This paper examines the experience of where we end and the rest of the world begins, that is, the sense of boundaries. Since meditators are recognized for their ability to introspect about the bodily level of experience, and in particular about their sense of boundaries, 27 senior meditators (those with more than 10, 000 hours of experience) were interviewed for this study. The main conclusions of this paper are that (a) the boundaries of the so-called “physical body” (body-as-object) are not equivalent to the individual’s sense of boundaries; (b) the sense of boundaries depends upon sensory activity; (c) the sense of boundaries should be defined according to its level of flexibility; (d) the sense of body ownership (the sense that it is one’s own body that undergoes an experience) cannot be reduced to the sense of boundaries; nevertheless, (e) the sense of ownership depends on the level of flexibility of the sense of boundaries.

Key words: boundaries, mindfulness, sense of boundaries, sense of ownership.

The so-called rigor–relevance gap appears unbridgeable in the classical view of organization science, which is based on the physical sciences’ model. Constructivist scholars have also pointed out a certain inadequacy of this model of science for organization research, but they have not offered an explicit, alternative model of science. Responding to this lack, this paper brings together the two separate paradigmatic perspectives of constructivist epistemologies and of organizational design science, and shows how they could jointly constitute the ingredients of a constructivism-founded scientific paradigm for organization research. Further, the paper highlights that, in this constructivist view of organizational design science, knowledge can be generated and used in ways that are mutually enriching for academia and practice

In this article, the author examines Colin Grant’s recent criticism of the so-called “interaction paradigm” and Jürgen Habermas’s universal pragmatics. Grant’s approach, which is presented as an open challenge to communication theories grounded in philosophical conceptions of communality and dialogue, can be construed as an exemplar of a radical constructivist approach to vital questions of contingency and incommensurability in communication studies. In response, the author outlines a classical pragmatist approach to the problem areas identified by Grant, with the aim of outlining how a pragmatist outlook can offer promising theoretical alternatives to universal pragmatics and radical constructivism. It is argued that moderate Peircean pragmatism, appropriately interpreted, can provide a philosophical platform capable of addressing issues of contingency, uncertainty, and autonomy in communication theory without succumbing to incommensurabilism, traditional objectivism, or nominalistic individualism.

Purpose: The text searches for possible uses of a daring postulate to reject dualism, formulated by Josef Mitterer. Furthermore, it explores the inconsistencies of dualism and its remnants in three projects: Richard Rorty’s neopragmatism, the strong program of the sociology of knowledge, and radical constructivism. The final aim of the argument is to demonstrate that a very interesting incorporation of Mitterer’s postulates is possible, and that it must take the form of a consistent antiessentialism. At this point the article presents Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory. Findings: The article underlines the specific role of the so-called other side of the discourse – which, according to Mitterer is fabricated by the dualizing mode of speaking. Such an instance is a priori essentialized and it plays a crucial role as a tool for settling arguments. The text traces the role of this instance in the concepts mentioned above. Benefits: Through the use of Latour’s constructivism, the text indicates that there exists a fruitful empirical (non-speculative) research program, which was projected in accordance with Mitterer’s postulates.

Key words: criticism of dualism, anti-essentialism, neopragmatism, strong programme, radical constructivism, actor-network theory

This article aims to explore the philosophical basis of classical radical constructivism (Piaget, Glasersfeld, Maturana) in the light of migration issues, with a general interest in the issue of housing theory (space) and the recent generated debate about constructivism therein. Thus, the article investigates three aspects of constructivism. First, the sense of ‘realm’ and, therefore, the notion of reality and realism in relation to both a physical world and a notion of knowledge or, more specifically, to what isknowledgeable; second, the problem of the so-called theory-laden issue, that is, the operational basis of theories; and finally, naturalism or, more specifically, the fact that there is a domain of actual things, a form of present, which always acquires a status in relation to government and/or State’s and corporate authorities. What interest us in this context is to propose a conceptual alternative with which to think through the notion of migration considered, in the context of humanities and social sciences, where a relativist sense of knowledge has been pushed to the extreme. We will also explore the consequences of the interactions between migration considered as a physical domain and as a conceptual domain.

Key words: epistemology, housing theory, humanities, migration, radical constructivism, social sciences.

In this paper we present a new model for the mechanism underlying what is traditionally known in immunology as the “selfnonself” distinction. It turns out that in operational terms, the distinction effected by this model of the immune system is between a sufficiently numerous set of antigens present from the start of the ontogeny of the system on the one hand, and isolated antigens first introduced after the system has reached maturity on the other. The coincidence between this “founder versus late” distinction and the traditional “somatic self-foreign pathogen” one is essentially contingent, an example of the purely opportunistic tinkering characteristic of biological organization in general. We conclude that the so-called “self-nonself” distinction in immunology is a misleading misnomer. This raises the question as to what would genuinely count as a “self-nonself” distinction, a fundamental question for biology in general and Artificial Life in particular.

The aim of the paper is: a) to gain some knowledge of the so-called ‘natural systems’ as interpreted or defined by modern systems scientists; b) to discuss these descriptions and definitions from the viewpoint of modern philosophy of science. In the course of both a) and b) the interwovenness of the classes of natural systems and the controversial issues connected therewith (a.o. their interwovenness with the artificial systems) will be touched upon.

Open peer commentary on the article “Examining the Role of Re-Presentation in Mathematical Problem Solving: An Application of Ernst von Glasersfeld’s Conceptual Analysis” by Victor V. Cifarelli & Volkan Sevim. Upshot: Problem solving is an enormous field of study, where so-called “problems” can end up having very little in common. One of the least studied categories of problems is open-ended mathematical modeling research. Cifarelli and Sevim’s framework - although not developed for this purpose - may be a useful lens for studying the development of mathematical modelers and researchers in applied mathematics.

Excerpt: People often see the teaching community as faddish-every year a different approach is “in. ” One decade “individualized instruction” is the way to go, and the next decade teachers are told to teach with “cooperative learning. ” In science education, discovery learning was popular in the 1960s, then came inquiry, then STS (science/technology/society). Today, inquiry and discovery are back again. In this article I try to make rhyme and reason of all these changes through the concept of constructivism. The strength of constructivism is that it unifies trendy teaching strategies. Many so-called fads in education turn out to have a firm, research-supported foundation in constructivist learning theory.

Emotion theorists tend to separate “arousal” and other bodily events such as “actions” from the evaluative component of emotion known as “appraisal.” This separation, I argue, implies phenomenologically implausible accounts of emotion elicitation and personhood. As an alternative, I attempt a reconceptualization of the notion of appraisal within the so-called “enactive approach.” I argue that appraisal is constituted by arousal and action, and I show how this view relates to an embodied and affective notion of personhood. Relevance: It proposes an enactive conceptualization of the phenomenon of appraisal.