This paper aims to point out some important theoretical innovations of the theory of Communicative Constructivism, and seeks to show the benefits of using this concept as a basis of the work in Communication and Media Studies. I start by reviewing the impact-oriented concept of communication, which underlies the Communicative Constructivism. Then, in working through Social Constructivism, I demonstrate why the Communicative Constructivism switches from language and knowledge to communicative action as the basic operation of generating knowledge. In conclusion, I examine the production and interpretation of television programmes in an exemplary manner, and will highlight the advantages of understanding these as artefacts, as communicative gestures of a corporated actor.

Key words: Communicative constructivism, social constructivism, corporated actor, impact-oriented concept of communicative acting

For a realist, nature embodies the ultimate arbiter, while for social constructivists nature is the projection of social interests. In this paper, the highly ambiguous term “nature” is discussed from yet another position, i.e., radical constructivism. It is argued that this position is incompatible with realism and, for reasons of consistency, also with social constructivism. Furthermore, from an ethical perspective, the radical constructivist conception of nature shifts responsibility further away from God, nature, and society to the individual. Relevance: The paper deals with questions such as: Is there a third reconciliatory position that takes the idea of reality construction seriously but “does not rob us of our ability to speak some degree of truth."

Context: Ernst von Glasersfeld introduced radical constructivism in 1974 as a new interpretation of Jean Piaget’s constructivism to give new meanings to the notions of knowledge, communication, and reality. He also claimed that RC would affect traditional theories of education. Problem: After 40 years it has become necessary to review and evaluate von Glasersfeld’s claim. Also, has RC been successful in taking the “social turn” in educational research, or is it unable to go beyond “private worlds? Method: We provide an overview of contributed articles that were written with the aim of showing whether RC has an impact on educational research, and we discuss three core issues: Can RC account for inter-individual aspects? Is RC a theory of learning? And should Piaget be regarded as a radical constructivist? Results: We argue that the contributed papers demonstrate the efficiency of the application of RC to educational research and practice. Our argumentation also shows that in RC it would be misleading to claim a dichotomy between cognition and social interaction (rather, social constructivism is a radical constructivism), that RC does not contain a theory of mathematics learning any more or less than it contains a theory of mathematics teaching, and that Piaget should not be considered a mere trivial constructivist. Implications: Still one of the most challenging influences on educational research and practice, RC is ready to embark on many further questions, including its relationship with other constructivist paradigms, and to make progress in the social dimension.

Key words: Educational research, social aspects of learning, theory of learning, theory of teaching, Ernst von Glasersfeld, Jean Piaget

Context: Despite the best efforts of postmodern, social constructivist scholars to discredit the notion that “realistic” works of theatre and film could contain genuine onto-epistemic goods, many lay observers (i.e., audiences) continue to describe individual performances and productions as more or less “truthful” than one another. Recently, some performance scholars have pushed back against the postmodern position and turned to contemporary cognitive science to undergird their insistence that the embodied nature of reception and perception does, in fact, allow audiences of such works to access “truths” within them. The literature of cybernetics (first- or second-order) has been almost entirely absent from the debate. Problem: While the hardcore scepticism of social constructivism may be unsatisfactory in fully accounting for the enduring power and appeal of dramatic art, a retreat to epistemic certainty in the name of cognitive science would be equally unwise. This article proposes the notion of “eigenbehavior” as a conceptual bridge that might facilitate the synthesis of the most useful insights from both perspectives and open up new avenues of study and research. Method: The article uses synthetic argumentation to propose a theory of eigenform within the context of theatrical performance. Results: Emerging from this argumentation is a conception of eigenform that is novel in its emphasis on the distinction between its bio-structured and socio-structured features. Implications: The insights in this article will be of value to scholars and practitioners of the dramatic arts and can be productively extended into cognate domains across the humanities. Constructivist content: The article draws on the works of constructivists such as von Glasersfeld, von Foerster, Maturana, Varela, and Luhmann and is grounded in such constructivist perspectives as cybersemiotics, theory of autopoiesis, and systems theory. Key Words: Social systems, semiotics, language, acting, culture, ethics.

Our task is to study comparisons and contrasts between social constructionism, radical constructivism, information processing constructivism, cybernetic system s, socio-cultural developmental approaches, and social constructivism.

Excerpt: The dispute concerning Social Constructivism has emerged from being an isolated and esoteric epistemological debate among relatively few academic scholars to being a notorious and widespread public scandal. Challenges to traditional conceptions of science which severely polarized philosophers, historians and sociologists have erupted into heated public disputes – the so-called Science Wars. The issues at stake concern the most fundamental questions about the nature of science, and inevitably these controversies have become prominent among educators where a variety of constructivist doctrines have become entangled.

