Today, digital media saturate all domains of society. However, what are the consequences of such changing media environments to the construction of social reality? This paper aims at offering a conceptual approach which might be used to answer this question in the light of social constructivism. Our starting point is a discussion of the need for an advancement of constructivist thinking in Media and Communication studies. Drawing on the results of mediatization research, we show that the changes within the media environment have different consequences to each of the social domains. In light of this, a conceptual approach is needed that focuses on the meso level; particularly on issues of collectivity and organizations. In a further step, the main trends of a changing media environment are outlined and discussed with respect to their potential consequences to the construction of social reality. Finally, we introduce the approach of ‘communicative figurations’ in order to investigating these consequences. Hence, the transforming media-related construction of social reality can now be reconstructed empirically as well as theoretically on the meso level.

Key words: Media change, mediatization, social constructivism, figuration, media environment

Outlines the basic principles of constructivist theory and discusses the limitations of the theory in terms of providing worthwhile science education. Advocates a shift from personal constructivism to social constructivism.

This article contrasts the positivist epistemology of modern thought with the social constructivism of postmodern thought. It makes a thorough analysis of the four myths on which positivist epistemology has its basis: the myth of knowledge as representation, the myth of the object, the myth of reality and the myth of truth. It concludes suggesting applications of the new constructivist epistemology for psychology.

In this paper our main objective is to interpret the major concepts in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics, in particular, language games and forms of life, from a social constructivist point of view in an attempt to show that this philosophy is still very relevant in the way mathematics is being taught and practiced today. We start out with a brief discussion of radical constructivism followed by a rudimentary analysis of the basic tenets of social constructivism, the final blow against absolutism – the soulless landmark of mathematics as often construed by the uninitiated. We observe that, the social constructivist epistemology of mathematics reinstates mathematics, and rightfully so, as “…a branch of knowledge which is indissolubly connected with other knowledge, through the web of language” (Ernest 1999), and portrays mathematical knowledge as a process that should be considered in conjunction with its historical origins and within a social context. Consequently, like any other form of knowledge based on human opinion or judgment, mathematical knowledge has the possibility of losing its truth or necessity, as well. In the third section we discuss the main points expounded in Wittgenstein’s two books, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations, as well as in his “middle period” that is characterized by such works as Philosophical Remarks, Philosophical Grammar, and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. We then briefly introduce the two main concepts in Wittgenstein’s philosophy that will be used in this paper: forms of life and language games. In the fifth and final section, we emphasize the connections between social constructivism and Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics. Indeed, we argue that the apparent certainty and objectivity of mathematical knowledge, to paraphrase Ernest (Ernest 1998), rest on natural language. Moreover, mathematical symbolism is a refinement and extension of written language: the rules of logic which permeate the use of natural language afford the foundation upon which the objectivity of mathematics rests. Mathematical truths arise from the definitional truths of natural language, and are acquired by social interaction. Mathematical certainty rests on socially accepted rules of discourse embedded in our forms of life, a concept introduced by Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein, 1956). We argue that the social constructivist epistemology draws on Wittgenstein’s (1956) account of mathematical certainty as based on linguistic rules of use and forms of life, and Lakatos’ (1976) account of the social negotiation of mathematical concepts, results, and theories.

Key words: radical constructivism, social constructivism, forms of life, language games

Purpose: Autopoiesis has been applied to many different fields. One area, however, where little work has been done is the application of autopoietic theory to knowledge management. The paper aims to provide a direct comparison between the theory of autopoiesis with aspects of knowledge management, specifically social constructivism. Design/methodology/approach – The theory of autopoiesis was broken down into easily comparable sections. The theory of social constructivism in relation to knowledge management was then described, followed by a comparison of the two. Findings: Strong correlations were discovered between autopoiesis and knowledge management, specifically that the cyclical nature of organisational learning and its ability to self‐reproduce the components of its system suggest that it is in some respect an autopoietic entity. However, serious flaws between the two approaches were discovered also. Originality/value – This paper is the first in‐depth application of autopoiesis to knowledge management and the study of organisations.

Context: Few professional philosophers have addressed in any detail radical constructivism, but have focused instead on the related assumptions and limitations of postmodern epistemology, various anti-realisms, and subjective relativism. Problem: In an attempt to supply a philosophical answer to the guest editors’ question, “Why isn’t everyone a radical constructivist?” I address the realist (hence non-radical) implications of the theory’s invocation of “others” as an invariable, observer-independent, “external” constraint. Results: I argue that constructivists cannot consistently defend a radically subjectivist theory of knowing while remaining entirely agnostic about the nature and existence of the larger world (including independent others). That is, any non-solipsistic account of human experience must explicitly acknowledge its extra-subjective, ontological dimension. Implications: It follows that no pedagogical, social, philosophical, or commonsensical insight associated with so-called “trivial” or “social” constructivism survives or receives any support from the move to radical constructivism.

