Context: Referring to a recent proposition by Kauffman about the “fundamental nature of circularity in cybernetics and in scientific work in general,” I try to advance this insight with the help of system scientific concepts and a computational model. Problem: Often circularity seems to be taken as a metaphor that does not provide a firm epistemological base that fosters analysis. Method: The methodology builds on mathematics, computer-based modeling, and reasoning. Results: By building on conceptual suggestions for grasping the micro-macro difference of complex systems in terms of computational power, circularity can be conceived of as an emerging macro-level phenomenon. Implications: I show that the seemingly irritating - and traditionally evaded - concept of circularity is a fundamental and ubiquitous phenomenon in complex systems that can be grasped on a firm physical basis open to computational analysis. The proposal could support constructivist reasoning and help to eventually bridge the disconcerting gap between the humanities and natural sciences. Constructivist content: Circularity is a fundamental principle in the conception of second-order cybernetics and in particular in the observation of observing systems, as suggested by von Foerster. Trying to set it up on a firm analytical basis could advance the constructivist approach and further support it in becoming the contemporary scientific epistemology it deserves to be.
Le Moigne J.-L. (2011) From Jean Piaget to Ernst von Glasersfeld: An Epistemological Itinerary in Review. Constructivist Foundations 6(2): 152–156. https://constructivist.info/6/2/152
Problem: While the elaboration and framing of constructivist epistemologies in keeping with the “currents of contemporary scientific epistemology” can be attributed to Jean Piaget, their development under the banner of radical constructivist epistemology is a result of the epistemological work of Ernst von Glasersfeld. The development of this epistemological paradigm, pursued over the last 40 years with the objective of “linking knowledge to action and situating the subject and the object on the same, multiple levels,” warrants further exploration and contextualization within the framework of current scientific activity. Results: In what amounts to a historical coincidence, von Glasersfeld discovered the work of Piaget in 1973, the same year that the author of this article first began to read Piaget’s Epistemological Studies; this coincidence provides a starting point for describing the epistemological itinerary that led the author from a reading of Piaget in 1973 to a somewhat tardy reading of von Glasersfeld in 1988 (the same year of the translation of his “Introduction to Radical Constructivism” into French). He then explicates the subsequent developments of this paradigmatic conjunction over the last 30 years, interpreting them in the contexts of contemporary developments of scientific and operational interdisciplinarity as well as in terms of historical roots extending from Leonardo da Vinci to Paul Valéry. Implications: The paradigm of constructivist epistemologies (working from a phenomenologically-based gnoseological hypothesis) can be presented and supported with arguments that are at least as solid and legitimate as those invoked in favor of alternative paradigms of realist and post-positivist epistemologies (working from an ontologically-based gnoseological hypothesis).
The epistemology of relativism that is featured by the theory of radical construc-tivism is addressed. In particular, I examine several objections, all based on this epistemic position of relativism, that are often raised by critics of the theory: the charge of reality denial (which, it is often claimed, must lead ultimately to the epistemically problematic position of solipsism), the assertion of self-referential contradiction (a theory that rejects the notion of truth cannot itself claim to be true), and the accusation that the theory must lead to a position of ethical indifference. It is demonstrated that these objections do not hold: they arise, to a large extent, from the failure to distinguish properly between different knowledge domains – spe¬cifically, between the notions of cognitive and non-cognitive knowledge. Some concrete examples, specifically pertaining to the conflict between natural science and creationism, are addressed; and their relevance for science education is discussed.
Quale A. (2007) The Epistemic Relativism of Radical Constructivism: Some Implications for Teaching the Natural Sciences. Constructivist Foundations 2(2-3): 107–113. https://cepa.info/37
Purpose: The relativism inherent in radical constructivism is discussed. The epistemic positions of realism and relativism are contrasted, particularly their different approaches to the concept of truth, denoted (respectively) as “truth by correspondence” and “truth by context.” I argue that the latter is the relevant one in the domain of science. Findings: Radical constructivism asserts that all knowledge must be constructed by the individual knower. This has implications for teaching, here imagined as a sharing of knowledge between teacher and students: it should be done, not by “reporting the true facts” of whatever is being taught, but rather by “telling a story” about it. An explicit distinction is made between the notions of cognitive and non-cognitive knowledge. It is argued that cognitive knowledge (such as in mathematics and science) is characterised by rules that can be unambiguously agreed on by actors who choose to “play the game”; and hence such knowledge is directly communicable from the teacher to the students. Implications: In telling the story of science, the teacher can verify that the students “have got it right,” even though they are all constructing their knowledge individually. In contrast, for non-cognitive knowledge (emotion, preferences, belief, …) there are no such unambiguous rules to agree on, and therefore it is not communicable in this way: in telling this story, the teacher has no way of verifying that the same knowledge is actually being shared. Conclusion: Science teaching should be carried out in the mode of story-telling; it does not need an epistemology of realism.