This research aimed to clarify 5 physics teachers’ constructing knowledge base for teaching regarding constructivism. The participants were 5 physics teachers who studying Master degree in science education in Khon Kaen University, Thailand. Three participants applied science, technology, and (STS) approach for developing their teaching regarding constructivism. Other 2 participants applied teaching strategies of Predict Observe Explain (POE). This qualitative research regarded interpretive paradigm for physics teachers’ constructing knowledge base for teaching regarding constructivism during applying STS approach and POE for 2 months of physics teaching. Research instruments include teachers’ lesson plan, observation, teachers’ journal writing, and interviewing. The study explicates such a knowledge base. It is demonstrated what kind of pedagogical content knowledge (PCK) originates from our cooperation with six participating teachers. The pathway of teachers’ constructing PCK will be discussed for provide information of enhancing physics teaching regarding constructivism. This study has implications for science teacher professional development.

Key words: pedagogical content knowledge, constructivism, sts, poe, and professional development.

Embodied and extended cognition is a relatively new paradigm within cognitive science that challenges the basic tenet of classical cognitive science, viz. cognition consists in building and manipulating internal representations. Some of the pioneers of embodied cognitive science have claimed that this new way of conceptualizing cognition puts pressure on epistemological and ontological realism. In this paper I will argue that such anti-realist conclusions do not follow from the basic assumptions of radical embodied cognitive science. Furthermore I will show that one can develop a form of realism that reflects rather than just accommodates the core principles of non-representationalist embodied cognitive science.

Key words: Embodied cognition, Enactivism, Mental representation, Realism

Context: Most recent attempts to define cognition dialectically lack the philosophical completeness necessary to explain neurocognitive and mental processes. Problem: Under what conditions could neurophenomenology be thought of as dialectical and what would be the implications of such a conception for contemporary issues such as “social cognition” and phenomenological subjectivity? Method: I assess dialectical approaches to neurocognitive processes and mind mostly within the recent neurophenomenological literature and provide reasons as to why these approaches could be further improved using Hegel’s conception of dialectical processes. Results: As suggested in the context of research on extended cognition, mostly by Gallagher and Crisafi, a cognitively shaped understanding of Hegel’s philosophy allows us to understand how neurophenomenology can be conceptualized dialectically. It allows us to conceive precisely of how dialectical processes can help shape our understanding of cognition from individual neurocognitive operations to socially embedded processes. A dialectical interpretation of Varela’s conception of neurocognitive processes can help achieve the endeavor of recent sociological work to understand the “continuity” from individual to social “entities” through a “relational ontology.” This amounts to expanding, through a neurodialectical framework, Gallagher’s research on extended cognition as well as articulating it with his most recent conception of “decentered” cognition. Implications: Neurodialectics has straightforward implications for phenomenological understandings of subjectivity as well as for recent sociological research: in both cases, it can provide us with a philosophically meaningful and empirically sustainable framework. In particular, it could help philosophically expand Gallagher’s “decentered” model of brainhood. Constructivist Content: I argue in favor of a general philosophical perspective, the neurodialectical one, stressing the “primacy of moulding on being.”

Key words: Dialectics, philosophy of mind, phenomenology, neurophenomenology, philosophy of social science, philosophy of cognitive science.

Context: Shaun Gallagher’s work is very influential in contemporary philosophy, especially when it comes to the mind, to philosophical issues raised by developmental psychology, and to intersubjectivity. Problem: Classical cognitivism” has been, and often still is dominating the sciences of the mind. The reasons for this dominance include being implementable on computers, being consistent with Darwinism, and being allegedly experimentally testable. However, this dominance could just as well be a historical phase as cognitivism is disconnected from biological, anthropological, and neuroscientific research. Method: We historically and epistemologically contextualize how Gallagher contributed to bringing the body and subjectivity back to the center of the sciences of the mind by focusing on two examples: theory of mind and evolutionary psychology. Results: Both contemporary epistemologists and Gallagher’s work indicate why classical cognitivism provides a flawed model of cognition, especially when it comes to its explanatory scope: embodiment, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity, among other things, are fundamentally mistreated by cognitivism. Implications: Gallagher helped to structure what Andler calls “heterodoxical” approaches to cognition by conceptualizing a unifying framework, the so-called “E-approaches.” This unification has the major implication of leading Gallagher to a model in which cognition is “decentered,” which helps tackle the philosophical issues one might encounter when narrowing down philosophy of cognition. Constructivist content: We apply E-approaches to the philosophy of cognition, psychology and social sciences.

