Brier S. (2003) The cybersemiotic model of communication: An evolutionary view on the threshold between semiosis and informational exchange. tripleC 1(1): 71–94. https://cepa.info/3625
This paper discusses various suggestions for a philosophical framework for a trans-disciplinary information science or a semiotic doctrine. These are: the mechanical materialistic, the pan-informational, the Luhmanian second order cybernetic approach, Peircian biosemiotics and finally the pan-semiotic approach. The limitations of each are analysed. The conclusion is that we will not have to choose between either a cybernetic-informational or a semiotic approach. A combination of a Peircian-based biosemiotics with autopoiesis theory, second order cybernetics and information science is suggested in a five-levelled cybersemiotic framework. The five levels are 1) a level of Firstness, 2) a level of mechanical matter, energy and force as Secondness, 3) a cybernetic and thermodynamic level of information, 4) a level of sign games and 5) a level of conscious language games. These levels are then used to differentiate levels of information systems, sign and language games in human communication. In our model Maturana and Varela’s description of the logic of the living as autopoietic is accepted and expanded with Luhmann’s generalization of the concept of autopoiesis, to cover also to psychological and socio-communicative systems. Adding a Peircian concept of semiosis to Luhmann’s theory in the framework of biosemiotics enables us to view the interplay of mind and body as a sign play. I have in a previous publication (see list of references) suggested the term “sign play” pertaining to exosemiotics processes between animals in the same species by stretching Wittgenstein’s language concept into the animal world of signs. The new concept of intrasemiotics designates the semiosis of the interpenetration between biological and psychological autopoietic systems as Luhmann defines them in his theory. One could therefore view intrasemiotics as the interplay between Lorenz’ biological defined motivations and Freud’s Id, understood as the psychological aspect of many of the natural drives. In the last years of the development of his theory, Lorenz worked with the idea of how emotional feedback introduced just a little learning through pleasurable feelings into instinctive systems because, as he reasoned, there must be some kind of reward of going through instinctive movements, thus making possible the appetitive searching behaviour for sign stimuli. But he never found an acceptable way of modelling motivation in biological science. I am suggesting a cybersemiotic model to combine these approaches, defining various concepts like thought-semiotics, phenosemiotic and intrasemiotics, combining them with the already known concepts of exosemiotics, ecosemiotics, and endosemiotics into a new view of self-organizing semiotic processes in living systems. Thus a new semiotic level of description is generated, where mind-body interactions can be understood on the same description level.
Briscoe G. & Paolo P. (2010) Towards autopoietic computing. In: Colugnati F. A. B., Lopes L. C. R. & Barretto S. F. A. (eds.) Digital ecosystems. Spinger, New York: 199–212. https://cepa.info/2617
A key challenge in modern computing is to develop systems that address complex, dynamic problems in a scalable and efficient way, because the increasing complexity of software makes designing and maintaining efficient and flexible systems increasingly difficult. Biological systems are thought to possess robust, scalable processing paradigms that can automatically manage complex, dynamic problem spaces, possessing several properties that may be useful in computer systems. The biological properties of self-organisation, self-replication, self-management, and scalability are addressed in an interesting way by autopoiesis, a descriptive theory of the cell founded on the concept of a system’s circular organisation to define its boundary with its environment. In this paper, therefore, we review the main concepts of autopoiesis and then discuss how they could be related to fundamental concepts and theories of computation. The paper is conceptual in nature and the emphasis is on the review of other people’s work in this area as part of a longer-term strategy to develop a formal theory of autopoietic computing.
Chiari G. & Nuzzo M. L. (1996) Personal construct theory within psychological constructivism: Precursor or avantgarde. In: Walker B. M., Costigan J., Vine L. L. & Warren B. (eds.) Personal construct theory: A psychology for the future. The Australian Psychological Society, Sydney NSW: 25–54.
Topics addressed include: constructive alternativism and the knowledge–reality relation; anticipation, self-organisation, and structural determinism; constructs, systems, and complementarity; identity, sociality, and the mind–body problem; acceptance, orthogonal interaction, and the psychotherapeutic relationship; and person-as-scientist and the narrative approach.
