In my answer to Ernst von Glasersfeld’s (2008) question “Who conceives Society?” I proposed a radically social constructivism (Krippendorff, 2008a) that overcomes what I perceive to be an unfortunate cognitivism in von Glasersfeld’s, Heinz von Foerster’s, and Humberto Maturana’s work. Since then, I published two other papers on the subject. One (2008b) moves the notion of human agency into the center of my project, focusing on its role in conceptions of social organizations – a concept less grand than “society” and one (2008c) teases out several reflexive turns that have grown in cybernetics but cannot be subsumed by the epistemology of radical constructivism and second-order cybernetics, which privileges observation and a representational theory of language over participation in conversation and cooperative constructions of reality. In all of these efforts, conversation has become the starting point of my conceptualizations of being human. In this essay, I wish to discuss what conversation entails, how it is maintained, and under which conditions it degenerates into something else.

The book features 18 of Klaus Krippendorff’s key papers on constructivist, second-order cybernetics, and dialogical approaches to social phenomena, organized in four sections, named in the title of the book. Part 1 offers a sketch of social constructivism, epistemological and conceptual issues of communication. Part 2 concerns the otherness that theorizing creates, the use of pronouns in social relations, power and emancipation. Part 3 critiques semiotics from a constructivist perspective, develops conceptions to come to grips with cultural artifacts and proposes a theory of discourse. Part 4 reviews information theory, and applies it to research processes, the internet and cyberspace more generally and to social memory.

Radical constructivism is currently a major, if not the dominant, theoretical orientation in the mathematics education community, in relation to children’s learning. There are, however, aspects of children’s learning that are challenges to this perspective, and what appears to be “at least temporary states of intersubjectivity” (Cobb, Wood, & Yackel, 1991, p. 162) in the classroom is one such challenge. In this paper I discuss intersubjectivity and through it offer an examination of the limitations of the radical constructivist perspective. I suggest that the extension of radical constructivism toward a social constructivism, in an attempt to incorporate intersubjectivity, leads to an incoherent theory of learning. A comparison of Piaget’s positioning of the individual in relation to social life with that of Vygotsky and his followers is offered, in support of the claim that radical constructivism does not offer enough as an explanation of children’s learning of mathematics.

Historically, journalism owes its authority to giving valid information about social reality from the use of specific forms as genres. However, this authority has doubtlessly become fragile. To examine this development and explain some of the reasons this article discusses the impact of constructivist theory on the development of a genre theory in Journalism Studies. While in the beginning, forms were mostly discussed in practical guides for future journalists, the constructivist theory of media forms offered a complex model of communication. Forms were understood as regulating, structuring and standardizing expectations of media texts for journalists and audiences alike. This article draws on discussions of communicative forms in social constructivism as a predecessor of radical constructivism. The assumption of a sharp distinction between factual and fictional journalistic forms, which produce an unambiguous reference to reality, then becomes theoretically and empirically problematic. Processes of hybridization are dissolving distinct journalistic genres – institutionalized communicative forms become contingent hybrids. Based on a constructivist analysis, this paper argues for an inclusion of the performative dimensions of forms. In such an understanding, any form is emerging in its performance as iteration and re-signification of established conventions.

For twenty years, social constructivism has been a paradigm in science teaching and not an easy bedfellow for piagetian constructivism, even though both have had the same thing in mind… a study of the learner. For this reason we attempt to find connections and bridges between them so that both may be enriched, to the benefit of science teaching.

Excerpt: Dennis Lomas in his essay on “Paul Ernest’s Application of Social Constructivism to Mathematics and Mathematics Education” correctly indentifies Ernest as a major proponent of social constructivism in mathematics education. Lomas’s essay is quite circumscribed in its goals: he leaves aside whether Ernest has adequately, or otherwise, interpreted the arguments of I. Lakatos, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and L. S. Vygotsky that he appeals to develop his philosophy of mathematics; and Lomas declines to reflect on the more general relevance of social constructivism to “mathematics, mathematics education, or education in general.” Lomas wishes to focus upon Ernest’s account of mathematical objects, and to begin a critique of the “social, political, and ethical consequences that [Ernest] draws from his position” for the “great issues of freedom, justice, trust and fellowship.” I propose in this commentary to first take a broader view of Ernest’s work, locating his social constructivism on the larger canvas of constructivism in science and mathematics education, and then follow Lomas’s more narrowed concerns.

Over the previous two decades the emergence of post-modernist thought (i.e., radical constructivism, social constructivism, deconstructivsm, post-structuralism, and the like) on the American intellectual landscape has presented a number of challenges to various fields of intellectual endeavor (i.e., literature, natural science, and social science) (Matthews, 1998; in press). Nowhere is this challenge more evident and therefore more problematic than in the application of post-modernism (in the form of constructivist teaching) to the classroom. Employing constructivist teaching practices is problematic at two levels: (1) there is an absence of empirical evidence of effectiveness; and (2) employing this approach for which there is a lack of evidential support, means not employing instructional practices for which there is empirical support. The purpose of this article is to present an overview and critique of constructivist teaching practices, followed by a brief review of evidenced-based practices in teaching.

This article provides a summary of developments in the history of science informed by social constructivist perspectives since the 1970s. It discusses key influential texts and highlights historical themes of particular importance such as the understanding of science as local culture, the material culture of experiment, science and performance, and science and labor. The article also emphasizes the constructivist understanding of science as a species of skilled practice and the ways in which such accounts draw attention to the importance of understanding the circulation of skills in the development and consolidation of new knowledge.

Key words: experiment, history of science, laboratories, local cultures, popular culture, scientific audiences, scientific communication, scientific performances, scientific practice, skill, social constructivism

Constructivism in science education has been the subject of considerable debate in the science education literature. The purpose of this study was to facilitate chemistry teachers’ understanding that the tentative nature of scientific knowledge leads to the coexistence and rivalries among different forms of constructivism in science education. The study is based on 17 in-service teachers who had registered for a 11-week course on ‘Epistemology of Science Teaching’ as part of their Master’s degree program. The course is based on 17 readings drawing on nature of science and a critical evaluation of constructivism. Course activities included written reports, classroom discussions based on participants’ presentations and written exams. Based on the results obtained, it is plausible to suggest that participant teachers experienced the following transitions leading to greater understanding, as they acquired experience with respect to constructivism: (a) Active participation of students as a pre-requisite for change; (b) Different forms of constructivism represent competing and conflicting interpretations of progress in science; (c) Acceptance of the present state of constructivism as a Kuhnian paradigm; (d) Social constructivism as the preferred form of constructivism; (e) Critical appraisal of social constructivism; (f) Despite its popularity, social constructivism does not constitute a Kuhnian paradigm (due to controversies, there is no consensus in the science education community); (g) Contradictions faced by constructivism in science education provide the base for its advance and evolution towards more progressive forms, and hence the need to consider, whither constructivism?

Key words: Constructivism, Science education, Nature of science, Tentative nature of scientific knowledge.

Recent scholars have argued that counseling has begun to embrace social constructivism as a paradigm for counseling. However, this commitment to social constructivist tenets may be both premature and undesirable. This article provides a critique of a dominant branch of social constructivism: radical social constructivism. Three arguments are presented establishing that radical social constructivism leads to logically impossible conclusions, violates counseling’s moral convictions, and denies secure scholarship in related fields.

Key words: radical social constructivism, cognitive constructionism, philosophy