This article reports part of a study (Wright 1989b, 1990c, 1988) in which the epistemology of radical constructivism (e.g., von Glasersfeld 1987, in press) was used as a basis for a teaching experiment which involved an investigation of the mathematics learning of young children. The research methodology adopted for the study has been expounded by Cobb and Steffe (e.g. Cobb & Steffe 1983; Steffe & Cobb 1988) and, according to Sinclair, is “methodologically… original, … [and] longitudinal but not naturalistic” (1988: v). Further, the methodology is hermeneutic rather than positivistic (Candy 1989: 2–3), has much in common with phenomenographic approaches (e.g., Marton 1981, 1987; Neuman 1987) and, as Hockings advocates when describing insights for educational researchers from the science of chaos, “has [moved] away from a reductionist approach to knowledge and [works] across discipline boundaries” (1990: 17). The article begins by briefly reviewing recent developments in K-6 mathematics in order to demonstrate, in general terms, the compelling need for research into mathematics learning.

Key words: teaching experiment, teaching session, number word, radical constructivism, counting type.

I make two points in this commentary on Carey (2009). First, it may be too soon to conclude that core cognition is innate. Recent advances in computational cognitive science and developmental psychology suggest possible mechanisms for developing inductive biases. Second, there is another possible answer to Fodor’s challenge – if concepts are merely mental tokens, then cognitive scientists should spend their time on developing a theory of belief fixation instead.

How can a teacher apply ideas from the constructivist learning model to classroom teaching? This article reviews the main ideas of the constructivist learning theory as well as the epistemological shift in the view of scientific knowledge, and suggests ways of applying these ideas to science teaching. Yager presents a teaching model developed by the National Center for Improving Science Education that is based on the constructivist learning model and includes four aspects: invitation, exploration, proposed explanation and solution, and taking action. Specific strategies that science teachers can use to help students construct their own meaning are listed. In addition, the article contains a self-check instrument that can be used to determine the extent to which a teacher is basing his or her practice on constructivist learning theory. Yager concludes with the recommendation that this model should also be used in preparing new teachers.

The following conversation with Michael R. Matthews took place in May and June of 2010 via e-mail after his visit to Istanbul and Ankara for giving seminars on “The Contribution of History and Philosophy of Science to Science Teaching and Research” at Bogazici University and Hacettepe University. Our conversation included topics such as Michael’s educational background, science teacher education in relation to history and philosophy of science, worldviews, nature of science, constructivism, possible future directions for research, and advices for junior scholars and doctoral students. We believe that Michael’s generous answers to our questions will be of interest to all science education researchers around the world.

Key words: history and philosophy of science, worldviews, nature of science, features of science, constructivism, science teacher education.

This research aimed to clarify 5 physics teachers’ constructing knowledge base for teaching regarding constructivism. The participants were 5 physics teachers who studying Master degree in science education in Khon Kaen University, Thailand. Three participants applied science, technology, and (STS) approach for developing their teaching regarding constructivism. Other 2 participants applied teaching strategies of Predict Observe Explain (POE). This qualitative research regarded interpretive paradigm for physics teachers’ constructing knowledge base for teaching regarding constructivism during applying STS approach and POE for 2 months of physics teaching. Research instruments include teachers’ lesson plan, observation, teachers’ journal writing, and interviewing. The study explicates such a knowledge base. It is demonstrated what kind of pedagogical content knowledge (PCK) originates from our cooperation with six participating teachers. The pathway of teachers’ constructing PCK will be discussed for provide information of enhancing physics teaching regarding constructivism. This study has implications for science teacher professional development.

Key words: pedagogical content knowledge, constructivism, sts, poe, and professional development.

Embodied and extended cognition is a relatively new paradigm within cognitive science that challenges the basic tenet of classical cognitive science, viz. cognition consists in building and manipulating internal representations. Some of the pioneers of embodied cognitive science have claimed that this new way of conceptualizing cognition puts pressure on epistemological and ontological realism. In this paper I will argue that such anti-realist conclusions do not follow from the basic assumptions of radical embodied cognitive science. Furthermore I will show that one can develop a form of realism that reflects rather than just accommodates the core principles of non-representationalist embodied cognitive science.

