Over the previous two decades the emergence of post-modernist thought (i.e., radical constructivism, social constructivism, deconstructivsm, post-structuralism, and the like) on the American intellectual landscape has presented a number of challenges to various fields of intellectual endeavor (i.e., literature, natural science, and social science) (Matthews, 1998; in press). Nowhere is this challenge more evident and therefore more problematic than in the application of post-modernism (in the form of constructivist teaching) to the classroom. Employing constructivist teaching practices is problematic at two levels: (1) there is an absence of empirical evidence of effectiveness; and (2) employing this approach for which there is a lack of evidential support, means not employing instructional practices for which there is empirical support. The purpose of this article is to present an overview and critique of constructivist teaching practices, followed by a brief review of evidenced-based practices in teaching.

This article provides a summary of developments in the history of science informed by social constructivist perspectives since the 1970s. It discusses key influential texts and highlights historical themes of particular importance such as the understanding of science as local culture, the material culture of experiment, science and performance, and science and labor. The article also emphasizes the constructivist understanding of science as a species of skilled practice and the ways in which such accounts draw attention to the importance of understanding the circulation of skills in the development and consolidation of new knowledge.

Key words: experiment, history of science, laboratories, local cultures, popular culture, scientific audiences, scientific communication, scientific performances, scientific practice, skill, social constructivism

Constructivism in science education has been the subject of considerable debate in the science education literature. The purpose of this study was to facilitate chemistry teachers’ understanding that the tentative nature of scientific knowledge leads to the coexistence and rivalries among different forms of constructivism in science education. The study is based on 17 in-service teachers who had registered for a 11-week course on ‘Epistemology of Science Teaching’ as part of their Master’s degree program. The course is based on 17 readings drawing on nature of science and a critical evaluation of constructivism. Course activities included written reports, classroom discussions based on participants’ presentations and written exams. Based on the results obtained, it is plausible to suggest that participant teachers experienced the following transitions leading to greater understanding, as they acquired experience with respect to constructivism: (a) Active participation of students as a pre-requisite for change; (b) Different forms of constructivism represent competing and conflicting interpretations of progress in science; (c) Acceptance of the present state of constructivism as a Kuhnian paradigm; (d) Social constructivism as the preferred form of constructivism; (e) Critical appraisal of social constructivism; (f) Despite its popularity, social constructivism does not constitute a Kuhnian paradigm (due to controversies, there is no consensus in the science education community); (g) Contradictions faced by constructivism in science education provide the base for its advance and evolution towards more progressive forms, and hence the need to consider, whither constructivism?

Key words: Constructivism, Science education, Nature of science, Tentative nature of scientific knowledge.

Recent scholars have argued that counseling has begun to embrace social constructivism as a paradigm for counseling. However, this commitment to social constructivist tenets may be both premature and undesirable. This article provides a critique of a dominant branch of social constructivism: radical social constructivism. Three arguments are presented establishing that radical social constructivism leads to logically impossible conclusions, violates counseling’s moral convictions, and denies secure scholarship in related fields.

Key words: radical social constructivism, cognitive constructionism, philosophy

Excerpt: It is not the purpose of this contribution to assess the epistemological monoor interdisciplinary implications that reconceptualizations revolving around theories of self-organization may bring with them, nor to pursue the question under what social and cognitive conditions concepts gain acceptability in fields that are otherwise literally “worlds apart.” Other contributions in this volume provide at least partial answers. Rather, I want to address a theory of self-organization of science, such as it has been proposed by Krohn and Küppers in this volume, in the context of historical developments as well as in a contemporary, comparative perspective: (i) where does such a theory stand with regard to the oppositionary dualism that has characterized the sociology of knowledge, separating “social constructions” from “scientific facts,” but also “the social” from “nature” or “objects” (things, technological artifacts) and (ii) compare it with another constructivist approach whose foremost and outspoken proponent is Bruno Latour. My thesis is that much of sociology of science and also of sociology of knowledge is heir to a general predicament of social science when it comes to conceptualizing and accessing the world of “nature” and its objects as well as those of the material world, notably in the form of technology, and that social constructivism has to be seen as a rather limited case of constructivism. While a theory of science based upon principles of self-organization does not entirely escape the traps of previous theories of science, notably either wanting to be a meta-theory or of being based upon a notion of science modelled after the leading discipline of the day, it offers a wider range for including other empirical as well as theoretical accounts, with some interesting points of convergence with alternative approaches.

