Hutto and Satne, Philosophia (2014) propose to redefine the problem of naturalizing semantic content as searching for the origin of content instead of attempting to reduce it to some natural phenomenon. The search is to proceed within the framework of Relaxed Naturalism and under the banner of teleosemiotics which places Ur-intentionality at the source of content. We support the proposed redefinition of the problem but object to the proposed solution. In particular, we call for adherence to Strict Naturalism and replace teleosemiotics with autopoietic theory of living beings. Our argument for these adjustments stems from our analysis of the flagship properties of Ur-intentionality: specificity and directedness. We attempt to show that the first property is not unique to living systems and therefore poses a problem of where to place a demarcation line for the origin of content. We then argue that the second property is a feature ascribed to living systems, not their intrinsic part and therefore does not form a good foundation for the game of naturalizing content. In conclusion we suggest that autopoietic theory can not only provide a competitive explanation of the basic responding of pre-contentful organisms but also clarify why Ur-intentionality is attributed to them in such an intuitive manner.

This paper is inspired by Edgar Morin’s paradigm of complexity and his constructivist and non-dualistic critique of scientific and philosophical forms of reductionism. It aims to challenge the fragmentation and the reduction framing the understanding of the notion of “critique” in educational sciences, and more broadly in the academia. Based on a review of the literature identified in French-speaking and English-speaking critical traditions in education, several factors determining the way the idea of critique is reduced are highlighted. Stressing the tacit character of those variables challenges the limits of traditional conceptions of critique in contemporary education. According to the constructivist, complex and non-dualistic position adopted, this paper illustrates the relevance of an epistemological framework integrating more systematically the conditions of emergence, the limitations, as well as the antagonistic, complementary and contradictory relationships, that connect educational theories of critique to one another. Based on this position, this paper finally suggests that a distinction be made between “hypocritique” and “hypercritique” as a semantic artifact, stressing the importance of challenging educational research and theories according to the level of complexity that one may attribute to them.

Natural systems cannot be closed to the environment. At the same time there is a necessity for closure in order to build the system. It is this quintessential tension between openness and closure that drives systems to unfold into further stages or levels of growth and development. In other words, the emergence of organization in natural systems is a result of cycles of openness and closure. There are two distinct and complementary ways by which a system will carry over closure while involved in a process of expansion across the environment. These two ways need to be expressed in any formal representation: (1) within a level this will be by means of transitive closure, which is additive; and (2) between levels (i.e., from one level to the next higher level) this requires algebraic closure, which is multiplicative. The former expresses space closure, whereas the latter expresses topological or time closure. The conjunction of these two closures generates a hierarchy of levels. Prior to, and outside of, the system lies semantic closure.

In this paper, the perspective of situated cognition, which gave rise both to the pragmatic theories and the so-called semantic theories of learning and has probably become the most representative standpoint of constructivism, is examined. We consider the claim of situated cognition to provide alternative explanations of the learning phenomenon to those of psychology and, especially, to those of the symbolic perspective, currently predominant in cognitive psychology. The level of analysis of situated cognition (i.e., global interactive systems) is considered an inappropriate approach to the problem of learning. From our analysis, it is concluded that the pragmatic theories and the so-called semantic theories of learning which originated in situated cognition can hardly be considered alternatives to the psychological learning theories, and they are unlikely to add anything of interest to the learning theory or to contribute to the improvement of our knowledge about the learning phenomenon.

Key words: constructivism, cognitive theories of learning, symbolic theories, pragmatic theories, situated cognition, situated learning

The central focus of this Ph. D. research is on ‘Logic and Cognition’ and, more specifically, this research covers the quintuple (Logic and Logical Philosophy, Philosophy of Education, Educational Psychology, Cognitive Science, Computer Science). The most significant contributions of this Ph. D. dissertation are conceptual, logical, terminological, and semantic analysis of Constructivist Concept Learning (specifically, in the context of humans’ interactions with their environment and with other agents). This dissertation is concerned with the specification of the conceptualisation of the phenomena of ‘learning’, ‘mentoring’, and ‘knowledge’ within learning and knowledge acquisition systems. Constructivism as an epistemology and as a model of knowing and, respectively as a theoretical model of learning builds up the central framework of this research.