Key words: Philosophy of mind, philosophy of cognitive science, history of science, embodiment, E-approaches

This paper discusses different approaches incognitive science and artificial intelligence research from the perspective of radical constructivism, addressing especially their relation to the biologically based theories ofvon Uexküll, Piaget as well as Maturana and Varela. In particular recent work in ‘New AI’ and adaptive robotics on situated and embodied intelligence is examined, and we discuss in detail the role of constructive processes as the basis of situatedness in both robots and living organisms.

Key words: adaptive robotics, artificial intelligence, embodied cognition, radical constructivism, situatedness

Embodiment has become an important concept in many areas of cognitive science. There are, however, very different notions of exactly what embodiment is and what kind of body is required for what type of embodied cognition. Hence, while many nowadays would agree that humans are embodied cognizers, there is much less agreement on what kind of artifact could be considered embodied. This paper identifies and contrasts six different notions of embodiment which can roughly be characterized as (1) structural coupling between agent and environment, (2) historical embodiment as the result of a history of struct ural coupling, (3) physical embodiment, (4) organismoid embodiment, i.e. organism- like bodily form (e.g., humanoid robots), (5) organismic embodiment of autopoietic, living systems, and (6) social embodiment.

Purpose: To point out the relevance of Heinz von Foerster’s work to modern embodied cognitive science and artificial intelligence research. Approach: The paper discusses (a) von Foerster’s contributions to understanding the limitations of the computer metaphor which has long dominated cognitive science, and (b) his theories concerning how reality is constructed in organizationally closed organisms, and what the underlying neural mechanisms are. The latter is exemplified with a simple neuro-robotic model that illustrates the constructive and anticipatory nature of memory. Findings: von Foerster’s work on the integration of a radical constructivist philosophy of knowledge construction with models of the underlying neurophysiological and sensorimotor mechanisms is still highly relevant to the understanding of embodied cognition and robotic models thereof. Value: This paper identifies conceptual contributions that von Foerster’s constructivist cybernetics can make to cognitive science’s still limited understanding of the embodiment of cognition and “representation.” Relevance: The paper addresses the relevance of radical constructivism in general, and von Foerster’s work in particular, to modern embodied cognitive science and artificial intelligence research.

Key words: Cognition, cybernetics, artificial intelligence, reality.

Upshot: Chemero provides a modern re-interpretation of Gibson’s ecological psychology and his affordance concept that is more coherent than the original and in line with antirepresentationalist, dynamical theories in embodied cognitive science. He argues for a radical embodied cognitive science, in which ecological and enactive approaches join forces against the more watered-down, mainstream embodied cognitive science that still maintains traditional commitments to representationalism and computationalism. He also defends a special version of realism, entity realism, which many constructivists might not find entirely convincing, but which is nevertheless more or less compatible with enactive theories of embodied cognition.

Embodied cognition is a hot topic in both cognitive science and AI, despite the fact that there still is relatively little consensus regarding what exactly constitutes ‘embodiment’. While most embodied AI and cognitive robotics research views the body as the physical/sensorimotor interface that allows to ground computational cognitive processes in sensorimotor interactions with the environment, more biologically-based notions of embodied cognition emphasize the fundamental role that the living body – and more specifically its homeostatic/allostatic self-regulation – plays in grounding both sensorimotor interactions and embodied cognitive processes. Adopting the latter position – a multi-tiered affectively embodied view of cognition in living systems – it is further argued that modeling organisms as layered networks of bodily self-regulation mechanisms can make significant contributions to our scientific understanding of embodied cognition.

Key words: allostasis, cognitive systems, grounding, homeostasis, embodied ai, embodied cognition, emotion, intentionality, predictive regulation, representation

Emotion is characterized as (a) closely connected to embodied cognition, (b) grounded in homeostatic bodily regulation, and (c) a powerful organizational principle—affective modulation of behavioral and cognitive mechanisms—that is ‘useful’ in both biological brains and robotic cognitive architectures. We elaborate how emotion theories and models centered on core neurological structures in the mammalian brain, and inspired by embodied, dynamical, and enactive approaches in cognitive science, may impact on computational and robotic modeling. In light of the theoretical discussion, work in progress on the development of an embodied cognitive-affective architecture for robots is presented, incorporating aspects of the theories discussed.