Open peer commentary on the target article “From Objects to Processes: A Proposal to Rewrite Radical Constructivism” by Siegfried J. Schmidt. Upshot: The critique of Western metaphysics, the definition of the sign as an inseparable unity of signified and signifier, the insight that language is a form of life, the deconstruction of the subject, the banning of human beings from the social system, and the appearance of non-human actors have made the traditional distinctions between real/unreal, subject /object, society/nature, and thought/action obsolete. The global map of meaning has to be redrawn. Siegfried J. Schmidt takes on this task in the name of a rewriting of radical constructivism. But is rewriting enough? Do the new differences introduced in place of the old ones “really” make a difference?

There has been a great deal of controversy over Barbara Held’s use of the term “antirealism” in her now popular critique of postmodern therapy. Many of her respondents have rejected this label, claiming that it restricts the debate and oversimplifies their position. Recognizing that this is so, I nevertheless accept Held’s term as a useful signifier of the epistemological framework of postmodern therapy, and, thus, challenge her critique on its own grounds. I argue that Held’s critique of this epistemological approach, in fact, misses the epistemological point, targeting ontological issues where there are none, and misinterpreting the original aim behind the shift to epistemological antirealism. It is Held’s contention that the antirealist turn aimed at “maximizing individuality” in therapy – a goal which can and should be achieved through realism. Her justification for the latter is a supposed “oscillation” between realism and antirealism in the theory of this movement. To the contrary, l suggest that the aim of this epistemological shift was the resolution of strictly epistemological problems, and that the oscillation that Held identifies is the product of her own conflation of epistemological and ontological issues.

Problem: The article seeks to tackle three problems of Mitterer’s non-dualistic philosophy. Firstly, the key term description remains not only rather unclear and rudimentary but also isolated from relevant neighboring terms and theories of other disciplines. Secondly, a logical reconstruction and formal model of non-dualism is still lacking. Thirdly, there are hardly any extensions of philosophical non-dualism to non-philosophical disciplines and fields. Findings: The three main findings of the article are based on the abovementioned problems. Firstly, the non-dualistic term description will be connected to the sociological and semiotic term meaning by emphasizing their semantic-pragmatic similarities. Moreover, a common and distinction-theoretic conceptualization of both terms will be proposed. Secondly, a non-dualistic formalization and logical reconstruction will be elaborated by deducing non-dualism from dualism using the operation of re-entry. Thirdly, the non-dualistic formalization will be applied to the classical semiotic triangle, resulting in the elaboration of a non-dualistic semiotic triangle. Benefits: The aforementioned findings have two possible benefits. Firstly, the compatibility between the terms description and meaning makes philosophical non-dualism connectable to social science approaches, especially to sociology and semiotics. This may be an important avenue for interdisciplinary cross-fertilization and co-operation. Secondly, the formalization and logical deduction may help to clarify and explicitize non-dualism’s main arguments and implicit assumptions.

Key words: meaning, description, category, re-entry, semiotic triangle, perception, signifier