The paper looks at a combination of systems theory, cybernetics, and sociological theory in search of a tool for inquiring into contemporary social forms. The idea of observing networks, drawing on Heinz von Foerster’s and Niklas Luhmann’s notion of observing systems and Harrison C. White’s network calculus of identity and control, is outlined to enable basic sociological intuitions about social forms to be integrated with an understanding of both complexity and recursivity organizing our perspective on the human condition in a precarious world. Social forms are shown to gain robustness not from substantial identity but from relational ambiguity. Observing networks, or so the hypothesis goes, combine bodies, minds, society, and – soon perhaps – intelligent machines. The paper looks at how an understanding of complexity, recursivity, system, form, and network may help flesh out the calculus of our human condition.

Key words: complexity, form, network, recursivity, society, system

The aim of this article is to present to the reader the theoretical construction of Jean-Louis Le Moigne. It starts with a discussion of the background that is relevant for this construction, which is: a few words about Le Moigne himself, some influences on his thinking and an overview of the theoretical framework together with some domains of application. The following exposition of Le Moigne’s Systemics (LMS) is articulated in three groups: the what, the why and the how of knowing. The what presents the two basic hypotheses of LMS’ epistemological version, called Projective Constructivist Epistemology. These are: the phenomenological and the teleological hypotheses. The three dominating properties of the first hypothesis, that is the irreversibility, the recursivity and the dialectics of knowing, are presented as well. The why question presents the criterion for validation, which is projective (or cognitive) feasibility, to be contrasted with the positivist’s aspiration for objective truth. This presents LMS’ solution to the dilemma between objectivity and relativism. Projective feasibility is possible due to the so-called social contract and the autonomy of science as a domain of thought, both are discussed. The third question, the how, presents a set of cognitive instruments for knowledge constitution. These may be articulated in three sub-categories: modelling rationality, systemic modelling and inforgetic theory. Under the label of modelling rationality the following topics are discussed: formalism, procedural rationality, conjunctive or self-referential system of logic and the discussion of the method for conduct of good reason. Secondly, systemic modelling discusses: complexity, modelling, the canonic model of a General System, LMS’ modelling instrument called Systemography, the canonic model of a General Process, the canonic model of Information Processing System, LMS’ instrument for articulation of complex systems called Teleological Complexification of Functional Levels, a general and a priori identification of pertinent levels of complexification of a complex system’s organisation as manifested in the canonic model called Decision-Information-Organisation System, and finally the paradigm of an active organisation: Eco-Auto-Re-Organisation with its canonic model of organisation, the latter is a conflictful conjunction of three recursive functions: to produce and self-produce, to relate and self-relate, to maintain and self-maintain. Thirdly, inforgetic theory refers to the conceptual relation between information and organisation. It includes: the canonic model of information: Signified-Sign-Signification, the first principle of inforgetics: the principle of self-organisation, and the second principle of inforgetics: the principle of intelligent action. Finally, the article gives a brief summing up of the significance of Le Moigne’s contribution.

This article reviews the potential of Niklas Luhmann’s autopoiesis as a contribution to organization theory. We consider organization theory to consist of three epistemological foundations, which we label equilibrium-based theory, process-based theory and recursivity-based theory. We review critically Luhmann’s autopoietic theory in relation to each of these three foundations. We suggest that whereas it deviates radically from equilibrium-based theory and deviates significantly from process-based theory, it holds potential in its complementarity with Giddens’s structuration theory in providing a promising basis for recursivity-based organization theory.

Key words: Organization theory, autopoiesis, systems theory, Luhmann

In the first cybernetics (McCulloch) and the second one (Ashby and von Foerster) as well recursivity was supposed to be a central concepts. But in both theories, the power of recursive functions (to find the code of the program which computes a function that depends on this very same code) as well as the troubles raised by non recursively enumerable functions have been overlooked. A similar position can be found in some theories related to the connectionism of the eighties, that have also been pretended to take place beyond the real power of recursivity.

Key words: recursivity, cybernetics, code, program, connectionism

Excerpt: So called “Second-Order” cybernetics developed the notions of self-organization in a manner more radical than Wiener, attempting to both give a strong sense to the prefix “auto” and, at the same time, to explain reflexive phenomena, memory, and the relation between the organism and its history, in terms of the emergence of a global effect out of local interactions and the networking of retroactive processes. But the proposed theories didn’t always work. Today’s connectionist systems are analogous in some ways to the “non-trivial machines” of von Foerster. They lay claim to a common filiate (the formal networks of neurons of McCulloch and Pitts) and, more recently, they attack the problem of the recognition and the representation of recursive, nested structures. This new step is reminiscent of the one which took us from Ashby’s homeostat to the application by von Foerster of the concept of recursivity to the problem of non-trivial or memory-equipped machines. We will attempt to show that the analogy is a real one and that von Foerster anticipated many of the current problems. But we will also see that with the development of working models, other more redoubtable difficulties have appeared precisely where Second-Order cybernetics failed to foresee them.

