questionnaire consisting of two parts - closed-ended questions and free associations - was used in the survey. 355 participants answered the questions concerning the nature of autism, its causes, sources of information and experiences in contact with people on the spectrum. Results: The results shows that there exists a cognitively interesting divergence between the level of knowledge declared by the respondents, based on credible sources, which is indicative of a positive attitude toward people with ASD, and the more negative attitude seen in the free associations. Implications: Despite the level of social reflective knowledge, relations between people with ASD and neurotypical people seem to be lined with feelings such as fear, anxiety or uncertainty. This should draw attention to the need for a deeper and more conscious analysis of societal beliefs about autism. Constructivist content: The theoretical framework for this survey is social representations theory (SRT), which derives from the constructivist paradigm. By showing the important role of individuals’ background knowledge in the construction of autism social representation, the results of the survey confirm the usefulness of the constructivist approach to the analysis of the autism phenomenon. Keywords: Autism spectrum, constructivism, social perception of autism, reflective knowledge, background knowledge, identity.­

Excerpt: It is not possible within the scope of this chapter to mount a full-scale philosophical defence of radical constructivism. What is possible is an attack from the radical constructivist point of view using a weapon readily adaptable to a wide range of opponents.

Open peer commentary on the target article “From Objects to Processes: A Proposal to Rewrite Radical Constructivism” by Siegfried J. Schmidt. Upshot: The aim is to show that, although Schmidt’s thesis must in most respects be warmly welcomed, there is an unexpressed implication concerning the dialogic structure of language that, when drawn out plainly, reveals a further valuable move open to the theory. I offer it therefore as a clarification of his theory with which I hope Schmidt may agree. He has already stressed the differences in understanding between one agent and another; it is because of this that, in order to communicate, agents must play without believing the mutual hypothetical projections of “truth,” “sincerity,” “objectivity,” “reference,” and other ideals of social “reality.” In the language process it is faith upon which this rests rather than blind trust. It is argued that only faith can properly take account of the risks of contingency.