We wished in this present study, to describe and automate the identification of the strategies implemented by blindfolded subjects. we had resource to the transformation of Fourier in our description. The transform of Fourier is known by his historical relevance in the characterization of the rhythmic behaviour. The trajectories of the subjects are recorded by means of substitution tactile interface. We could define descriptors that differentiate the perceptive strategies. deployed by the subjects. This study has goal to facilitate the acquistion of sensory substitution device. by offering to the subjects rules and strategies which they can adopt. thus they reduce the period of training phase.

Sensory substitution constitutes an interesting domain of study to consider the philosopher’s classical question of distal attribution: how we can distinguish between a sensation and the perception of an object that causes this sensation. We tested the hypothesis that distal attribution consists of three distinct components: an object, a perceptual space, and a coupling between subjects’ movements and stimulation. We equipped sixty participants with a visual-to-auditory substitution device, without any information about it. The device converts the video stream produced by a head-mounted camera into a sound stream. We investigated several experimental conditions: the existence or not of a correlation between movements and resulting stimulation, the direct or indirect manipulation of an object, and the presence of a background environment. Participants were asked to describe their impressions by rating their experiences in terms of seven possible “scenarios”. These scenarios were carefully chosen to distinguish the degree to which the participants attributed their sensations to a distal cause. Participants rated the scenarios both before and after they were given the possibility to interrupt the stimulation with an obstacle. We were interested in several questions. Did participants extract laws of co-variation between their movements and resulting stimulation? Did they deduce the existence of a perceptual space originating from this coupling? Did they individuate objects that caused the sensations? Whatever the experimental conditions, participants were able to establish that there was a link between their movements and the resulting auditory stimulation. Detection of the existence of a coupling was more frequent than the inferences of distal space and object.

Key words: sensory substitution, distal attribution, space, object, objecthood, sensorimotor theory, sensorimotor coupling.

Excerpt: Given that the average American citizen now spends one-fifth of her lifetime engaging with real and fictional worlds via moving images (U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014), we need a deeper understanding of how this medium influences our habits of perceiving, thinking, and feeling. 4EA cognitive science has already made ample reference to interactions between organisms and technologies (such as virtual realities or sensory substitution devices); yet film has largely been neglected. Here we will argue that an embodied approach to film can deepen our understanding of this medium, while at the same time providing the necessary means to understanding how film has already altered our embodied habits of perceiving and experiencing.

The aim of this article is to set up a reciprocal relationship between a scientific study of perception, and phenomenology as a philosophical method. The domain chosen for this exercise is the constitution of spatiality, and in particular spatial depth. After recalling the question of depth as it is presented in The phenomenology of perception by Merleau-Ponty, we present an original experimental study based on a sensory substitution device. This study, which is based on an approach to perception as the extraction of sensory-motor loops, is carried out following two successive points of view: an objective, “third person” perspective, and a “first person” perspective involving a phenomenological analysis of the experience of the subject. The concluding discussion, based on the original phenomenological status of tools, proposes the existence of an “asymmetrical reciprocal envelopment” between that which is constitutive and that which is constituted. This makes it possible to determine the objective “correlates” of the elements of the phenomenological description of the constitution of the experience of depth.

Key words: depth perception, phenomenology, experimental study, third person perspective, first person perspective, tools, constitution.

This paper tackles the problem of the nature of the space of perception. Based both on philosophical arguments and on results obtained from original experimental situations, it attempts to show how space is constituted concretely, before any distinction between the “inner” and the “outer” can be made. It thus sheds light on the presuppositions of the well-known debate between internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind; it argues in favor of the latter position, but with arguments that are foundationally antecedent to this debate. We call the position we defend enactive externalism. It is based on experimental settings which, in virtue of their minimalism, make it possible both to defend a sensori-motor/enactive theory of perception; and, especially, to inquire into the origin of the space of perception, showing how it is concretely enacted before the controversy between internalism and externalism can even take place.

Key words: Constitution, enaction, externalism, internalism, sensori-motor, sensory-substitution, space.

Abstract: Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual “filling in,” visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception. Relevance: action; change blindness; consciousness; experience; perception; qualia; sensation; sensorimotor.

The strategies of action employed by a human subject in order to perceive simple 2-D forms on the basis of tactile sensory feedback have been modelled by an explicit computer algorithm. The modelling process has been constrained and informed by the capacity of human subjects both to consciously describe their own strategies, and to apply explicit strategies; thus, the strategies effectively employed by the human subject have been influenced by the modelling process itself. On this basis, good qualitative and semi-quantitative agreement has been achieved between the trajectories produced by a human subject, and the traces produced by a computer algorithm. The advantage of this “reciprocal modelling” option, besides facilitating agreement between the algorithm and the empirically observed trajectories, is that the theoretical model provides an explanation, and not just a description, of the active perception of the human subject.

Key words: active perception, computer modelling, sensory-motor invariants, visual tactile sensory substitution.

To apply enactive principles within human–computer interaction poses interesting challenges to the way that we design and evaluate interfaces, particularly those that possess a strong sensorimotor character. This article surveys the field of tactile sensory substitution, an area of science and engineering that lies at the intersection of such research domains as neuroscience, haptics, and sensory prosthetics. It is argued that this area of research is of high relevance to the design and understanding of enactive interfaces that make use of touch, and is also a fertile arena for revealing fundamental issues at stake in the design and implementation of enactive interfaces, ranging from engineering, to human sensory physiology, and the function and plasticity of perception. A survey of these questions is provided, alongside a range of current and historical examples.

The objective of this work concerns the design and the implementation of a zoomable interface implying the haptic modality. The initial postulate is that the zoom experience is not a natural, a direct experience, but supposes instrumentation and learning. In other words, the zoom experience is built by the appropriation of a technical substitution which makes it possible to modify the properties of the space-time flow; these properties which bind the subject to his (real or virtual) world are relational. To conceive this new interface, directly inspired from technologies known as of sensory substitution, we carried out a set of experiments allowing to define and to qualify the technical conditions and of use which favour the emergence of a perceptive experience of the zoom type. More generally, it concerns the proposition of more intuitive or immediate modes of instrumental interaction engaging explicitly the body in action.

In this study, we mentions the first results concerning the validity of the 2/3 power law for shapes explored by Tactos, a sensory substitution device.