I present here an analysis of the core of biological organization from a genealogical perspective, trying to show which could be the driving forces or principles of organization leading from the physico-chemical world to the biological one. From this perspective the essential issue is to understand how new principles of generation and preservation of complexity could appear. At the beginning, the driving force towards complexity was nothing but the confluence of several principles of ordering, such as self-assembly, template replication, or self-organization, merged in the framework of what I have called a nontrivial self-maintaining organization. The key of this process is functional recursivity, namely, the fact that every novelty capable of contributing to a more efficient form of maintenance will be recruited. This leads us to the central concept of autonomy, defined as a form of self-constructing organization, which maintains its identity through its interactions with its environment. As such, autonomy grasps the idea of (minimal) metabolic organization, which, in turn, is at the basis of what we mean by (minimal) organism. Finally, from the concept of autonomy, I try to show how it has generated a new and more encompassing system in which evolution by natural selection takes over, generating in turn a new form of individual organization (genetically instructed metabolism) erasing the previous ones.

This paper aims to offer an overview of the meaning of autonomy for biological individuals and artificial models rooted in a specific perspective that pays attention to the historical and structural aspects of its origins and evolution. Taking autopoiesis and the recursivity characteristic of its circular logic as a starting point, we depart from some of its consequences to claim that the theory of autonomy should also take into account historical and structural features. Autonomy should not be considered only in internal or constitutive terms, the largely neglected interactive aspects stemming from it should be equally addressed. Artificial models contribute to get a better understanding of the role of autonomy for life and the varieties of its organization and phenomenological diversity.

Key words: Agency, biological organization, cognition, function, integration, self-organization

The genotype-phenotype (genome-form) distinction is considered by many to be fundamental to modern evolutionary thinking. Indeed, the premises that: DNA solely constitutes the genotype; that the phenotype is a transient product of the genotype, with the latter not only describing, but also implementing the construction of the former; and that the constructed materials and systems of the cell have no impact on the genotype, have become dogmas. Yet a vast body of data from molecular genetics reveals that cellular systems, directly and indirectly, alter the genome. Some of these data are reviewed. Proteins can influence mutations along the chromosomes, heritably modify the information content of DNA sequences, and, in some instances, reorganize the germline or somatic genome via DNA engineering pathways. These data suggest that the constructed (proteins, chromatin arrays, and metabolic pathways) has an important role in shaping the descriptor. Insofar as it is biochemically possible for states adopted by cellular structures to be stabilized and eventually memorized by engineering chromosomes, semantic closure can be transcended-meaning can be transferred from the domain of form to the genome, and this presumably ongoing process is termed teleomorphic recursivity. Throughout the paper, I implicitly argue that the genome-form partition is strictly a formal one, with no deeply material basis.

Context: In the past three decades, the work of Varela has had an enormous impact on current developments in contemporary science. Problem: Varela’s thought was extremely complex and multifaceted, and while some aspects – notably his contributions to the autopoietic theory of living and enactivist approach to cognition – have gained widespread acclaim, others have been ignored or watered down. Method: We identify three dimensions of Varela’s thought: (i) anti-realism of the “middle way”; (ii) anti-foundationalism of the circular/recursive onto-epistemology; and (iii) ethical/social implications of the circularity/recursivity. The discussion of these dimensions is followed by a concise overview of the individual target articles in this issue and the topics they cover. Finally, we discuss in what ways the articles extend and relate to Varela’s work. We do this by means of a concrete example: the relation between “enaction” and “enactivism. Results: We show that the ignoring-cum-watering-down process of Varela’s contributions to science is at least partly linked to the three dimensions of Varela’s thought. Based on our examination we also find that the more narrow research topics are always interrelated with broader philosophical reflection. Researching into ignored and watered-down aspects of Varela’s work enables us to not only gain fresh insights into Varela’s overall philosophy and rekindle interest in the topics and themes that have been brushed aside, but also cast a fresh light on those that are currently in full bloom. Implications: Reviving interest in Varela’s work in toto could lead to fruitful research and discussion in numerous scientific fields. To illustrate this idea, we delineate, tentatively, three domains – theoretical, empirical, and existential – where Varela’s contribution to philosophy and science could instigate prolific exchange of views. Constructivist content: All three dimensions of Varela’s philosophy have strong affinities with radical constructivist critique of realism and some of its epistemological and ethical implications.

Key words: Francisco Varela, anti-realism, anti-foundationalism, certainty, circularity, enaction, enactivism, ethics, reality, second-order science, self-reflexivity