In the following text I propose a certain view of historiography of philosophy. My starting point will be the analysis of Richard Rorty regarding the historiography of philosophy. The first part will discuss Rorty’s text and the differences between various ways of approaching the history of philosophy. Rorty’s text is important because it reveals a lack of unitary vision when we are speaking about the best way in which we can write history of philosophy. This lack of unity implies that there are different frames of thinking historiography so we are entitled to say that the clashes between visions constitutes a whole new area of inquiry which we can call “the philosophy of historiography.” The following step is to distinguish the philosophy of historiography from the philosophy of history. We will see then, that one of the most important questions of philosophy of historiography is: what is philosophy? Before we start writing the history of philosophy, we should ask ourselves what is our view about the nature of philosophy. Following the French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, my view is that philosophy is essentially “the art of creating concepts.” Viewing the philosophy in this way implies that the history of philosophy is a history of concepts. Since the concepts are constructed entities, and not discovered things, it follows that viewing the history of philosophy in this way, forces us to adopt a constructivist approach.

Key words: historiography of philosophy, philosophy of historiography, philosophy of history, constructivism, art of concept creation

Purpose: The text searches for possible uses of a daring postulate to reject dualism, formulated by Josef Mitterer. Furthermore, it explores the inconsistencies of dualism and its remnants in three projects: Richard Rorty’s neopragmatism, the strong program of the sociology of knowledge, and radical constructivism. The final aim of the argument is to demonstrate that a very interesting incorporation of Mitterer’s postulates is possible, and that it must take the form of a consistent antiessentialism. At this point the article presents Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory. Findings: The article underlines the specific role of the so-called other side of the discourse – which, according to Mitterer is fabricated by the dualizing mode of speaking. Such an instance is a priori essentialized and it plays a crucial role as a tool for settling arguments. The text traces the role of this instance in the concepts mentioned above. Benefits: Through the use of Latour’s constructivism, the text indicates that there exists a fruitful empirical (non-speculative) research program, which was projected in accordance with Mitterer’s postulates.

Key words: criticism of dualism, anti-essentialism, neopragmatism, strong programme, radical constructivism, actor-network theory

Excerpt: In summary, I agree that “there are no ‘true’ theories, so there are no universally ‘right’ methodologies” (Norman, 1998). But the realist/dualist thinking of modern science has been overtaken by the “post” modern constructivist view which, when coupled with a pragmatic approach to justification – not verification – is very convincing and has important implications for assessing the relevance of methodologies within the various areas of educational research. At the least, researchers in medical education should seriously explore this new pragmatic thinking (e.g., Rorty, 1998), which I think has considerable potential for keeping us on track and dispelling what Kaestle (1993) has called “the awful reputation of educational research.”

In the reception of Josef Mitterer’s writings up to now, there are two predominant types of motifs: the radical constructivist background of his philosophy and the ontological and epistemological foundations and consequences of non-dualism. The critics are focused rather on some problematic consequences of non-dualism, ranging from the problem of infinite regress up to the thesis assuming that Mitterer’s philosophy presupposes a world reduced to descriptions. However, these two types of readings are founded on dualizing assumptions which are not coherent with non-dualism. \\Thus, in the present paper I interpret non-dualism in the frame of non-dual-ism, based on non-dualizing assumptions. I argue that non-dualism is a rhetorical project resulting in far-reaching consequences in the field of academic and scientific debates, poetics and practice of negotiations and deliberations, as well as in ordinary discourse. Non-dualism fulfills Richard Rorty’s dream of culture as a never-ending conversation in which the argument of power is successfully replaced by the power of argument. Mitterer makes transparent the rhetorical techniques performed in the dualizing discourse (not only in situations of conflict) in order to present an alternative – the non-dualizing mode of discourse. Mitterer’s philosophy – reread in the context of Rorty’s pragmatism, Foucault’s conception of discourses, Perelman’s new rhetoric – offers the new vocabulary (in Rorty’s meaning) which may change the practice of speaking

Key words: non-dualizing mode of speaking, description “so far” / “from now on, ” constructivism, rhetoric, discourse.

Excerpt: I will take you on a tour through the idea of reality construction by travelling back and forth between the two intellectual strands in the process of modernization: the Enlightenment and Romanticism. The major part of our tour will be spent in the land of Romanticism, accepting without argument the kind of irrealism propounded by constructivists like Nelson Goodman, Richard Rorty and Jacques Derrida. But throughout I will try to give the Enlightenment its due by pointing out the important roles of technology in the processes of reality construction: in material constructions, as a basis for thought experiments, as provider of intellectual tools, and as a source for constructivist ideas in general.

