Context: This conceptual paper tries to tackle the advantages and the limitations that might arise from including second-order science into global climate change sciences, a research area that traditionally focuses on first-order approaches and that is currently attracting a lot of media and public attention. Problem: The high profile of climate change research seems to provoke a certain dilemma for scientists: despite the slowly increasing realization within the sciences that our knowledge is temporary, tentative, uncertain, and far from stable, the public expectations towards science and scientific knowledge are still the opposite: that scientific results should prove to be objective, reliable, and authoritative. As a way to handle the uncertainty, scientists tend to produce “varieties of scenarios” instead of clear statements, as well as reports that articulate different scientific opinions about the causes and dynamics of change (e.g., the IPCC. This might leave the impression of vague and indecisive results. As a result, esteem for the sciences seems to be decreasing within public perception. Method: This paper applies second-order observation to climate change research in particular and the sciences in general. Results: Within most sciences, it is still quite unusual to disclose and discuss the epistemological foundations of the respective research questions, methods and ways to interpret data, as research proceeds mainly from some version of realistic epistemological positions. A shift towards self-reflexive second-order science might offer possibilities for a return to a “less polarized” scientific and public debate on climate change because it points to knowledge that is in principle tentative, uncertain and fragmented as well as to the theory- and observation-dependence of scientific work. Implications: The paper addresses the differences between first-order and second-order science as well as some challenges of science in general, which second-order science might address and disclose. Constructivist content: Second-order science used as observation praxis (second-order observation) for this specific field of research.

Key words: Second-order science, climate change research, observation theory, theory-dependency, causality, production of knowledge.

Luhmanian sociocybernetics is an observation of socio-communicative systems with a specific difference. It is a second order observation of observations understanding society as being ‘functionally differentiated’ into autonomous autopoietic subsystems or meaning worlds in the symbolic generalized media such as money, power, truth, love, art and faith. Only communication communicates and the social is communication. The social system creates products of meaning which do not represent an aggregation of the content of individuals’ minds. The bioand psychological autopoietic systems only establish boundary conditions for the sociocommunicative systems, they do not control the socio-communicative system in any way. Somehow the socio-communicative systems seem to develop on their own (by will?) although they have no body and no subject. The psychic system in Luhmann’s theory is thus not a Kantian or Husserlian transcendental ego in spite of Luhmann’s use of aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology (while at the same time destroying its philosophical frame). On the other hand, Luhmann works with an open ontology, combined with Spencer-Brown’s philosophy that making distinctions is what creates the difference between system and environment. Thus observation is basic to the theory-but where is the observer in the theoretical framework of system theory? The inspiration from Hegel is hidden here, where distinction, creation and evolution merge. Also, Hegel has been taken out of his metaphysical frame while Luhmann never took the time to finish his own. On the other hand, the father of the pragmatic triadic semiotic C. S. Peirce-also inspired by Hegel-explicitly confronted some of these problems. Like Bataille, Peirce sees a continuity between mind and matter and his Firstness contains pure feeling, meaning that there is also an inner experience aspect of matter. The article compares Luhmann’s and Spencer-Brown’s strategies with Peirce’s, the latter of whom built an alternative transdisciplinary theory of signification and communication based on a Panentheistic theory of knowing. Surprisingly it fits well with Spencer-Brown’s metaphysics, which makes it possible to establish a consistent foundation for system theory.

The newest trend in the world of education leads to a shift from a paradigm centered on curricular content to a paradigm centered in the students’ learning processes. Teachers will now have to plan, implement, mediate and evaluate educational intervention practices with the purpose that each learner develops the ability to transfer knowledge(s) to a myriad of contexts. Now, in their role of companion-mediators, besides learning about theories and techniques, teachers will also need to try out new strategies and adopt other attitudes, on a trial and error basis, in order to succeed in deeply involving students in their formation process. As part of the activities of the Diploma Program “Transition towards the learning centered paradigm” carried out in the framework of the Permanent Program of Teacher Education at the Autonomous University “Benito Juárez” of Oaxaca (UABJO), three teachers-researchers observed and were observed in their teaching practices. As a result of both peer observation and peer accompaniment reflecting on the conditions of the “teaching-learning environments”(TLE) that encourage or limit the students’ involvement in class, the teachers manage to reflect on peer observations of their own teaching practices. Consequently, teachers changed aspects of their TLE and, once more in accompaniment, the teachers assess the effects of such changes on the students’ attitudes. The second-order observation is the methodological tool used to describe and analyze the classrooms’ reality.

Key words: long life training, accompaniment training environment, second order observation, undergraduate education, teaching learning environments.

Current methodology concerning participating observation in general leaves the act of observation unobserved. Approaching participating observation from systems theory offers fundamental new insights into the topic. Observation is always participation. There is no way to escape becoming a participant and, as such, co-producer of the observed phenomenon. There is no such thing as a neutral or objective description. As observation deals with differences and process meaning, all descriptions are re-constructions and interpretations of the observed. Hence, the idea of neutral descriptions as well as the idea of the naïve observer becomes a void. Not recognizing and observing oneself as observer and co-producer of empirical data simply leaves the process of observation as the major unobserved absorber of contingency in data production based on participating observation. Relevance: The paper describes participating observation as second order observation.