Excerpt: Let me start with some clarifications concerning the subject of my contribution. Luckmann himself rejected the label of “social constructivism,” but he did not succeed. Thus, I follow the common usage and will address the approach of Berger and Luckmann using this term. Also, the label of “radical constructivism” denotes much more than solely Luhmann’s theory of autopoietic systems, but in this chapter I will concentrate on this variant of radical constructivist theory. I will compare these two approaches not just because they both conceive of the construction of reality as a process of self-production of society. More interesting is the fact that both concepts are built on the same philosophical ground, namely on Husserl’s theory of consciousness, and that, despite their common ground, both theories reach quite contradictory results even though they share a series of corresponding presumptions.

Critics praise applications of constructivism in science pedagogy, but they argue that constructivism is severely impaired and hopelessly flawed as a theory. Flawed theory should not be employed to explain innovative practice. My purposes are twofold. First and foremost, I present a case to support my own and others’ assertions that constructivism is a sound theory with which to explain the practice of science and science pedagogy. In accomplishing my primary purpose, I also fulfill my secondary purpose, to respond to constructivism’s critics. My argument is presented in three parts. In Part 1, I delineate the epistemological ground with a brief synopsis of the purpose, nature, and orientation of radical and social constructivism. I then offer a synthesis of their foundations. In Part 2, I offer a constructivist account of five long-standing epistemological issues, including truth, solipsism, experience, instrumentalism, and relativity. Truth is the center piece of the argument, and I show how constructivism avoids the root paradox by embracing truth as coherence. Next, constructivism is shown to be a rejection of solipsism. Then, an account of experience based in neurophysiological theory, emergent properties, and the brain as a parallel data-processing organ is provided to support constructivism’s inside-out view of experience, in which meaning making occurs within individual minds and in communities of individuals. In the final segment of Part 2, I present a constructivist account of relativity which focuses on physicists’ acceptance of relativity, its translation to constructivist epistemology, and constructivists’ request for silence regarding ontology. Response to critics’ objections are also presented at appropriate points throughout Part 2. In the third part, I present constructivism as an epistemological foundation for a cybernetic perspective of knowing. I then summarize the value of constructivism in explaining and interpreting the practice of science and science pedagogy.

The caption that I have chosen for my discussion of the papers by Peter Renshaw and Paul Cobb is particularly relevant because it encapsulates much of what I want to say. Both authors emphasize that socio-cultural theory, whatever its form, has come to the fore in early childhood mathematics education. Renshaw provides an excellent overview of Vygotsky’s socio-cultural theory and how it has influenced mathematics education at the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences in Moscow, and Cobb provides an equally insightful comparison and contrast of Soviet Activity Theory and social constructivism. Rather than attempt to carry on with comparing and contrasting the two theories, my goal is to bring Piaget’s genetic epistemology squarely into sociocultural theory and to explore the consequences of doing so. Piaget based his genetic epistemology on interaction as a hard core principle, so in my view it is unnecessary to keep genetic epistemology and sociocultural theory separate as we create our visions of what early childhood mathematics might be like. In fact, I believe that including Piaget’s genetic epistemology in sociocultural theory is especially important in the context of early childhood mathematics education.

Purpose: One of my goals in the paper is to investigate why realists reject radical constructivism (RC) as well as social constructivism (SC) out of hand. I shall do this by means of commenting on Peter Slezak’s critical paper, Radical Constructivism: Epistemology, Education and Dynamite. My other goal is to explore why realists condemn the use of RC and SC in science and mathematics education for no stated reason, again by means of commenting on Slezak’s paper. Method: I restrict my comments to Slezak’s paper and leave it to the reader to judge which, if any, of the reasons that I advance for these two states of affairs are not specific to Slezak’s paper. Other readers might not agree with my interpretations of Slezak’s paper, including Slezak himself, but I offer them after having worked with von Glasersfeld in interdisciplinary research in mathematics education for over 25 years. Findings: My findings are that Slezak: (1) rejects RC and SC on the basis of unjustified criticisms, (2) does not explore basic tenets of RC nor of SC beyond the unjustified criticisms, (3) rejects how SC and RC have been used in science and mathematics education, based at least in part on the unjustified criticisms, (3) dislikes how SC has been used in science and mathematics education, a dislike that fuels his rejection of any constructivism, and (4) doesn’t explore how RC has been used in scientific investigations in mathematics education. On the basis of these findings, I conclude that how epistemological models of knowing might be used in science or mathematics education would be better left to the educators who use them in interdisciplinary work.

Key words: idealism, experiential reality, constraints, interaction, adaptation, first-order models, second-order models, scheme, self-reflexivity