Biosemiotics is the synthesis of biology and semiotics, and its main purpose is to show that semiosis is a fundamental component of life, i.e., that signs and meaning exist in all living systems. This idea started circulating in the 1960s and was proposed independently from enquires taking place at both ends of the Scala Naturae. At the molecular end it was expressed by Howard Pattee’s analysis of the genetic code, whereas at the human end it took the form of Thomas Sebeok’s investigation into the biological roots of culture. Other proposals appeared in the years that followed and gave origin to different theoretical frameworks, or different schools, of biosemiotics. They are: (1) the physical biosemiotics of Howard Pattee and its extension in Darwinian biosemiotics by Howard Pattee and by Terrence Deacon, (2) the zoosemiotics proposed by Thomas Sebeok and its extension in sign biosemiotics developed by Thomas Sebeok and by Jesper Hoffmeyer, (3) the code biosemiotics of Marcello Barbieri and (4) the hermeneutic biosemiotics of Anton Markoš. The differences that exist between the schools are a consequence of their different models of semiosis, but that is only the tip of the iceberg. In reality they go much deeper and concern the very nature of the new discipline. Is biosemiotics only a new way of looking at the known facts of biology or does it predict new facts? Does biosemiotics consist of testable hypotheses? Does it add anything to the history of life and to our understanding of evolution? These are the major issues of the young discipline, and the purpose of the present paper is to illustrate them by describing the origin and the historical development of its main schools.

Key words: biosemiotics, signs, meaning, codes, interpretation, semiosis

The failure of modern science to create a common scientific framework for nature and consciousness makes it necessary to look for broader foundations in a new philosophy. Although controversial for modern science, the Peircean semiotic, evolutionary, pragmatic and triadic philosophy has been the only modern conceptual framework that can support that transdisciplinary change in our view of knowing that bridges the two cultures and transgresses Cartesian dualism. It therefore seems ideal to build on it for modern biosemiotics and can, in combination with Luhmann’s theory of communication, encompass modern information theory, complexity science and thermodynamics. It allows focus on the connection between the concept of codes and signs in living systems, and makes it possible to re-conceptualize both internal and external processes of the human body, mind and communication in models that fit into one framework.

Key words: autopoiesis, biosemiotics, cybersemiotics, peirce, sebeok, hoffmeyer, kull, emmeche, brier, zoösemiotics, phytosemiotics, endosemiotics, ethology, copenhagen school of biosemiotics.

Although semiotics has not consistently and explicitly developed a theory of observership, constructivism has, particularly in its radical form (see, for example, Watzlawick 2008, Poerksen 2004). However, it envisages a theory of the observer that amounts to a form of nominalism. This paper takes its cue from Sebeok’s (1986, 1991) comments on John Archibald Wheeler’s conception of the “participatory universe” and tries to explicate the relevance of Wheeler’s (1994, 1998) philosophy of science for semiotics. The paper contributes to recent key debates in the field on “knowing” sciences (Kull 2009) and on relation (Deely 2010).

I will investigate the plausibility of three theses: (1) The Umwelt theory of Jakob von Uexküll, even though his theoretical biology was often characterized as being thoroughly vitalist, can in the context of contemporary science, more adequately be interpreted as a branch of qualitative organicism in theoretical biology. Qualitative organicism is a position which claims, first, a kind of middle road position, that is, on the one hand, there are no mysterious or non-material vital powers in organisms (non-vitalism), but on the other hand, the characteristic properties of living beings cannot be fully accounted for by physics and chemistry because these properties are nonreducible emergent properties (emergentism); second, that some of these emergent pro- perties have an experiential, phenomenal, or subjective character which plays a major role in the dynamics of the living system. Modern bio- semiotics (inspired by C. S. Peirce and Jakob von Uexküll, instituted by Thomas A. Sebeok) is a kind of qualitative organicism. (2) This position sheds light on recent discussions in cognitive science, artificial life, and robotics about the nature of representation and cognition – indeed genuine semiotic questions as they deal with the role of information and signs for any system that has the property of being ‘animal-like,’ that is, systems that move by themselves and seem to be guided by a kind of entelechy or, in modern but shallow terms, a behavioral program. (3) Particularly, qualitative organicism allows us to approach the question of whether a robot can have an Umwelt in the sense that Jakob von Uexküll used the term (a subjectively experienced phenom- enal world) The eventuality of a positive answer to this question, i.e., a claim that a robot indeed can have an Umwelt, seems counterintuitive to the extent that a robot may be seen as – to use a bewildering word – an incarnation of the mechanical and reductionist world picture to which Jakob von Uexküll was so strongly opposed. But certain ideas and concepts may sometimes lead us to unexpected consequences, which threaten our cherished metaphysical assumptions, and we should try to face such questions with an open mind.