Eriksson D. M. (1997) A principal exposition of Jean-Louis Le Moigne’s systemic theory. Cybernetics and Human Knowing 4(2–3): 35–77. https://cepa.info/3976
The aim of this article is to present to the reader the theoretical construction of Jean-Louis Le Moigne. It starts with a discussion of the background that is relevant for this construction, which is: a few words about Le Moigne himself, some influences on his thinking and an overview of the theoretical framework together with some domains of application. The following exposition of Le Moigne’s Systemics (LMS) is articulated in three groups: the what, the why and the how of knowing. The what presents the two basic hypotheses of LMS’ epistemological version, called Projective Constructivist Epistemology. These are: the phenomenological and the teleological hypotheses. The three dominating properties of the first hypothesis, that is the irreversibility, the recursivity and the dialectics of knowing, are presented as well. The why question presents the criterion for validation, which is projective (or cognitive) feasibility, to be contrasted with the positivist’s aspiration for objective truth. This presents LMS’ solution to the dilemma between objectivity and relativism. Projective feasibility is possible due to the so-called social contract and the autonomy of science as a domain of thought, both are discussed. The third question, the how, presents a set of cognitive instruments for knowledge constitution. These may be articulated in three sub-categories: modelling rationality, systemic modelling and inforgetic theory. Under the label of modelling rationality the following topics are discussed: formalism, procedural rationality, conjunctive or self-referential system of logic and the discussion of the method for conduct of good reason. Secondly, systemic modelling discusses: complexity, modelling, the canonic model of a General System, LMS’ modelling instrument called Systemography, the canonic model of a General Process, the canonic model of Information Processing System, LMS’ instrument for articulation of complex systems called Teleological Complexification of Functional Levels, a general and a priori identification of pertinent levels of complexification of a complex system’s organisation as manifested in the canonic model called Decision-Information-Organisation System, and finally the paradigm of an active organisation: Eco-Auto-Re-Organisation with its canonic model of organisation, the latter is a conflictful conjunction of three recursive functions: to produce and self-produce, to relate and self-relate, to maintain and self-maintain. Thirdly, inforgetic theory refers to the conceptual relation between information and organisation. It includes: the canonic model of information: Signified-Sign-Signification, the first principle of inforgetics: the principle of self-organisation, and the second principle of inforgetics: the principle of intelligent action. Finally, the article gives a brief summing up of the significance of Le Moigne’s contribution.
Kollias P. A. (2011) The self-organising work of music. Organised Sound 16(2): 192–199. https://cepa.info/848
In this paper, I will focus on the musical work as a self-organising entity within a systemic framework. In particular, two significant and inter-related systemic concepts will be mentioned: self-organisation and open system. Firstly, I shall explain the two concepts within the context of systems thinking with reference to a graphical model of second-order cybernetics. This section will conclude with a discussion of the difference between natural and artificial self-organising systems. I will then extend the systemic perspective, describing what I call self-organising music, and discussing my algorithmic composition Ephemeron as a case study. Relevance: It focuses on the musical work as a self-organising entity within a systemic framework, mainly using the systemic concepts of self-organisation and open system. It firstly discusses the two concepts within the context of systems thinking with reference to second-order cybernetics, then extends the systemic perspective, describing self-organising music.
Kull K. (2000) Organisms can be proud to have been their own designers. Cybernetics & Human Knowing 7(1): 45–55. https://cepa.info/3146
According to H. F. Osborn, one of the three authors of “Baldwin effect,” adaptive evolution may not require neither natural selection nor the inheritance of acquired characteristics. An adaptive evolutionary change in population without natural selection means that an identical adaptive change in genetically different organisms of a population can take place without a systematic difference in the reproductive value between them, and these changes can also become irreversible on the level of genome without the difference in the reproductive value involved. The mechanisms, which allow this are known and sketched in this paper. Their description requires an approach on the level of whole genome and a look to the organism as a self-organising and communicating system. Consequently, it is possible to have a theory of adaptive evolution, for which the evolution with natural selection is a special case.
Kyselo M. (2015) The enactive approach and disorders of the self: The case of schizophrenia. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15(4): 591–616. https://cepa.info/4344
The paper discusses two recent approaches to schizophrenia, a phenomenological and a neuroscientific approach, illustrating how new directions in philosophy and cognitive science can elaborate accounts of psychopathologies of the self. It is argued that the notion of the minimal and bodily self underlying these approaches is still limited since it downplays the relevance of social interactions and relations for the formation of a coherent sense of self. These approaches also illustrate that we still lack an account of how 1st and 3rd person observations can fruitfully go together in an embodied account of disorders of the self. Two concepts from enactive cognitive science are introduced, the notions of autonomy and sense-making. Based on these, a new proposal for an enactive approach to psychopathologies of the self is outlined that integrates 1st and 3rd person perspectives, while strongly emphasising the role of social interactions in the formation of self. It is shown how the enactive framework might serve as a basis for an alternative understanding of disorders of the self such as schizophrenia, as a particular form of socially constituted self-organisation.