The world, as we perceive it, is our own invention, so we always invent and never discover realities. This main thesis is grounded on neurophysiological research. But how radical then is FOERSTER’s constructivism “really”? Is it not also an empirical as well as a social constructivism plus some realism in it, too? And what shall we do with such academic questions if “the way in which a question is asked determines the way in which an answer may be found”? The physicist and philosopher Heinz von FOERSTER and the journalist and communication scientist Bernhard PÖRKSEN talk about the sensual perception of human beings and the borders of our capacity for knowledge, communication and understanding. They debate about truth, objectivity and responsibility and discuss the connections between knowledge, ethics and practice. I have been enriched of some of the aphorisms, anecdotes and aporias, still, I am not able to answer the questions asked above conclusively. The book is interesting for people who love sophistic conversations, but it is not very helpful for qualitative social research. URN: urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs050330

Key words: constructivism, dialogue, labeling, communication, hermeneutics, culture, truth, objectivity, responsibility

Reviewed Work: Wahrheit ist die Erfindung eines Lügners. Gespräche für Skeptiker (6. Aufl.) by Heinz v. Foerster, Bernhard Pörksen. The world, as we perceive it, is our own invention, so we always invent and never discover realities. This main thesis is grounded on neurophysiological research. But how radical then is FOERSTER’s constructivism „really“? Is it not also an empirical as well as a social constructivism plus some realism in it, too? And what shall we do with such academic questions if „the way in which a question is asked determines the way in which an answer may be found“? The physicist and philosopher Heinz von FOERSTER and the journalist and communication scientist Bernhard PÖRKSEN talk about the sensual perception of human beings and the borders of our capacity for knowledge, communication and understanding. They debate about truth, objectivity and responsibility and discuss the connections between knowledge, ethics and practice. I have been enriched of some of the aphorisms, anecdotes and aporias, still, I am not able to answer the questions asked above conclusively. The book is interesting for people who love sophistic conversions, but it is not very helpful for qualitative social research.

Catherine Fosnot’s labeling of my essay (O’Loughlin, 1992a) as “nihilistic, culturally relative, and dangerous” is rancorous and perplexing. Her characterization of my research on Piaget as meager, erroneous, and flawed is amusing, considering her stance as an avowed constructivist, and her argument for a rapprochement between her kind of cognitive constructivism and the social constructivism she attributes to me is mystifying considering the lambasting she gives my position. I stand by my original text. It depicts my attempt to weave together a story from diverse sources-and emphatically not from the single source Fosnot alleges-that articulates my concerns about the limitations of Piagetian forms of constructivism as the basis for a pedagogy that might enable diverse learners to gain ownership over scientific discourse and allow them to construct a critical understanding of the role of science in our society. My text is open to multiple interpretations and Fosnot is entitled to hers. However, she does a disservice by not laying bare the interpretive frameworks and interests on which her critique is based. Clues to her stance are to be found in her response, however, and I will use the brief space available to me to identify some of these so readers can draw their own conclusions about the relevance of her critique.

An effective classroom, where teachers and students are communicating optimally, is dependent on using constructivist strategies, tools and practices. There are two major types of constructivism in the classroom: (1) Cognitive or individual constructivism depending on Piaget’s theory, and (2) Social constructivism depending on Vygotsky’s theory. Similarities include inquiry teaching methods and students creating concepts built on existing knowledge that are relevant and meaningful. Differences include language development theory where thinking precedes language for cognitive constructivism and language precedes thinking for the theory of social constructivism. Understanding communicative tools and strategies helps teachers to develop individual learning methods such as, discovery learning, and social interactive activities to develop peer collaboration.

At present, social constructivists agree on little more than the important assumption that knowledge is a social product. Beyond this, there is little agreement about proems. Different viewpoints about what it means to negotiate meaning and what the object of that negotiation ought to be (i.e., strategies/skills versus big ideas) reflect different assumptions about learning and the nature of truth. We examine these assumptions by contrasting three underlying world views: mechanistic-information processing, organismic-radical constructivism, and Deweyan contextualism or transactional realism. This third world view, we argue, is most consistent with idea-based social constructivism.