Context: By proposing to regard objects as “tokens for eigenbehavior,” von Foerster’s seminal paper opposes the intuitive subject-object dualism of traditional philosophy, which considers objects to be instances of an external world Problem: We argue that this proposal has two implications, one for epistemology and one for the demarcation between the natural sciences and the humanities. Method: Our arguments are based on insights gained in computational models and from reviewing the contributions to this special issue. Results: Epistemologically, von Foerster’s proposal suggests that what is called “reality” could be seen as an ensemble of eigenforms generated by the eigenbehavior that arises in the interaction of multiple dynamics. Regarding science, the contributions to this special issue demonstrate that the concept of eigenbehavior can be applied to a variety of disciplines from the formal and natural sciences to the humanities. Its universal applicability provides a strong argument for transdisciplinarity, and its emphasis on the observer points in the direction of an observer-inclusive science. Implications: Thinking in eigenbehavior may not only have implications for tearing down the barriers between sciences and humanities (although a common methodology based on von Foerster’s transdisciplinary approach is still to crystalize), a better understanding of eigenbehaviors may also have profound effects on our understanding of ourselves. This also opens the way to innovative behavior design/modification technologies.

Key words: Eigenbehavior, eigenform, Heinz von Foerster, computational philosophy, scientific methodology, observer-inclusive science, transdisciplinarity, nondualism

Based primarily on the belief that it is man who constructs reality, a trend has grown in recent years to regard cybernetics as superseding the scientific methodology. Shows the untenability of this belief, its reliance on imprecise language, in particular on the ambiguous term “system,” and reiterates that sound cybernetics is just a part of the scientific tradition, firmly rooted in two Objectivity Axioms. The constructivist trend has drawn attention away from serious and difficult problems, and put the focus on the superficial and the trivial. Offers some suggestions as to how the cybernetical movement can regain contact with the advancing frontiers of science.

Purpose: This paper is a brief introduction to enactive cognitive science: a description of some of the main research concerns; some examples of how such concerns have been realized in actual research; some of its research methods and proposed explanatory mechanisms and models; some of the potential as both a theoretical and applied science; and several of the major open research questions. Findings: Enactive cognitive science is an approach to the study of mind that seeks to explain how the structures and mechanisms of autonomous cognitive systems can arise and participate in the generation and maintenance of viable perceiver-dependent worlds – rather than more conventional cognitivist efforts, such as the attempt to explain cognition in terms of the “recovery” of (pre-given, timeless) features of The (objectively-existing and accessible) World. As such, enactive cognitive science is resonant with radical constructivism. Research implications: As with other scientific efforts conducted within a constructivist orientation, enactive cognitive science is broadly “conventional” in its scientific methodology. That is, there is a strong emphasis on testable hypotheses, empirical observation, supportable mechanisms and models, rigorous experimental methods, acceptable criteria of validation, and the like. Nonetheless, this approach to cognitive science does also raise a number of specific questions about the scope of amenable phenomena (e.g., meaning, consciousness, etc.) – and it also raises questions of whether such a perspective requires an expansion of what is typically considered within the purview of scientific method (e.g., the role of the observer/scientist).

Key words: cognition, radical constructivism, olfactory system, autonomy, umwelt, concepts, Francisco Varela

The paper draws a comparison between feminist epistemology as exemplified by Donna Haraway’s work and radical constructivist approaches to the process of knowing. Both approaches observe scientific operations in the context of theories that are based on the notion of difference, both describe research as an empirically conditioned activity. Operations of research are consequently situated at various levels within historical fields of differentiation. While radical constructivism describes observation as a prototypical distinction in general and therefore draws its arguments from cognitive and social systems theories, feminist arguments work out the distinction of gender as an epistemological category and demarcate the interpretative conditions of engendered representation. Both approaches put the traditional distinction between theoretical and empirical knowledge into question and emphasize the mutual constitution of observation and the world observed. Reality appears to be an operational process that is embodied in the concrete action of observing systems. Thus, process-oriented, non-dualistic concepts of the knowing subject are proposed. Finally, the paper points out the innovative impact both approaches could have on the reinterpretation of scientific methodology. On the one hand the combination of quantitative and interpretive methods is outlined within a framework of hermeneutic cybernetics, on the other hand, a feminist interpretation of cybernetic self-reflection serves as an example for the transdisciplinary integration of different knowledges.