The paper attempts to review the impact of Thomas A. Sebeok (1920 2001) on biosemiotics, or semiotic biology, including both his work as a theoretician in the field and his activity in organising, publishing, and communicating. The major points of his work in the field of biosemiotics concern the establishing of zoosemiotics, interpretation and development of Jakob v. Uexkull’s and Heini Hediger’s ideas, typological and comparative study of semiotic phenomena in living organisms, evolution of semiosis, the coincidence of semiosphere and biosphere, research on the history of biosemiotics. •

Key words: semiotic biology, zoosemiotics, endosemiotics, biosemiotic paradigm, semiosphere, biocommunication, theoretical biology Culture, so-called, is implanted in nature, the environment, or Umwelt, is a model generated by the organism. Semiosis links them. T. A

Excerpt: All living creatures receive and emit signs. It is even legitimate to call them ‘subjects’ on account of this capacity. But subjects are, as Sebeok (1976, 1979) keeps pointing out, not only human. He distinguishes betweenanthroposemiotics and zoosemiotics, and one is even entitled to talkabout phytosemiotics (Krampen 1981). Thus we are confronted with thefollowing problem: As human observers we can grasp the signs of otherliving beings, i.e., zoo- and phytosemiotic signs, only with anthropo-semiotic concepts. How can we avoid the danger of denaturing them bydoing so? This problem is of concern to medicine, as well as to zoology and tobotany; for within the body we deal with phytosemiotic sign-processesthat occur within cells and between cells, and that are regulated by theautonomic nervous, endocrine, and immune systems. On the other hand,sensomotor processes are regulated by the voluntary nervous system,which communicates zoosemiotic signs. Thus medicine constantly dealswith the problem of how phyto-, zoo-, and anthroposemiotic signprocesses are interrelated in sickness and in health and how the physicianas a human observer can grasp their relationships. To approach this complex problem I shall examine what is common toanthropo-, zoo-, and phytosemiotic sign processes and in what mannersthey differ. Such an analysis could be a first step in helping us avoid theanthropomorphic fallacy.

Excerpt: Of particular interest to Uexküll was the fact that signs are of prime importance in all aspects of life processes. He developed an original and integrated theory of sign processes, which was, however – and still is – open to misinterpretation, since it cannot be classed among any of the established sciences. Thus it concerns itself neither with physiology – even behavioral physiology, although the latter comes close to his theory in many aspects – nor with psychology, although subjects and their perceptual and behavioral activities are of central importance to it. Moreover, it cannot be placed within those boundaries which separate the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) from the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften). Uexküll himself referred to his field of research as ‘biology’, though he did not use the term in the narrowly defined sense applied to it today, but understood it as the science of the life of plants, animals, and human beings. Many misinterpretations can be overcome if his theory is classified as ‘general semiotics’. Yet at the same time it becomes obvious that general semiotics also falls into an area between the boundaries of the established disciplines. A science which embraces the natural sign systems alongside and before the human sign systems we call ‘language’ must at the same time break down the traditional division between the human sciences and the natural sciences. However, the attempt to classify Jakob von Uexküll’s theory as general semiotics also presents us with some difficulties. As he knew neither Peirce nor Saussure and did not use their terminology, his theory cannot easily be accommodated to any of the known semiotic schools of thought. Thus it long remained unknown to those semioticians who trace their origins to linguistics. Sebeok (1979: 187–215) was the first to recognize Uexküll’s contribution to general semiotics. The differences in terminology, however, are not to be regarded simply as a source of difficulty; they may also prove helpful in shedding light on those points where the various semiotic theories diverse.