Key words: Embodied cognition, Enactivism, Mental representation, Realism

Context: Most recent attempts to define cognition dialectically lack the philosophical completeness necessary to explain neurocognitive and mental processes. Problem: Under what conditions could neurophenomenology be thought of as dialectical and what would be the implications of such a conception for contemporary issues such as “social cognition” and phenomenological subjectivity? Method: I assess dialectical approaches to neurocognitive processes and mind mostly within the recent neurophenomenological literature and provide reasons as to why these approaches could be further improved using Hegel’s conception of dialectical processes. Results: As suggested in the context of research on extended cognition, mostly by Gallagher and Crisafi, a cognitively shaped understanding of Hegel’s philosophy allows us to understand how neurophenomenology can be conceptualized dialectically. It allows us to conceive precisely of how dialectical processes can help shape our understanding of cognition from individual neurocognitive operations to socially embedded processes. A dialectical interpretation of Varela’s conception of neurocognitive processes can help achieve the endeavor of recent sociological work to understand the “continuity” from individual to social “entities” through a “relational ontology.” This amounts to expanding, through a neurodialectical framework, Gallagher’s research on extended cognition as well as articulating it with his most recent conception of “decentered” cognition. Implications: Neurodialectics has straightforward implications for phenomenological understandings of subjectivity as well as for recent sociological research: in both cases, it can provide us with a philosophically meaningful and empirically sustainable framework. In particular, it could help philosophically expand Gallagher’s “decentered” model of brainhood. Constructivist Content: I argue in favor of a general philosophical perspective, the neurodialectical one, stressing the “primacy of moulding on being.”

Key words: Dialectics, philosophy of mind, phenomenology, neurophenomenology, philosophy of social science, philosophy of cognitive science.

Context: Shaun Gallagher’s work is very influential in contemporary philosophy, especially when it comes to the mind, to philosophical issues raised by developmental psychology, and to intersubjectivity. Problem: Classical cognitivism” has been, and often still is dominating the sciences of the mind. The reasons for this dominance include being implementable on computers, being consistent with Darwinism, and being allegedly experimentally testable. However, this dominance could just as well be a historical phase as cognitivism is disconnected from biological, anthropological, and neuroscientific research. Method: We historically and epistemologically contextualize how Gallagher contributed to bringing the body and subjectivity back to the center of the sciences of the mind by focusing on two examples: theory of mind and evolutionary psychology. Results: Both contemporary epistemologists and Gallagher’s work indicate why classical cognitivism provides a flawed model of cognition, especially when it comes to its explanatory scope: embodiment, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity, among other things, are fundamentally mistreated by cognitivism. Implications: Gallagher helped to structure what Andler calls “heterodoxical” approaches to cognition by conceptualizing a unifying framework, the so-called “E-approaches.” This unification has the major implication of leading Gallagher to a model in which cognition is “decentered,” which helps tackle the philosophical issues one might encounter when narrowing down philosophy of cognition. Constructivist content: We apply E-approaches to the philosophy of cognition, psychology and social sciences.

Key words: Philosophy of mind, philosophy of cognitive science, history of science, embodiment, E-approaches

Embodiment has become an important concept in many areas of cognitive science. There are, however, very different notions of exactly what embodiment is and what kind of body is required for what kind of embodied cognition. Hence, while many would agree that humans are embodied cognizers, there is much less agreement on what kind of artefact could be considered as embodied. This paper identifies and contrasts five different notions of embodiment which can roughly be characterized as (1) structural coupling between agent and environment, (2) historical embodiment as the result of a history of structural coupling, (3) physical embodiment, (4) “organismoid’ embodiment, i.e. organism-like bodily form (e.g., humanoid robots), and (5) organismic embodiment of autopoietic, living systems.

This paper discusses different approaches in cognitive science and artificial intelligence research from the perspective of radical constructivism, addressing especially their relation to the biologically based theories of von Uexküll, Piaget as well as Maturana and Varela. In particular recent work in ‘New AI’ and adaptive robotics on situated and embodied intelligence is examined, and we discuss in detail the role of constructive processes as the basis of situatedness in both robots and living organisms.

Key words: adaptive robotics, artificial intelligence, embodied cognition, radical constructivism, situatedness