The book uses the method and categories of systems theory (inspired by Niklas Luhmann) in a scrutiny of the evolution of the main semantic trends of modern society and its influence in the formation of the systemic boundaries of the social systems of society. The book is an investigation of the meaning of the functional differentiation according to its semantic symptoms and evolution. In order to reconstruct the semantic evolution of basic modern socio-economic categories the book is divided according to the three classic branches of the political philosophy of the classic tradition, the Aristotelian division also conserved in Hegel’s own distribution of the themes of his “Sittlichkeit” – family, civil society and the state. Thus, in “The Individuation of Modern Society” the author explores the classic notion of oikós and its opposition to the pólis, the evolution of the concept of utility in modern times and its importance to the formation of the modern political economy and the economic system as an autonomous functional system, the idea of “civil society,” its meaning in the Hegelian description of the social modernity, the fragmentation of XVIIIth century civil society according to the use of the term “Entzweiung” in the Hegelian philosophical vocabulary, and the formation of the concept of the nation as a self-referential condition of the political system. The book finishes with a discussion of Niklas Luhmann’s theory of functional differentiation and his concept of the political system. Relevance: The book applies second-order cybernetics to the analysis of the evolution of modern social systems, especially in the case of the formation of self-referential conditions for the observation and reproduction of the systems.

In this historical treatise two biological-system theories, formulated in the 1920s and 1930s, are roughly sketched. The first part discusses the concept of a thermodynamically open system, as coined by the Russian pathologist Ervin Bauer (1890–1942). Like Bertalanffy, Bauer wanted to prove the specificity of the biological sciences against physics. To achieve this, he postulated the necessity to formulate specific laws of motion which are valid for living matter alone. In the second part of the paper, the organismic-system theory of the Austrian-Canadian philosopher and biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1901–1972) is outlined. The focus of this theory relied on the process dynamics that is inherent inside an organismic system. Both theories exemplify closure models for a living organism from a methodical point of view that distinguishes these earlier models from semantic closure, developed by Howard Pattee as an epistemic clue in solving the enigma of living phenomena. The objective here is to disclose the essential differences between these closure conceptions. To encourage further research on closure, the essay concludes with a few questions concerning clarification of the term.

This paper discusses how the second order cybernetics of von Foerster, Maturana, Varela and Luhmann, can be fruitfully integrated with Peirce’s semiotics through the bio-semiotics of Hoffmeyer. The conclusion is that what distinguish animals from machines is that they are autopoietic, have code-duality and through their living organization constitutes a biological interpretant. Through this they come to inhabit a new life world: their games of life take place in their own semiotic Umwelt (von Uexküll). It is the biological context and the history of the species and the individual the determine the meaning of signs in the structural couplings that constitutes the channels of communication. Inspired by Wittgenstein’s theory of language games as the context that determines semantic content of the expressions of sentences, we suggest that animals participate in sign games.

Radical Enactivism holds that the best explanation of basic forms of cognition is provided without involving information of any sort. According to this view, the ability to perceive visual affordances should be accounted for in terms of extensional covariations between variables spanning the agent’s body and the environment. Contrary to Radical Enactivism, I argue that the intensional properties of cognition cannot be ignored, and that the way in which an agent represents the world has consequences on the explanation of basic sensorimotor abilities. To support this claim, I show that the perception of visual affordances is not segregated from higher forms of cognition; rather, it is modulated by the agent’s ability to recognize the semantic identity of the visual target. Accordingly, since the semantic recognition of an object involves a way of representing it under a certain description, it can be inferred that the perception of visual affordances cannot be accounted for without considering the intensional properties of cognition. This poses an explanatory issue for Radical Enactivism.

Various classes of physical devices having adaptive sensors, coordinative parts, and/or effectors are considered with respect to the kinds of informational relations they permit the device to have with its environment. Devices which can evolve their own physical hardware can expand their repertoires of measurements, computations, and controls in a manner analogous to the structural evolution of sensory, coordinative, and effector organs over phylogeny. In particular, those devices which have the capacity to adaptively construct new sensors and effectors gain the ability to modify the relationship between their internal states and the world at large. Such devices in effect adaptively create their own (semantic) categories rather than having them explicitly specified by an external designer. An electrochemical device built in the 1950's which evolved the capacity to sense sound is discussed as a rudimentary exemplar of a class of adaptive, sensor- evolving devices. Such devices could potentially serve as semantically-adaptive front-ends for computationally-adaptive classifiers, by altering the feature primitives (primitive categories) that the classifier operates with. Networks composed of elements capable of evolving new sensors and effectors could evolve new channels for inter-element signalling by creating new effector-sensor combinations between elements. The new channels could be formed orthogonal to pre-existing ones, in effect increasing the dimensionality of the signal space. Such variable-dimension signalling networks might potentially lead to more flexible modes of information processing and storage. Devices having the means to both choose their sensors (primitive perceptual categories) and effectors (primitive action categories) as well as the coordinative mappings between the two sets would acquire a degree of epistemic autonomy not yet found in contemporary devices.