Context: Direct realism is a non-reductive, anti-representationalist theory of perception lying at the heart of mainstream analytic philosophy, where it is currently generating a lot of interest. For all that, it is widely held to be both controversial and anti-scientific. On the other hand, the sensorimotor theory of perception (which is a specific development of Gibsonian approaches to perception) initially generated a lot of interest within enactive philosophy of cognitive science, but has arguably not yet delivered on its initial promise. Problem: I aim to show that the sensorimotor theory and direct realism complement each other, and that the result is a philosophically radical, but fully scientifically realised, theory of perception. Method: The article uses (non-reductive) philosophical analysis and discussion. It also draws on empirical evidence from the relevant cognitive sciences. Results: Direct realism can be augmented by sensorimotor theory to become a scientifically tractable alternative to the mainstream, representationalist research programme within cognitive science. Implications: The article aims to further clarify the philosophical importance of the sensorimotor approach to perception. It also aims to show that the apparently radical claim that we perceive objects themselves is amenable to normal scientific study. Constructivist content: Objects are analysed as a kind of collaboration between the world and the perceiver. On this account, we can never perceive outside the categories of our own understanding, but we do perceive genuinely outside our own heads. Thus, the approach here is not exactly constructivism, though it shares many goals and results with constructivism.

Key words: Sensorimotor theory of perception, direct realism, phenomenology, non-reductive ontology, consciousness.

Connectionism and classicism, it generally appears, have at least this much in common: both place some notion of internal representation at the heart of a scientific study of mind. In recent years, however, a much more radical view has gained increasing popularity. This view calls into question the commitment to internal representation itself. More strikingly still, this new wave of anti-representationalism is rooted not in ‘armchair’ theorizing but in practical attempts to model and understand intelligent, adaptive be-havior. In this paper we first present, and then critically assess, a variety of recent antirepresentationalist treatments. We suggest that so far, at least, the sceptical rhetoric outpaces both evidence and argument. Some probable causes of this premature scepticism are isolated. Nonetheless, the anti-representationalist challenge is shown to be both important and progressive insofar as it forces us to see beyond the bare representa-tional/non-representational dichotomy and to recognize instead a rich continuum of degrees and types of representationality.

Key words: Internal representation, scientific study, adaptive behavior, radical view, rich continuum.

Context: Affective neuroscience has not developed first-person methods for the generation of first-person data. This neglect is problematic, because emotion experience is a central dimension of affectivity. Problem: I propose that augmenting affective neuroscience with a neurophenomenological method can help address long-standing questions in emotion theory, such as: Do different emotions come with unique, distinctive patterns of brain and bodily activity? How do emotion experience, bodily feelings and brain and bodily activity relate to one another? Method: This paper is theoretical. It advances ideas for integrating neurophenomenology and affective neuroscience, and explains how this integration would allow progress on the above questions. Results: An integrated “affective neuro-physio-phenomenology” may help scientists understand whether discrete emotion categories come in different experiential varieties, which would in turn help interpret concomitant brain and bodily activity. It may also help investigate the bodily nature of emotion experience, including how experience relates to actual brain and bodily activity. Implications: If put into practice, the ideas advanced here would enrich the scientific study of emotion experience and more generally further our understanding of the relationship of consciousness and physical activity. The paper is speculative and its ideas need to be implemented to bear fruit. Constructivist content: This paper argues in favor of the neurophenomenological method, which is an offshoot of enactivism.

Key words: Emotion, experience, bodily feelings, neurophenomenology, affective neuroscience

We introduce a series of evolutionary robotics simulations that address the behaviour of individuals in socially contingent interactions. The models are based on a recent study by Auvray, Lenay and Stewart [(2006) The attribution of intentionality in a simulated environment: The case of minimalist devices. In Tenth meeting of the association for the scientific study of consciousness, Oxford, UK, 23–26 June, 2006] on tactile perceptual crossing in a minimal virtual environment. In accordance, both the empirical experiments and our simulations point out the essential character of global embodied interaction dynamics for the sensitivity to contingency to arise. Rather than being individually perceived by any of the interactors, sensitivity to contingency arises from processes of circular causality that characterise the collective dynamics. Such global dynamical aspects are frequently neglected when studying social cognition. Furthermore, our synthetic studies point out interesting aspects of the task that are not immediately obvious in the empirical data. They, in addition, generate new hypotheses for further experiments. We conclude by promoting a minimal but tractable, dynamic and embodied account to social interaction, combining synthetic and empirical findings as well as concrete predictions regarding sensorimotor strategies, the role of time-delays and robustness to perturbations in interactive dynamics.

