Key word "social agency"
Carvalho E. M. D. (2021) The shared know-how in Linguistic Bodies. Filosofia Unisinos 22(1): 94–101. https://cepa.info/7634
Carvalho E. M. D.
(
2021)
The shared know-how in Linguistic Bodies.
Filosofia Unisinos 22(1): 94–101.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/7634
The authors of Linguistic Bodies appeal to shared know-how to explain the social and participatory interactions upon which linguistic skills and agency rest. However, some issues lurk around the notion of shared know-how and require attention and clarification. In particular, one issue concerns the agent behind the shared know-how, a second one concerns whether shared know-how can be reducible to individual know-how or not. In this paper, I sustain that there is no single answer to the first issue; depending on the case, shared know-how can belong to the participants of a social activity or to the system the participants bring forth together. In relation to the second issue, I sustain, following the authors, a non-reductive account of shared know-how. I also suggest that responsiveness to others, which is a fundamental element of shared know-how, can be extended by perceptual learning.
Cuffari E. C. (2020) On Life-Language Continuity. Constructivist Foundations 15(2): 149–151. https://cepa.info/6341
Cuffari E. C.
(
2020)
On Life-Language Continuity.
Constructivist Foundations 15(2): 149–151.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/6341
Open peer commentary on the article “A Critique of Barbieri’s Code Biology” by Alexander V. Kravchenko. Abstract: Kravchenko encourages language science to approach languaging as “a species-specific semiotic activity that has a biological function.” Languaging as a form of social agency is broader than semiosis but not necessarily “above” it nor driven by biological function. By focusing on participation and becoming, the enactive approach to linguistic bodies offers conceptual resources to bridge human and non-human sense-making without resorting to codes.
Cuffari E. C., Di Paolo E. & De Jaegher H. (2015) From participatory sense-making to language: There and back again. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14(4): 1089–1125. https://cepa.info/4351
Cuffari E. C., Di Paolo E. & De Jaegher H.
(
2015)
From participatory sense-making to language: There and back again.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14(4): 1089–1125.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4351
The enactive approach to cognition distinctively emphasizes autonomy, adaptivity, agency, meaning, experience, and interaction. Taken together, these principles can provide the new sciences of language with a comprehensive philosophical framework: languaging as adaptive social sense-making. This is a refinement and advancement on Maturana’s idea of languaging as a manner of living. Overcoming limitations in Maturana’s initial formulation of languaging is one of three motivations for this paper. Another is to give a response to skeptics who challenge enactivism to connect “lower-level” sense-making with “higher-order” sophisticated moves like those commonly ascribed to language. Our primary goal is to contribute a positive story developed from the enactive account of social cognition, participatory sense-making. This concept is put into play in two different philosophical models, which respectively chronicle the logical and ontogenetic development of languaging as a particular form of social agency. Languaging emerges from the interplay of coordination and exploration inherent in the primordial tensions of participatory sense-making between individual and interactive norms; it is a practice that transcends the self-other boundary and enables agents to regulate self and other as well as interaction couplings. Linguistic sense-makers are those who negotiate interactive and internalized ways of meta-regulating the moment-to-moment activities of living and cognizing. Sense-makers in enlanguaged environments incorporate sensitivities, roles, and powers into their unique yet intelligible linguistic bodies. We dissolve the problematic dichotomies of high/low, online/offline, and linguistic/nonlinguistic cognition, and we provide new boundary criteria for specifying languaging as a prevalent kind of human social sense-making.
Gahrn-Andersen R. & Cowley S. J. (2017) Phenomenology & Sociality: How Extended Normative Perturbations Give Rise to Social Agency [Artificial intelligence without using ontological data about a presupposed reality]. Intellectica 67: 379–398. https://cepa.info/7342
Gahrn-Andersen R. & Cowley S. J.
(
2017)
Phenomenology & Sociality: How Extended Normative Perturbations Give Rise to Social Agency [Artificial intelligence without using ontological data about a presupposed reality].
Intellectica 67: 379–398.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/7342
Although cognitive science has recently asked how human sociality is constituted, there is no clear and consistent account of the emergence of human style social agency. Previously, we have critiqued views based on '‘participatory sensemaking’’ by arguing that agency requires a distinctive kind of phenomenology that enables a diachronic social experience. In advancing the positive argument, we link developmental psychology to phenomenological insights by focusing on childcaregiver dynamics around the middle of the second year. Having developed very basic social skills, an infant comes to feel normative perturbances impinging on her in a way that leads to new modes of action. Accordingly, we trace agency and linguistic competencies to how these kinds of coordination intermesh. Nascent capabilities for predicating draw on the child’s history of coping with norms and rules that are imposed by caretakers. Developmental events thus transform the child’s experience and drive the emergence of social agency. Once the child has successfully dealt with the environment’s normative perturbations she is able to develop the skills of a fullyfledged human social agent.
Halsall F. (2012) Niklas Luhmann and the body. The New Bioethics: A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body 18(1): 4–20.
Halsall F.
(
2012)
Niklas Luhmann and the body.
The New Bioethics: A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body 18(1): 4–20.
For Niklas Luhmann the body seems to almost disappear in modernity. Modern society, he argues, is a system comprised of a number of operatively closed and functionally distinct sub-systems such as economics, science, law, the mass media and so on. Each system is autonomous and observes the world in its own terms via its internal communications. Thus, Luhmann’s sociology is generally characterized as a post-human one. That is, one in which the basic unit of both social agency and sociological analysis is not the embodied human subject but rather instances of impersonal communication. This article offers a challenge to this by arguing that the body still has a significant function in Luhmann’s account of social systems. My claim is that the body has the ability to migrate between different systems and, thus, has a transcendent status in social systems. That is, the body can migrate between social systems and, in Luhmann’s terms, irritate them in significant ways.
Halsall F. (2012) Niklas Luhmann and the body: Irritating social systems. The New Bioethics 18(1): 4–20. https://cepa.info/930
Halsall F.
(
2012)
Niklas Luhmann and the body: Irritating social systems.
The New Bioethics 18(1): 4–20.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/930
For Niklas Luhmann the body seems to almost disappear in modernity. Modern society, he argues, is a system comprised of a number of operatively closed and functionally distinct sub-systems such as economics, science, law, the mass media and so on. Each system is autonomous and observes the world in its own terms via its internal communications. Thus, Luhmann’s sociology is generally characterized as a post-human one. That is, one in which the basic unit of both social agency and sociological analysis is not the embodied human subject but rather instances of impersonal communication. This article offers a challenge to this by arguing that the body still has a significant function in Luhmann’s account of social systems. My claim is that the body has the ability to migrate between different systems and, thus, has a transcendent status in social systems. That is, the body can migrate between social systems and, in Luhmann’s terms, irritate them in significant ways. Relevance: It offers an account and critique of the radical constructivism of Luhmann’s systems theoretical account of social systems by looking at the place of the body in it.
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