The concept of environment in the systems theory of Niklas Luhmann has been much discussed. First of all, the environment exists as a constitutive entity for every individual system, each representing its own unique unity of the distinction system/environment. This, however, means that the environment remains undefined. Secondly, the environment exists as something defined, that is, as a result of the observations of a given system. In this sense, the environment is merely a product of the internal operations of the system. However, the very same system’s relations with its environment can be construed differently by a different system’s observations of the relations of precisely this system to its environment. This article argues that such second-order observation entails several possibilities for constructing another system’s relations to its environment. In his writings, Luhmann makes a distinction between two fundamental ways in which systems can internally construct the relations to their environment: either as a question of information or as a question of resource (Luhmann, 1984, pp. 252–253). This article contends that this insight allows not only for an understanding of the way that systems, in their reflection, are able to distinguish between themselves and their environment in two essentially different ways, but also that this distinction can be seen as forming the basis of second-order strategies for how to construct the relations of other systems to their environments. The possibility of thematizing the relations of other systems to their environments as a question of information or resource respectively depends on the ability of systems theory to cogently develop second-order concepts, which may specify this observation and give it meaning within the general theory of social systems. To this end, the article will present two well-known concepts from systems theory, that is, penetration and structural coupling. The article will seek to uncover a pattern in Luhmann’s writings in which the concept of penetration makes it possible to precisely thematize the relations of systems to their environments as a question of resources whereas the concept of structural coupling makes it possible to thematize the same relations as a question of information. Based on the identification of such a pattern, the article argues in favor of reserving the concepts of penetration and structural coupling for each their analytical strategy for how a second-order observer may construct the relation of other systems to their environment.

Considering the current state of system theory, the theory of self-organization and autopoiesis, we come to the conclusion that, first of all, we must identify what would determine the essence of cybernetics for us. Among the reasons why it is difficult to reveal the essence of cybernetics is the presence of numerous directions of this system theory, which are mutually overlapping. Despite the fact that due to this breadth the active development of cybernetics is ensured, it also causes the lack of certainty. Such a lack of certainty in some cases is perceived as inconsistency. The analysis mentioned in this article is not focused on streamlining the categories, concepts related to cybernetics. It seems necessary only to present the key features inherent in the cybernetic approach. Nor can we bypass what is usually called cybernetics 2. 0, second-order cybernetics, or cybernetics of self-referential or self-observing systems. The emergence of second-order cybernetics is associated with the interpretation of the system and its environment in relation to an infinite sequence of discrimination processes carried out by the observer.…

Key words: systems theory, cybernetics, cybernetics 2. 0, self-organization, autopoiesis, self-reference, second-order observation, heinz von foerster

Excerpt: On November 4th, 2019, Hans-Georg Moeller delivered a presentation on systems theory at the Law School of the University of São Paulo and was interviewed about Niklas Luhmann’s theory of society, with emphasis on issues such as law, politics, and the history of philosophy. Professor Moeller is the author of important books such as Luhmann explained: From souls to systems (Moeller, 2006) and The radical Luhmann (Moeller, 2011), the latter also translated to Japanese and Italian. He also works on Chinese philosophy and is currently Full Professor at the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies in the Faculty of Arts and Humanities of the University of Macau, China. Throughout the interview, professor Moeller situated Luhmann in the philosophical tradition of German idealism and presented the shift to second-order observation as a crucial aspect of contemporary society, in religion and politics, science, economy and law. The interview was conducted partly in writing and partly in the form of a recorded and transcribed debate.

Relying on von Foerster’s distinction between trivial and non-trivial machines, this paper discusses some crucial arguments for a constructivist concept of ‘empiricity’. The concept ‘empirical’ is oriented towards (social) knowledge and knowledge-constructing operations instead of objects or reality, thus following the strategy of systems theory to replace the subject / object difference by the difference system / environment. Consequently, scientific empirical research is located at the level of second-order observation in the social system science.

Key words: Empirical/empiricity/empirical research, trivial/non-trivial machinesn trivialization/ de-trivialization as research proceduresn constructivist epistemologyn reality (as emergent experiences)n self-organization.

Many disciplines talk about “learning,” but since each of them relates this term to another domain of reference each one selects by this term other phenomena which are then called “learning.” In this article I do not strive for a substantial definition of ‘learning’. Instead I will analyse how we talk about learning and whether we might perhaps improve the plausibility of this discourse. The main idea of this article reads as follows: “Learning” serves as an explanatory model for the observation of a specific type of change happening in terms of contingent self alterations of self organising systems. The changing system and the observer of this system are inseparably related to one another since there “is” no change without an observation. Thus, talking about learning means talking about the observer and his culture of observation and description at the same time. The results of my analysis of the learning discourse are not meant to serve as how-to-do-knowledge for ameliorating learning processes. Instead they can contribute to a more complex observation of these processes aiming at a second order observation of the complicated since complementary interrelations between the individual, the socio-cultural, the institutional, and the situational components in the domain called “learning.”

 Problem: Many disciplines talk about “learning“, but since each of them relates this term to another domain of reference, each one selects, by this term, other phenomena that are then called “learning.” Method: This article does not strive for a substantial definition of “learning” nor does it compete with psychological and pedagogical theories of learning, which are therefore not discussed. Instead I will analyse how we talk about learning and whether or not we might perhaps improve the plausibility of this discourse by applying a crucial constructivist concept, namely self-organisation. The main idea of this article reads as follows: “Learning” serves as an explanatory model for the observation of a specific type of change that happens in terms of contingent self-alterations of self-organising systems. The changing system and the observer of this system are inseparably related to one another since there “is” no change without an observation. Thus, talking about learning means talking about the observer and his culture of observation, description and evaluation at the same time. Benefits: The results of my analysis of the learning discourse are neither meant to serve as how-to knowledge for ameliorating learning processes nor do I regard them as an elaborated or new theory of learning as some ideas developed in this paper have a long tradition. Instead they can contribute to a more complex observation of these processes, aiming at a second order observation of the complicated, since complementary, interrelations between the individual, the socio-cultural, the institutional, and the situational components of the domain called “learning.” In other words, I try to demonstrate the plausibility of observing learning from the perspective of self-organisation.

Key words: change processes, contingency, culture, knowledge, second order observation, self-organisation