Key words: perceptual crossing, social contingency, agency, interaction dynamics, evolutionary robotics, simulation modelling.

In recent decades, the scientific study of complex systems (Bar-Yam 1997; Mitchell 2009) has demanded a paradigm shift in our worldviews (Gershenson et al. 2007; Heylighen et al. 2007). Traditionally, science has been reductionistic. Still, complexity occurs when components are difficult to separate, due to relevant interactions. These interactions are relevant because they generate novel informationwhich determines the future of systems. This fact has several implications (Gershenson 2013).

The aim of this article is to set up a reciprocal relationship between a scientific study of perception, and phenomenology as a philosophical method. The domain chosen for this exercise is the constitution of spatiality, and in particular spatial depth. After recalling the question of depth as it is presented in The phenomenology of perception by Merleau-Ponty, we present an original experimental study based on a sensory substitution device. This study, which is based on an approach to perception as the extraction of sensory-motor loops, is carried out following two successive points of view: an objective, “third person” perspective, and a “first person” perspective involving a phenomenological analysis of the experience of the subject. The concluding discussion, based on the original phenomenological status of tools, proposes the existence of an “asymmetrical reciprocal envelopment” between that which is constitutive and that which is constituted. This makes it possible to determine the objective “correlates” of the elements of the phenomenological description of the constitution of the experience of depth.

Key words: depth perception, phenomenology, experimental study, third person perspective, first person perspective, tools, constitution.

This paper analyzes an explicit instantiation of the program of “neurophenomenology” in a neuroscientific protocol. Neurophenomenology takes seriously the importance of linking the scientific study of consciousness to the careful examination of experience with a specific first-person methodology. My first claim is that such strategy is a fruitful heuristic because it produces new data and illuminates their relation to subjective experience. My second claim is that the approach could open the door to a natural account of the structure of human experience as it is mobilized in itself in such methodology. In this view, generative passages define the type of circulation which explicitly roots the active and disciplined insight the subject has about his/her experience in a biological emergent process.

Open peer commentary on the article “Kaleidoscope of Pain: What and How Do You See Through It” by Maja Smrdu. Abstract: I argue that a research method solely focused on subjective experience (phenomenological method) provides scarce scientific evidence to evaluate its support for the 5E theory. Instead, I suggest the experimental phenomenological method, which integrates the scientific study of human subjectivity and research procedures based on experimental psychology.

Our culture is obsessed with the brain―how it perceives; how it remembers; how it determines our intelligence, our morality, our likes and our dislikes. It’s widely believed that consciousness itself, that Holy Grail of science and philosophy, will soon be given a neural explanation. And yet, after decades of research, only one proposition about how the brain makes us conscious―how it gives rise to sensation, feeling, and subjectivity―has emerged unchallenged: we don’t have a clue. In this inventive work, Noë suggests that rather than being something that happens inside us, consciousness is something we do. Debunking an outmoded philosophy that holds the scientific study of consciousness captive, Out of Our Heads is a fresh attempt at understanding our minds and how we interact with the world around us.

Context: In sciences of the mind, cognitive phenomena are typically investigated with the use of psychological tasks. These usually represent highly constrained environments that isolate and make phenomena under investigation measurable. However, it is poorly understood how psychological tasks constrain one’s cognition and, to a certain extent, construct their own object of inquiry. Problem: I address the question of how visual-spatial working memory is constrained differently in a naturalistic setting, as compared to when measured with psychological tasks. Specifically, can we observe principled and empirical support for the claim that psychological tasks to a certain extent construct the phenomena they purportedly measure? Method: I employ an empirical phenomenological approach that combines the methodological and analytical framework of constructivist grounded theory with contemporary approaches to the scientific study of experience, to gather phenomenal data on visual working memory in a naturalistic setting - a drawing task. Results: The drawing task elicits visual-spatial working memory as a type of visual-motor behavior with rare instances of mnemonic representations taking the form of language. Importantly, my empirical findings show that investigating cognitive phenomena in naturalistic settings yields constructs that are different from phenomena elicited in a laboratory setting. Implications: The findings suggest that investigating the mind solely with psychological tasks provides an incomplete picture of the phenomena under investigation. Constructivist content: I outline empirical data that points to how, under different constraints from the environment, not only do we conceptualize cognitive phenomena according to different theoretical constructs, but our cognitive system deploys different strategies to solve the task at hand. Keywords: Psychological task, visual-spatial working memory, empirical phenomenology, naturalistic task, drawing task.