Key words: Ernst von Glasersfeld, solipsism, fictional posits, ontological agnosticism, others, subjects, observer-independence

Building on methodical constructivism and based on the distinction between (1) trans-subjectively founded (objective) reality, merely intersubjectively agreed (social) reality and subjective reality in the narrow sense, and (2) between (well-founded) facts, possible facts, fictitious facts and simulated facts the maintainability of the social–constructivist view is examined, according to which every representation of reality only offers a distorted image of reality, so that all representations of reality stand side by side on an equal footing. The fact that socially constructed reality is necessarily selective and therefore an interpreted (meaningful) reality is not questioned, but the conclusions that social constructivism draws from it are: (1) The concept of an “external reality” and its “representation” cannot be sustained. (2) In contrast to facts, which can be verified trans-subjectively, meanings lack a trans-subjective basis. Hence statements about the meaning of a fact are neither true nor false. (3) Nevertheless, not every meaningful construction of reality can raise the same claim to validity. (4) At least “alternative facts” can be identified as such. (5) Truth vs. falsehood of alleged facts is not the only criterion by which a construction of reality can be measured. (6) Although the discourse about meanings cannot be a discourse about whether they are true or false, constructions of reality can nonetheless be questioned for their appropriateness. And depending on what we orient our actions towards, they can prove to be appropriate or inappropriate.

Key words: methodical constructivism, facts and meanings, objective reality, social reality, subjective reality.

In this essay, I provide normative guidelines for developing a philosophically interesting and plausible version of social constructivism as a philosophy of science, wherein science aims for social-epistemic values rather than for truth or empirical adequacy. This view is more plausible than the more radical constructivist claim that scientific facts are constructed. It is also more interesting than the modest constructivist claim that representations of such facts emerge in social contexts, as it provides a genuine rival to the scientific axiologies of scientific realists and constructive empiricists. I further contrast my view with positions holding that the aims of science are context dependent, that the unit of normative analysis is the scientific community, and that the aims of science are non-epistemic social values.

Key words: Social construction, scientific realism, values, aims

Purpose: This paper aims to examine Socratic dialogue in asynchronous online discussions in relation to constructivism. The links between theory and practice in teaching are to be discussed whilst tracing the origins of Socratic dialogue and recent trends and use of seminar in research based institutions. Design/methodology/approach – Many online degree courses employ asynchronous discussions where the teacher, acting as a moderator, is seen as the guide on the side rather than the sage on the stage. Such an approach, employing collaborative learning, is often described as constructivist. Practitioners may see the term constructivist as simply a convenient label to describe a range of effective teaching practices. Even when it is said that knowledge is constructed, this may be viewed as little more than a metaphor. There are however, behind these labels, epistemological theories such as radical constructivism and social constructivism which pose serious challenges to traditional views that perception is guided by contact with an independent reality and that science involves a search for objective truth. Many significant philosophical objections can be raised against these theories. The links between the theory and teaching practices of proven value are tenuous. There is an alternative explanation of the origins of teaching practices associated with asynchronous discussions. Findings: Asynchronous discussion makes it possible for all students to make an initial written contribution based on both research and industry experience, as well as an extensive participation in a written debate. The relative ease of assessing contributions to a written debate helps overcome the problem of the seminar where only one person may get credit for his or her contribution. Contributions can to a great extent be made when it is convenient for both moderator and students. Research limitations/implications – The present study has considered the case of one institution; it will be useful to examine it for many. Practical implications: Asynchronous online discussion is one of the highest forms of Socratic dialogue. Originality/value – This is a different approach to the traditional belief and new ideas for consideration are presented. The Socratic dialogue has been developed as both an oral and written tradition from the works of authors like Plato, through to the development of the medieval university with its disputations and oral examinations, the introduction of seminars in research based universities inspired by Humboldt, the development of scholarly journals, and on to the asynchronous online discussions in the era of the Web.

Key words: Socratic dialogue, Asynchronous, Online discussions, Constructivism, Philosophical concepts, Higher education, Teaching methods

For some years, social constructivism has been confronted with a range of basic caveats and objections. From the point of view of the critics, the concept of a “social construction of reality” has proved to be an unattractive variation of anti-realism that acknowledges the right of social things to exist, but does so at the price of denying non-social entities the right to their own reality. This article attempts to rebut this line of criticism. Using the example of the sociology of scientific knowledge, it argues that social constructivism follows an empirical research program that pursues the question as to which interpretations of reality achieve social commitment. The paper argues, with regard to considerations of neo-pragmatism and analytical language philosophy, that the social constructivist sociology of science takes a theoretical position that maintains distance from the premises of both realism and anti-realism even though many of its advocates have opted explicitly for one of the two sides.