This article deals with the research tradition of Radical Constructivism and proposes four central claims for its theoretical, methodological and epistemic orientation and status. First, Radical Constructivism should be viewed as a comprehensive empirical research tradition with an emphasis on cognition, learning, living systems and organization which, in addition, developed a new general methodology for scientific operations. Second, the main opponent of Radical Constructivism, especially in the research program of Heinz von Foerster, does not lie in philosophical or epistemological terrains but in the area of the general scientific methodology and in its conventional mode of exploring the world. Third, Radical Constructivism proposed a new and alternative way for scientific explorations and world-making which produces, additionally, tangible and non-trivial effects with respect to scientific outcomes. Fourth, due to this new way of scientific world-making and due to its novel scientific methodology Radical Constructivism was only marginally interested in epistemological issues. Instead, the empirical research tradition of Radical Constructivism offered intriguing answers why the varieties of scientific realism and its allies like scientific objectivity seem so appealing and almost self-evident.

Key words: radical constructivism, general scientific methodology, exo-mode, endo-mode, anti-realism.

Context: Although second-order cybernetics was proposed as a new way of cybernetic investigations around 1970, its general status and its modus operandi are still far from obvious. Problem: We want to provide a new perspective on the scope and the currently available potential of second-order cybernetics within today’s science landscapes. Method: We invited a group of scholars who have produced foundational work on second-order cybernetics in recent years, and organized an open call for new approaches to second-order cybernetics. The accepted contributions are discussed and mapped. We also investigate the relations between second-order cybernetics and second-order science. Results: We present a coherent outlook on the scope of second-order cybernetics today, identify a general methodology of science (with second-order cybernetics as a special instance) and show that second-order cybernetics can be used in a large number of disciplines that go well beyond purely scientific domains. These results are based on a new epistemic mode “from within,” which can be traced back directly to von Foerster. We also arrived at the conclusion that from its early years onwards second-order cybernetics was developed in two different ways, so that second-order cybernetics and second-order science operate in different domains. Implications: Both the coherent perspective of the scope of second-order cybernetics with a new five-part agenda and the outline for a general methodology of science based on a new epistemic mode that was created within and for second-order cybernetics demonstrate the growing importance of reflexivity in science, which, so far, has not been widely recognized.

Key words: Second-order cybernetics, second-order science, observers, endo-mode, reflexive domains, scientific methodology, Heinz von Foerster, Ranulph Glanville

Context: The term “second-order cybernetics” was introduced by von Foerster in 1974 as the “cybernetics of observing systems,” both the act of observing systems and systems that observe. Since then, the term has been used by many authors in articles and books and has been the subject of many conference panels and symposia. Problem: The term is still not widely known outside the fields of cybernetics and systems science and the importance and implications of the work associated with second-order cybernetics is not yet widely discussed. I claim that the transition from (first-order) cybernetics to second-order cybernetics is a fundamental scientific revolution that is not restricted to cybernetics or systems science. Second-order cybernetics can be regarded as a scientific revolution for the general methodology of science and for many disciplines as well. Method: I first review the history of cybernetics and second-order cybernetics. Then I analyze the major contents of von Foerster’s fundamental revolution in science and present it as a general model for an alternative methodology of science. Subsequently, I present an example of practicing second-order socio-cybernetics from within. I describe some consequences of doing science from within, and I suggest some new horizons for second-order cybernetics. Results: Second-order cybernetics leads to a new foundation for conducting science and offers important contributions for a new way of organizing science. It expands the conception of science so that it can more adequately deal with living systems. Implications: Second-order cybernetics extends the traditional scientific approach by bringing scientists within the domain of what is described and analyzed. It provides models of research processes for when the scientist is within the system being studied. In this way it offers a new foundation for research in the social sciences, in management science, and in other fields such as the environmental sciences or the life sciences. Keywords: Epistemology, general scientific methodology, cybernetics, social sciences, action research, Heinz von Foerster.

Key words: Epistemology, general scientific methodology, cybernetics, social sciences, action research, Heinz von Foerster