Palmaru R. (2012) Making Sense and Meaning: On the Role of Communication and Culture in the Reproduction of Social Systems. Constructivist Foundations 8(1): 63-75. https://cepa.info/808
Context: Although the relationship between communication and culture has received significant attention among communication scholars over the past thirty or more years, there is still no satisfactory explanation as to how these two are related and how culture evolves in communication. It forces the author to turn to Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory, which is one of the main hypotheses of how social systems emerge. Problem: Unfortunately, Luhmann’s concept of meaning is too weak to explain the autopoiesis of communication. In looking for a solution, the author suggests that it is necessary to distinguish between personal sense structures and socio-cultural meanings and to introduce the concept of shared meaning to the systems-theoretical approach. The paper conceptualises “meaning” as a phenomenon that evolves in communication and defines “culture” as a pattern of structurally related meanings. Findings: (1) According to Luhmann, social systems do not consist of static objects, but of dynamic operations, and for a social system to emerge, its elements – communications – must be connected to one another. The author argues that culture equips the momentary elements of the social system – communications – with the capacity for connection, and makes the social system operationally closed, self-referential, and autopoietic. (2) The problem of adaptation does not lose its importance if we understand cognition as a “self-founding activity” of operationally closed systems but transforms into a question of whether the “reality” construed by the media favours or restricts the coping of the system in the ever changing environment. (3) From the perspective of adaptation of the social system to its internal and external environments, an important condition of the continuous process of creation of shared knowledge to which individuals orientate themselves in their activities is the existence of variations.
Palmaru R. (2016) Constructivism as a Key Towards Further Understanding of Communication, Culture and Society. Constructivist Foundations 12(1): 30–38. https://cepa.info/3801
Context: The interest of communication scholars in (radical) constructivism is fuelled by the need to radically rethink the theoretical assumptions that have governed most media and communication research for the past three or four decades. Problem: On at least two points, constructivism poses difficulties that need to be overcome by scholars of communication. These are the attitudes of many radical constructivists towards “reality” and the constructivist position with regard to “society.” The article seeks to clarify the constructivist position with regard to social interaction and society by determining how successful communication among individuals is possible, despite their cognitive autonomy. Method: In order to contribute to a discussion about the current situation in communication and media studies, the article takes up the author’s argument that communication cannot be understood unless models describing it are centred on the individual. Based on this conceptualisation, considerations about the ontological assumptions of constructivism and the constructivist position with regard to social interaction are revisited. Results: It is argued that (a) cognition is not pure self-reference; (b) society cannot be considered simply as an individual construct; self-organisation also occurs at the supra-individual level, where shared knowledge and socio-cultural meanings emerge in the operatively closed motion of the successive communicative elements. Implications: Clarifying the constructivist position with regard to society can contribute to innovative theory building and research in communication science, and in the social sciences more broadly.
Problem: Many disciplines talk about “learning“, but since each of them relates this term to another domain of reference, each one selects, by this term, other phenomena that are then called “learning.” Method: This article does not strive for a substantial definition of “learning” nor does it compete with psychological and pedagogical theories of learning, which are therefore not discussed. Instead I will analyse how we talk about learning and whether or not we might perhaps improve the plausibility of this discourse by applying a crucial constructivist concept, namely self-organisation. The main idea of this article reads as follows: “Learning” serves as an explanatory model for the observation of a specific type of change that happens in terms of contingent self-alterations of self-organising systems. The changing system and the observer of this system are inseparably related to one another since there “is” no change without an observation. Thus, talking about learning means talking about the observer and his culture of observation, description and evaluation at the same time. Benefits: The results of my analysis of the learning discourse are neither meant to serve as how-to knowledge for ameliorating learning processes nor do I regard them as an elaborated or new theory of learning as some ideas developed in this paper have a long tradition. Instead they can contribute to a more complex observation of these processes, aiming at a second order observation of the complicated, since complementary, interrelations between the individual, the socio-cultural, the institutional, and the situational components of the domain called “learning.” In other words, I try to demonstrate the plausibility of observing learning from the perspective of self-organisation.