Traditionally, writing is viewed as a code that stands in one-to-one correspondence to spoken language, which is therefore also viewed as a code. However,this is a delusion, which is shared by educators and has serious consequences for cognition, both on individual and on social levels. Natural linguistic signs characteristic for the activity of languaging and their symbolizations (graphic markings) are ontologically different phenomena; speech and writing belong to experiential domains of different dynamics. These dynamics impact differently the linguistic/behavioral strategies of individuals and communities, viewed as second- and third-order living systems operating in a consensual domain as structure-determined systems. Failure to acknowledge this contributes to the spread of functional illiteracy in modern societies, which may lead to cognitive/communicative dysfunction. Technology-enhanced new literacies challenge the value of traditional written culture, raising questions about the relationship between speech and writing and their roles in human evolution. This paper builds on and extends Maturana’s biology of cognition and language.

A critique of the traditional dualistic view of grammar as linguistics is given, and an approach is suggested that emphasizes the relational nature of linguistic signs in the framework of the biology of cognition. Using the epistemological lining in the study of language provided by the biology of cognition, grammar studies should take into account the cognitive dynamics of languaging as consensual coordinations of consensual coordinations of behavior, or, semiosis.

[opening paragraph]: That human orientation to the world uses signs, indeed is bound up with signs, has been known and discussed since antiquity. The concept of the sign was first and foremost supported by a certain familiarity: that signs abound in the world was considered common sense. The word “sign” thus designated something that realizes a certain mode of being – an essence – in Being. More precisely, signs serve to make intelligible what is not in itself observable. This is reflected, for example, in the medical usage of the terms semeion and signum. Therefore, signs could be distinguished from other sorts of things and investigated in their specificity. Rhetoric, for instance, distinguished between verba (words) and res (things). This consequently led to a sub-ontology of sign-using beings and, in this context, to an ontology of language. Both knowing names and giving names was thought to require a certain artistry – in particular, a knowledge of the nature of things. And the same holds for writing.

This paper aims to explain how semiotics and constructivism can collaborate in an educational epistemology by developing a joint approach to prescientific conceptions. Empirical data and findings of constructivist research are interpreted in the light of Peirce’s semiotics. Peirce’s semiotics is an anti-psychologistic logic (CP 2. 252; CP 4. 551; W 8: 15; Pietarinen in Signs of logic, Springer, Dordrecht, 2006; Stjernfelt in Diagrammatology. An investigation on the borderlines of phenomenology, ontology and semiotics, Springer, Dordrecht, 2007) and relational logic. Constructivism was traditionally developed within psychology and sociology and, therefore, some incompatibilities can be expected between these two schools. While acknowledging the differences, we explain that constructivism and semiotics share the assumption of realism that knowledge can only be developed upon knowledge and, therefore, an epistemological collaboration is possible. The semiotic analysis performed confirms the constructivist results and provides a further insight into the teacher-student relation. Like the constructivist approach, Peirce’s doctrine of agapism infers that the personal dimension of teaching must not be ignored. Thus, we argue for the importance of genuine sympathy in teaching attitudes. More broadly, the article also contributes to the development of postmodern humanities. At the end of the modern age, the humanities are passing through a critical period of transformation. There is a growing interest in semiotics and semiotic philosophy in many areas of the humanities. Such a case, on which we draw, is the development of a theoretical semiotic approach to education, namely edusemiotics (Stables and Semetsky, Pedagogy and edusemiotics: theoretical challenge/practical opportunities, Sense Publishers, Rotterdam, 2015).

Key words: semiotics, constructivism, prior knowledge, preconceptions/misconceptions, agapism, icon.

Upshot: Signs do not interpret the world, but rather act through interpretants, which are themselves sign complexes. Understanding a particular sign requires understanding not only the sign itself, but also the ground, or Umwelt expressed as signs, for that sign. The system of embodied sign, its ground, and resolution as an eigenform is analogous to a description of a response of a creature to a stimulus from an environment at a certain level of analysis.