Key words: Enlightenment, Romanticism, Goodman, Rorty, Derrida, irrealism, social constructivism, material construction

Context: Josef Mitterer’s critique of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concept of aspectual vision as elaborated in the second part of Philosophical Investigations and an attempt to develop a kind of non-dualistic “philosophy of systemic psychotherapy.” Problem: How can we ever say that we see something as some other thing when already seeing something is a kind of interpretative activity? Is everything we see an interpretation of an antecedent interpretation? Method: Analyzing and interpreting literature. Results: Wittgenstein, Rorty, and Mitterer develop their positions from a comparable kind of discomfort. The foundation of Mitterer’s critique, however, is completely different: his concept of non-dualism no longer only discusses problems resulting from aspectual vision or from the metaphor of a mirror in relation to objects but seeks to overcome the problems arising from the belief in a categorical difference between objects and the description of objects. Implications: If considered residually dualist in Mitterer’s perspective, aspectual vision in the sense of Wittgenstein is a controversial construction that needs further reflection.

Key words: Dichotomy, observation, objectivity, aspectual vision, argumentation, discourse

In this paper I argue that Josef Mitterer’s non-dualizing mode of discourse and Richard Rorty’s ironist philosophy should team up. After an introduction (1), my starting point is the portrayal of anti-representationalism which is of central importance in Rorty’s philosophical project (2). Then I argue that the nondualizing mode of discourse is the best available way to cash out anti-representationalism (3). To close this paper I will describe a type of philosopher who will most likely be sympathetic towards such a non-dualizing project (4). Here I will make use of Rorty’s ideas in calling this figure the edifying ironist. My claim is that edifying ironists should consider adopting the non-dualizing way of speaking and that non-dualists should consider becoming edifying ironists.

Key words: Non-dualism, richard rorty, josef mitterer, edifying philosophy, irony.

In this paper, I argue that radical constructivists shall refrain from using formulations such as “We can only experience our constructed world but never reality as it is in itself “. Ernst von Glasersfeld’s claim that knowledge in principle cannot reflect reality is symptomatic in this respect (von Glasersfeld 1981, p. 95). The problem is that many radical constructivists take these formulations and the idea behind it for granted – although they are self-contradictory. \\To resolve this problem, I propose that constructivists are well advised to adopt Richard Rorty’s “antirepresentationalist particularism.” In this way we do not answer the problem of self-contradiction in an argumentative way, but we lose interest in making such problematic statements. As I take it, after we freed ourselves from the ensnarement of such statements forced upon us by philosophical tradition, radical constructivism becomes even more fascinating and enchanting.

When drawing a distinction between classical philosophy of identity and contemporary philosophy of difference, we tend to overlook crucial differences between the various philosophies of difference. In this article, an argument in favour of focusing on the different uses that are made of difference is presented. Thus, it investigates four central theoreticians of difference, Derrida, Deleuze, Luhmann, and Rorty in order to show how they differ from each other in spite of the fact that they all opt for a post-ontological philosophy of difference. The investigation is undertaken with the help of two central distinctions. Firstly, the radical attack on discursive order as such (typical for Derrida and Deleuze) is opposed to the evolutionary attempt to give up classical conceptuality in order to settle on new territories (to be found in Luhmann and Rorty). Secondly, a distinction is drawn between the use of difference as the heart of a theoretical enterprise (as can be seen in Derrida and Luhmann) and the use of difference for pragmatic purposes only (shared by Deleuze and Rorty). In conclusion, it is suggested that the four philosophies of difference are used as different means for different purposes.

Key words: are: Philosophy of difference, constructivism, deconstruction, pragmatism, nomadology, systems theory.

This short text discusses what Heinz von Foerster referred to as his Hermeneutics Principle, which I juxtapose with Rorty’s expatiation of the theories of epistemology and hermeneutics. I suggest that both thinkers’ intentions cohere, mentioning von Foerster’s self-referential operator of “I think” that he contrasted to “There is.” Rorty encouraged that hermeneutics be regarded similarly to epistemology, just as his prolific output further attests to his theory that “truth is made, rather than discovered.”