This paper addresses the learning paradox, which obliges radical constructivists to explain how cognition can advance from a lower level of reasoning to a higher one. Although the question is at least as old as Plato, two major flaws have inhibited progress in developing solutions: the assumption that learning is an inductive process, and the conflation of epistemological and ontological questions. I adopt a radical constructivist perspective and present a few related solutions from previous mathematics education literature. I then provide a new solution that relies on Peirce’s theory of abduction and Piaget’s theory of operational schemes. However, with the learning paradox resolved, an ontological paradox remains: If individuals construct their mathematical realities based on their personal actions and experiences, how can we explain the predictive power of scientific hypotheses that are based on this mathematics?

In this paper epistemological, ontological and sociological questions concerning the statistical significance of sharp hypotheses in scientific research are investigated within the framework provided by Cognitive Constructivism and the FBST (Full Bayesian Significance Test). The constructivist framework is contrasted with the traditional epistemological settings for orthodox Bayesian and frequentist statistics provided by Decision Theory and Falsificationism.

Key words: autopoiesis, cognitive constructivism, epistemology, ontology, scientific hypotheses, statistical significance tests, social systems, systems theory