Biosemiotics and cybernetics are closely related, yet they are separated by the boundary between life and non-life: biosemiotics is focused on living organisms, whereas cybernetics is applied mostly to non-living artificial devices. However, both classes of systems are agents that perform functions necessary for reaching their goals. I propose to shift the focus of biosemiotics from living organisms to agents in general, which all belong to a pragmasphere or functional universe. Agents should be considered in the context of their hierarchy and origin because their semiosis can be inherited or induced by higher-level agents. To preserve and disseminate their functions, agents use functional information – a set of signs that encode and control their functions. It includes stable memory signs, transient messengers, and natural signs. The origin and evolution of functional information is discussed in terms of transitions between vegetative, animal, and social levels of semiosis, defined by Kull. Vegetative semiosis differs substantially from higher levels of semiosis, because signs are recognized and interpreted via direct code-based matching and are not associated with ideal representations of objects. Thus, I consider a separate classification of signs at the vegetative level that includes proto-icons, proto-indexes, and proto-symbols. Animal and social semiosis are based on classification and modeling of objects, which represent the knowledge of agents about their body (Innenwelt) and environment (Umwelt). Relevance: The paper suggests an agency-based approach to biosemiotics. This approach is related to the interactivism of Mark Bickhard.

Development of artificial cognition, one of the major challenges of contemporary science, requires better understanding of the nature and function of mind. This paper follows the idea of Searle that mind is more than computation, and explores the notion that mind has to be embodied in agency that actively interacts with the outside world. To avoid anthropocentrism and dualism, I develop the concept of agency using principles of biosemiotics, a new discipline that integrates semiotics (science on signification and meaning) with biology. In evolutionary terms, human cognition is an advanced form of agency that emerged from simpler ancestral forms in animals, plants, and single-cell organisms. Agency requires autonomy, informed choice, and goal-directedness. These features imply a capacity of agents to select and execute actions based on internal goals and perceived or stored signs. Agents are always constructed by parental agents, except for the most simple primordial molecular-scale self-reproducing agents, which emerged from non-living components. The origin of life coincides with the emergence of agency and primitive communication, where signs are not yet associated with objects, and instead used to activate or regulate actions directly. The capacity of agents to perceive and categorize objects appeared later in evolution and marks the emergence of minimal mind and advanced communication via object-associated signs. Combining computation with agential features such as goal-directedness, adaptability, and construction may yield artificial systems comparable in some respects to human mind.

Key words: biosemiotics, constructivism, multi-levelness, autonomy, protosemiosis, eusemiosis, autonomous learning

Open peer commentary on the article “A Critique of Barbieri’s Code Biology” by Alexander V. Kravchenko. Abstract: Biosemiotics assumes multiple levels of interpretation of signs. At the lowest level is protosemiosis, which is represented by intracellular information processes, and which can be seen as a semiotic alternative to code biology. Protosemiosis includes interpretation. However, it has fewer components in comparison to mental interpretation. In particular, protosemiosis lacks references to external objects in the sense of Peirce.

The various assumptions on which linguistic elements, structures, or usages are subjective in which respect seem to agree in relating subjectivity to a speaking subject. In the communication process, this speaking subject is usually ascribed the agentive role, language is thought of as ready-made object, and the hearer remains a rather passive recipient. However, conceptions of subjectivity relying on these assumptions are circular ( in referring to a speaking subject) and tautological (every choice of linguistic entities reflects a speaker’s choice). \\This article argues for a sign-centred approach to communication as providing the basis for an adequate conception of linguistic subjectivity. Based on a dynamic and dialogical model of sign processes, linguistic signs are regarded not as ready-made objects waiting to be used, but as agents getting and keeping the sign process going. Linguistic signs are provided with an inherent subjectivity potential – their establishing differences between system( s) and environment(s) – which is realized through observation. Subjectivity is to be regarded not as some exceptional case within an objective linguistic code, but as inherent property of the sign system itself

Key words: subjectivity, communication, autopoiesis, semiosis, observer, interpretant.

The various assumptions on which linguistic elements, structures, or usages are subjective in which respect seem to agree in relating subjectivity to a speaking subject. In the communication process, this speaking subject is usually ascribed the agentive role, language is thought of as ready-made object, and the hearer remains a rather passive recipient. However, conceptions of subjectivity relying on these assumptions are circular (in referring to a speaking subject) and tautological (every choice of linguistic entities reflects a speaker’s choice) This article argues for a sign-centred approach to communication as providing the basis for an adequate conception of linguistic subjectivity. Based on a dynamic and dialogical model of sign processes, linguistic signs are regarded not as ready-made objects waiting to be used, but as agents getting and keeping the sign process going. Linguistic signs are provided with an inherent subjectivity potential – their establishing differences between system(s) and environment(s) – which is realized through observation. Subjectivity is to be regarded not as some exceptional case within an objective linguistic code, but as inherent property of the sign system itself.

Key words: subjectivity, communication, autopoiesis, semiosis, observer, interpretant.